

Douglas Selvage and Christopher Nehring

## **The AIDS Conspiracy**

The Ministry for State Security and the  
AIDS Disinformation Campaign  
of the KGB

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We would like to extend our special thanks to Professor Erhard Geißler for his insights, advice, willingness to engage in dialogue, and meticulous research. Although we sometimes reached different conclusions than he did, we hold him in particularly high regard for his challenge of conventional wisdom and his struggle in the GDR and after reunification to uncover the truth about the origins of HIV/AIDS. We would also like to thank our colleague Georg Herbstritt from the Department of Education and Research

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<sup>1</sup> For information on the Bulgarian Commission and its archives, see Schiller–Dickhut, Reiner; Rosenthal, Bert (eds.): *The “European Network of Authorities Responsible for Secret Police Files.” A Reader on Their Legal Foundations, Structures, and Tasks.* Berlin 2010, pp. 6–17.

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Despite the generous assistance we received from others in preparing this study, we alone are responsible for its scholarly content.

# 1 Preliminary Note on Sources, Terminology, and Structures

The Soviet Union's AIDS disinformation campaign, launched in the mid-1980s, has been and remains the focus of an ongoing debate. Controversies in the discussion center on the role of the KGB, the Stasi (MfS), and the Stasi's Main Administration A (HV A), which was responsible for foreign intelligence. These controversies stem from the unsatisfactory state of the sources, but also arise from differing interpretations of terms such as "conspiracy theory" or misunderstandings regarding the content of "Chekist" technical terms and, consequently, the activities of the KGB or MfS. There is also a certain lack of knowledge regarding the structures and mechanisms of foreign propaganda in the Eastern Bloc states relevant here. To reduce existing misunderstandings and avoid creating new ones, the authors of this study aim to describe the source situation, clarify terminology, and outline the structures of foreign propaganda in former Eastern Bloc countries.

## Source Material

In 1992, the head of Russian intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov, admitted that the KGB was behind the international disinformation campaign that traced the origin of the HIV virus to a U.S. military research laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland.<sup>2</sup> However, he said nothing about a supporting role played by the MfS or the HV A in the campaign, nor about any connection between the KGB and the scientist couple Jakob and Lilli Segal. Both were Soviet citizens and residents of the GDR who had authored a scientific study supporting the Fort Detrick theory and were frequently cited in Soviet propaganda. Further research into the disinformation campaign has been hampered by the fact that, with few exceptions, the files of the former KGB in the archives of its successor organizations remain closed to external researchers.

In the same year, 1992, former HV A officers Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer claimed that the HV A's disinformation unit, the HV A/X, had been behind the drafting and dissemination of the Segal study. The whole affair had been one of their "active measures,"

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<sup>2</sup> KGB planted story tying US to AIDS, Russian says. In: The Boston Globe March 19, 1992, p. 1.

which she allegedly carried out at the request of the KGB n.<sup>3</sup> However, her claim was difficult to substantiate with archival evidence, since most of the files of the former HV A were either destroyed<sup>4</sup> or removed<sup>5</sup> and are therefore not part of the BStU's archival holdings. The claims of the former Stasi officers were not only taken up by the German press, but also in 2009 by historian Thomas Boghardt in an essay for the journal of the "Center for the Study of Intelligence" at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He substantiated his thesis that the HV A had played a central role in the disinformation campaign primarily with statements by Bohnsack—drawn from his publications, from remarks made by to third-party authors, and from private correspondence with Boghardt.<sup>6</sup>

Based on in-depth research into the files of the former ruling party, the SED, the East German Ministry of Health, and units of the Stasi in the BStU archives, molecular biologist and bioethicist Erhard Geißler concluded, however, that J. Segal's "propaganda poster \* d-zug\*" was "by no means" a disinformation campaign by the Stasi.<sup>7</sup> There is no evidence in the BStU archives that HV A played a role in the

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<sup>3</sup> Bohnsack, Günter; Brehmer, Herbert: *Mission: Deception. How the Stasi Shaped Politics in the West.* Hamburg 1992, p. 219 ff.

<sup>4</sup> In February 1990, the Working Group on Security of the Central Round Table, which included members of the East German opposition and former East German officials, approved the self-dissolution of the HV A. As part of this process, the HV A was permitted to destroy its own archives. Knabe, Hubertus: *West-Arbeit des MfS: Das Zusammenspiel von »Aufklärung« und »Abwehr«.* Berlin 1999, p. 133.

<sup>5</sup> Based on records from the Polish secret police held in the archives of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN), Polish scholars claim that in 1990, files from the HV A archives were transported to the Soviet Union in railway containers. See, for example, Cenckiewicz, Sławomir: "W kontenerach do Moskwy... [In Containers to Moscow]." In: Cenckiewicz, Sławomir (ed.): *Śladami Bezpieki i Partii: Studia – Źródła – Publicystyka* [Traces of the State Security Service and the Party: Studies – Sources – Journalism]. Łomianki 2009, pp. 589–600.

<sup>6</sup> Boghardt, Thomas: *Operation INFEKTION. Soviet bloc intelligence and its AIDS disinformation campaign.* In: *Studies in Intelligence* 53 (2009) 4, pp. 1–24. In his work, Boghardt also cites individual documents from the SED collection held at the Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR at the Federal Archives, but does not cite any Stasi files.

<sup>7</sup> Geißler, Erhard: "Better AIDS than nothing from the West!" *How the Party and State Leadership of the GDR Dealt with the AIDS Problem.* In: *Journal of the Research Network on the SED State* 22 (2007), pp. 91–116, here 108–114.

played a role in the creation or dissemination of the various versions of the Segal hypothesis.<sup>8</sup> In the archives of the BStU, Geißler found important sources in the holdings of other Stasi units regarding the SED government's AIDS policy, as well as sources concerning the activities of Jakob and Lilli Segal and the negative reaction of most East German experts to the Segal AIDS hypothesis. Based on these sources, he concluded that the MfS did not learn of Segal's thesis until September 1986 e.<sup>9</sup> However, Geißler did not reflect—or at least not visibly—on the fact that the HV A archive holdings, which shed light on HV A activities, are effectively unavailable for research. The lack of evidence of any influence by the HV A does not, in this respect, constitute proof of its inaction, but is primarily due to the current state of the sources. Against this background, any findings regarding the influence or lack thereof of the MfS on the Segals and their research must be evaluated.

However, the authors of this study have identified new documents regarding the KGB's disinformation campaign and the accompanying role of the HV A in the archives of the former Bulgarian Security and Intelligence Services (AKRDOPBGDSRSBNA or COMDOS-A) in Sofia and, thanks to inferences drawn from these files, also in the archives of the BStU in Berlin. Use was also made of the former HV A database (SIRA: HV A Information Research System)<sup>10</sup> and the (partial) HV A index card "Rosenholz"<sup>11</sup>, two sources that have been

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>9</sup> Geißler, Erhard; Sprinkle, Robert Hunt: Disinformation squared: Was the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth a Stasi success? In: *Politics and the Life Sciences* 32 (2013) 2, pp. 3–99, here 45.

<sup>10</sup> A detailed description of the SIRA database can be found online at [http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/HVA-Sira/hva-sira\\_node.html](http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/HVA-Sira/hva-sira_node.html). The database was largely reconstructed by the end of 1998 and has been available to researchers ever since. The reconstruction process continued in the following years. See also Konopatzky, Stephan: Possibilities and Limitations of the SIRA Databases. The Examples of Günter Guillaume and Werner Stiller. In: Herbstritt, Georg; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut (eds.): *Facing the West ... GDR Espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bremen 2003, pp. 112–132. For a summary overview of SIRA, see Herbstritt, Georg: *West German Citizens in the Service of GDR Espionage. An Analytical Study*. Göttingen 2007, pp. 54–64.

<sup>11</sup> On Rosenholz, see Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: "Rosenholz." *A Critical Analysis of Sources*. Berlin 2007. (BF Informiert; 28), p. 52; [http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/Rosenholz/rosenholzbericht2007\\_pdf.pdf](http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/Rosenholz/rosenholzbericht2007_pdf.pdf).

are not mentioned in connection with this topic. A portion of an IM file pertaining to one of the Segals' employees ("Nils") was also located. These new sources, together with the findings in SIRA and Rosenholz, demonstrate how many HVA files regarding the AIDS disinformation campaign and its presence in the Segals' circle were destroyed or removed—including the files on the "Denver" operation, the "Vorwärts II" operation, the "Wind" security operation "Wind," the operational surveillance operation "Diagnosis," and HVA informants in the Segals' circle—"Nils," "Joachim," and "Jörg." In addition, there are a few transcripts of conversations between the HV A and the KGB in the BStU archives, though unfortunately none on the subject of this study. Should the relevant KGB files on the AIDS disinformation campaign and on transcripts of conversations with the HV A and the HV A/X survive, they could one day provide further important information on the subject of this investigation.

Terms: Conspiracy and conspiracy theory

In her book *The AIDS Conspiracy: Science Fights Back*, economist and AIDS activist Nicoli Natrass writes of a "real conspiracy" between the Soviet secret service, the KGB, and Department A of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR, which was responsible for espionage. They allegedly devised a plan to spread the theory that the HIV virus responsible for AIDS had been artificially developed in a U.S. military research laboratory in Fort Detrick i.<sup>12</sup>

The East German molecular biologist Erhard Geißler agrees with Natrass insofar as he considers the claim that HIV was developed as a biological weapon to be a conspiracy theory. However, unlike the authors of the present study, he finds no convincing evidence that the HV A was involved in the KGB's activities to formulate and disseminate this conspiracy theory. Therefore, he concludes, Natrass is spreading a "conspiracy theory about a e conspiracy theory" or a "conspiracy theory squared."<sup>13</sup> The crux of the matter for Geißler is whether the HV A or the MfS generally played a role in the development or dissemination of a specific version of the "HIV as a biological weapon" thesis. This refers to the "Fort-

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<sup>12</sup> Natrass, Nicoli: *The AIDS Conspiracy. Science Fights Back*. New York, 2012, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Geißler, Erhard: *AIDS and Its Pathogens—A Web of Hypotheses, Findings, and Conspiracy Theories*. In: Anton, Andreas (ed.): *Conspiracy: The Sociology of Conspiracy Thinking*. Wiesbaden 2014, pp. 113–128, here 127 and 132.

“Detrick Thesis” of the East German scientist couple Jakob and Lilli Segal, who held Soviet citizenship. Geißler, who risked his career in the 1980s by contradicting the Segal thesis both in the GDR and abroad, is certain that the Segals not only developed their thesis without influence from the HV A and the MfS, but also published and disseminated it without assistance from those agencies. He substantiates his claim with several of his own empirically grounded publications. Natrass, on the other hand, writes of “Soviet-Stasi-Segal misinformation”<sup>14</sup> based on “secondary literature,”<sup>15</sup> without providing archival evidence to support it.

Although the term “conspiracy theory” is controversial, Natrass, Geißler, and the authors of this publication use it in its common sense, that is, with a negative connotation. Accordingly, a “conspiracy theory” is more than a theory about a conspiracy—“a usually secret agreement among a small group of people”—who, through a conspiracy, plan “the achievement of a specific goal.”<sup>16</sup> In what follows, we will use the definition provided by historian Helmut Reinalter:

“The term ‘conspiracy theory’ refers to the attempt to interpret events, conditions, relationships, and developments from the perspective of a conspiracy. This usually involves the purposeful, conspiratorial actions of individuals or groups of individuals. Conspiracy theories construct a simplified model of reality in order to better understand complex relationships; they reduce complexity. Added to this is a normative standard, because the processes characterized as conspiracies are not assessed in a value-neutral manner, but from a normative standpoint. In this sense, conspiracy theories are not based on a diagnosis, but always contain an ideological assessment of events and connections.”<sup>17</sup>

According to this definition, a “conspiracy theory” is not a “theory” in the scientific sense, that is, a “more developed

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<sup>14</sup> Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12), p. 69.

<sup>15</sup> Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 132.

<sup>16</sup> Pfahl-Traughber, Arnim: “Building Blocks” for a Theory on “Conspiracy Theories.” In: Reinalter, Helmut (ed.): Conspiracy Theories, p. 30 ff., here 31. Quoted from: Reinalter, Helmut: The World Conspirators. What They Were Never Supposed to Know. Salzburg 2010, p. 16 f.

<sup>17</sup> Reinalter: The World Conspirators (note 16), p. 7 ff.

“a rationally grounded model [...] regarding a specific set of facts,”<sup>18</sup> but<sup>rather</sup> the exact opposite of that.

Before an event can be proven or dismissed as a conspiracy, the hypothesis must first be raised that the event may have been a conspiracy. What should such a hypothesis or theory be called? Reinalter proposes the terms

“central control or conspiracy hypothesis.” Unlike conspiracy theories, such hypotheses are verifiable or falsifiable, based on concrete evidence, and are abandoned—albeit sometimes reluctantly—by the person who formulated them when sufficient counterevidence is available.<sup>19</sup> According to this definition, Natrass’s claim of secret collaboration between the HV A and the KGB in propagating the “Fort Detrick thesis” is not a conspiracy theory—and certainly not “squared”—but a central control hypothesis. This holds true even if the evidence for it was rather weak until the publication of the work now available here, as Geißler demonstrates on several occasions e.<sup>20</sup>

#### Stasi Terminology: Disinformation and Active Measures

The Stasi’s Political-Operational Dictionary defines “disinformation” as the deliberate dissemination of information that is wholly or partially untrue, through speech, writing, images, or actions, with the aim of steering the enemy’s activities and forces in a direction favorable to the Stasi, or of unsettling or paralyzing those forces.<sup>21</sup> The dissemination of such disinformation, including conspiracy theories about the “enemy” abroad, was only one component of the “active measures” (Russian: *aktivnie meropriyatiya*) undertaken by the HV A, the KGB, and their “sister agencies” (the intelligence services of socialist countries) undertook. The KGB’s internal definition of “active measures” underscored their objectives:

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> For more on the weak evidence, see, e.g., Geißler: *AIDS and Its Pathogens* (note 13), pp. 127–131; Geißler; Sprinkle: *Disinformation Squared* (note 9), pp. 33 ff.; Geißler: “Better AIDS ...” (note 7), pp. 108–114; Geißler, Erhard: *AIDS Conspiracy: Where Did the Virus Really Come From?* In: *einstages*, Spiegel Online, July 20, 2012, <http://einstages.spiegel.de/s/tb/25215/aids-verschwuerung-woher-kam-hiv-wirklich.html>.

<sup>21</sup> Suckut, Siegfried (ed.): *The Dictionary of State Security: Definitions of “Political-Operational Work.”* Berlin 1996, p. 88.

“Agency-operational measures aimed at influencing the foreign policy and internal political situation of target countries in favor of the Soviet Union, the other countries of the socialist community, and the world communist and national liberation movements by weakening the political, military, economic, and ideological position of capitalism and undermine its aggressive plans, thereby creating favorable conditions for the successful implementation of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and ensuring peace and social progress.”<sup>22</sup>

Although the Stasi shared the KGB’s general objectives, in 1979 it defined “active measures” more broadly and with particular regard to their implementation:

“Active measures are aimed at using operational forces, means, and methods to expose, compromise, or disorganize and undermine the enemy or individual enemy forces and institutions; to disseminate progressive ideas and thoughts and to promote progressive groups and movements in the operational area; to influence the development of leadership figures and those individuals who play a special role in shaping public opinion. The use of conspiratorial forces, means, and methods must be carried out in such a way that the starting points, acting persons, and objectives of the active measures are concealed.”<sup>23</sup>

Terms: Multipliers, “unconscious multipliers,” unofficial collaborators with special tasks (IMA), and contact persons

To conceal the “points of origin, persons involved, and objectives of the active measures,” the “sister agencies” selected appropriate “multipliers.” They were to be capable of “triggering and steering political movements, shaping public opinion, or even initiating exposé campaigns.”<sup>24</sup> Using the example of HV A, multipliers can be divided into two broad categories: those who consciously and willingly spread disinformation, and those who do so “unconsciously”

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<sup>22</sup> Mitrokhin, Vasilii: *KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook*. London, Portland 2002, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> Stasi, Informant Directive 2/79, dated December 8, 1979. In: Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: *Informants of the Ministry for State Security. Part 2: Guidelines for Working with Agents, Scouts, and Spies in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Berlin 1998, p. 476.

<sup>24</sup> Müller-Enbergs: *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, Part 2 (note 23)*, p. 226.

“key multipliers” or, somewhat pejoratively, “useful idiots.”<sup>25</sup> Among the multipliers who were knowingly deployed were IMs working for the HV A or other units of the MfS. Among these was a special category of HV A informants, used particularly within HV A/X: unofficial collaborators for special tasks (IMA), who specialized primarily in carrying out “active measures”—including disinformation—(rather than, like most informants, in gathering information). For this “demanding unofficial activity,” the HV A primarily recruited journalists from the GDR or from the “area of operations” (i.e., from the non-socialist world).<sup>26</sup> So-called “contact persons” (KP) of the MfS in the GDR could also serve as knowingly active multipliers. According to the MfS’s definition, these were “trustworthy citizens” of the GDR “who are approached to solve specific tasks” .<sup>27</sup>

In most cases, however, multipliers who were instrumentalized played a central, if not the most important, role—the so-called “unwitting multipliers” or “useful idiots n” already mentioned.<sup>28</sup> The best multipliers for the KGB, the First Chief Directorate (HV A), and the “brother agencies” were—according to the concept of the First Plenum of the KGB—often those contacts in the “operational area” to whom one did not reveal one’s identity as a secret service.<sup>29</sup> The Stasi’s informant directive envisioned the development of “stable

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<sup>25</sup> “Once on Stalinallee.” In: *Der Spiegel*, July 15, 1991, pp. 32–34, here 34. The term “multiplier” is also used by Müller-Enbergs. See Müller-Enbergs: *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, Part 2 (note 23), p. 226.

<sup>26</sup> Müller-Enbergs: *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, Part 2 (note 23), pp. 41 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Directive 1/58 on Working with Unofficial Collaborators in the Territory of the German Democratic Republic, dated October 1, 1958. In: Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: *Unofficial Collaborators of the Ministry for State Security*. Part 1. Berlin 1996, pp. 195–239, here 205. See also Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: *Contact Person*. In: Engelmann, Roger et al. (eds.): *The MfS Lexicon. Terms, Persons, and Structures of the State Security of the GDR*. 2nd ed., Berlin 2012, p. 207.

<sup>28</sup> “Once on Stalinallee.” In: *Der Spiegel*, July 15, 1991, pp. 32–34, here p. 34; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: *Hauptverwaltung A (HV A). Tasks – Structures – Sources*. Berlin 2011, p. 176.

(<sup>29</sup>) *The Art of Planning, Developing, and Implementing AM*, based on a statement by W. Ivanov (Bulgarian), January 1985. In: Kiryakova, Tatiana; Angelova, Nadezhda Angelova (eds.): *KGB and DS – Connections and Dependencies*, CD edition. Sofia 2010, pp. 1514–1519, here 1517. Available online: <http://AKRDOPBGDSRSBNA-R.bg/media/KGB-disk.pdf>. Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov was head of “Service A,” the department responsible for disinformation within the First Directorate of the

KGB. See also D. Stankov, On-

“connections” to such Communist Parties for active measures, without recruiting them as informants, because this was “not possible, expedient, or necessary for political, operational, or other reasons.”<sup>30</sup>

Among the “unwitting multipliers” who allowed themselves to be used as instruments of Eastern disinformation were not only members of the Communist Party. There were also individuals who, without any direct influence from Eastern intelligence services, spread their disinformation narratives. They believed in these narratives and therefore repeated them in a way that garnered public attention, or—in the case of foreign journalists and media—reported “objectively” on the disinformation narratives without clearly refuting them. Such cases were recorded as successes by the departments for active measures (AM), precisely because they were not deployed in a targeted manner. It was the stated goal of active measures that a disinformation narrative take on a life of its own and continue to spread without the aid of intelligence services.

### Structures of Foreign Propaganda

In foreign propaganda, the Eastern secret services did not act alone. They were not only networked under the leadership of the KGB; they were also directed by the ruling communist parties of their respective countries under the guidance of the CPSU. The disinformation or “black propaganda” of the secret services had to be coordinated with the open, “white propaganda” of the ruling parties.

While the ideology departments of the Central Committees (CC) of the ruling communist parties bore primary responsibility for ideological education, including the propagation of enemy stereotypes domestically, the International Departments (ID) of the CCs took the lead in disseminating propaganda abroad. The IA of the CC of the CPSU set the general line for foreign propaganda. This line was then put into practice in the realm of “white propaganda”—that is, through supposedly objective (albeit ideologically distorted) reporting with citations—by state news agencies and the state press. The IA’s line also served as a guide for the KGB when conducting “black” propaganda abroad or domestically

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Report on the discussions with Department “A” of the First Directorate of the KGB in Moscow from October 25–28, 1988, regarding cooperation with Section 8 of the First Directorate of the DS (Bulgarian), November 28, 1988. In: Kiryakova; Angelova (eds.): KGB and DS (note 29), pp. 1870–1903, here 1875 ff.

<sup>30</sup> See MfS: IM Directive 2/79, dated December 8, 1979. In: Müller-Enbergs: Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, Part 2 (note 23), pp. 476 and 507 ff. See also Müller-Enbergs’ commentary on AM, *ibid.*, pp. 225 ff.

disseminated. Much of this, however, fell into the realm of “gray” propaganda. State news agencies, for example, disseminated reports from Western media that the KGB had previously planted in those media as part of a disinformation campaign e.<sup>31</sup> KGB agents also worked within the press. Certain publications, such as “Literaturnaya Gazeta,” were considered media outlets that the KGB used intensively to disseminate favorable information

<sup>32</sup>

Foreign propaganda was organized in a similar manner in the other Warsaw Pact countries. In the GDR, Hermann Axen, Central Committee Secretary for International Relations (IV) and member of the Politburo, oversaw foreign propaganda. Axen chaired the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and directed the work of the Central Committee’s Department of International Relations (IV). Both bodies were responsible for the general policy on foreign propaganda. The Foreign Propaganda Department of the SED Central Committee, which was responsible for the “white” propaganda institutions—e.g., the Panorama Foreign Press Agency and Radio Berlin International—was subordinate in terms of content and practice to Axen and Department IV.<sup>33</sup> Axen and the relevant departments and commissions in the Central Committee, for their part, took into account the propaganda line of the CPSU, which the SED usually followed. The general line for foreign propaganda was communicated to Axen by Boris Ponomaryov, head of the IA of the CPSU Central Committee, primarily during bilateral and multilateral meetings.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> For a discussion of the organization of Soviet foreign propaganda, see Godson, Roy; Shultz, Richard H.: “Active Measures in Soviet Strategy.” In: Laird, Robbin Frederick; Hoffmann, Erik P. (eds.): *\*Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World\**. Hawthorne 1986,

pp. 207–218, here 208 ff.; Statement by Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence. In: United States, 95<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, September 12–13, 1985, Part 2 of 5, pp. 2–28, here 2–5. On “white,” “gray,” and “black” propaganda, see Kux, Dennis: *Soviet Active Measures and Propaganda*. In: *Parameters*, Journal of the U.S. Army War College XV (1985) 4, pp. 19–28, here 19; Scholz, Michael F.: *Active Measures and Disinformation as Part of East Germany’s Propaganda War, 1953–1972*. In: Macrakis, Kristie; Friis, Thomas Wegener; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut (eds.): *East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy*. Abingdon, New York 2003, pp. 113–133, here 113.

<sup>32</sup> Kalugin, Oleg: *\*Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West\**. Philadelphia 2009, p. 178.

<sup>33</sup> Muth, Ingrid: *GDR Foreign Policy 1949–1972. Content, Structures, Mechanisms*. Berlin 2001, pp. 59 and 66 ff.

<sup>34</sup> Starting in 1973, multilateral meetings of the International and Ideological Secretaries of the “brother parties” (of all WVO states) played a special role

The main themes for foreign propaganda could then be transmitted via various channels from the Central Committee to the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the responsible Main Administration A. When it came to the general line,

, among others, Minister for State Security Erich Mielke—who, as a member of the Politburo, had access to the relevant plans—and the SED district leadership within the MfS as conduits. When it came to coordinating the content of individual operations, the head of HV A and the head of Department X (HV A/X), which was responsible for disinformation, had as their direct counterparts not only Department IV, but also the Central Committee’s Western Department and the Central Committee’s “Agitation and Propaganda” Department.<sup>35</sup>

The Stasi saw itself not only as the “shield and sword of the Party”<sup>36</sup> (the SED) but also, according to Mielke, as a “combat unit of the glorious Soviet Cheka”<sup>37</sup> (the Soviet secret police). In its foreign propaganda efforts, the MfS therefore also received guidance from the “Chekists” of the KGB. The leadership of the MfS and HV A received corresponding requests and instructions directly from the KGB.<sup>38</sup> Regular bilateral meetings took place not only between the heads of the

First Chief Directorate (HV) of the KGB and the HV A, but also between the heads of the “A” services responsible for disinformation within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, Major General Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov, and the HV A/X, Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth. In addition, there were multilateral meetings between the heads of intelligence or their department heads, during which joint

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(excluding Romania). At these meetings, Ponomarjew brokered and coordinated a unified approach to foreign and domestic propaganda (responses to alleged ideological attacks from the West). Minutes from these meetings are held in the Hermann Axen Office collection at the Federal Archives. See the Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR at the Federal Archives (BArch), DY 30/IV 2/2.035, vols. 21–25.

<sup>35</sup> Marxen, Klaus; Werle, Gerhard (eds.): *Criminal Justice and Injustice in the GDR. Documentation*. Vol. 4/1: Espionage. Berlin 2004, pp. 474 ff.; Scholz: *Active Measures and Disinformation* (note 31), pp. 118 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Süß, Walter: “Shield and Sword” – The Ministry for State Security and the SED. In: Henke, Klaus-Dietmar; Engelmann, Roger (eds.): *The Documentary Record. The Significance of the State Security Service’s Files for Contemporary Historical Research*. Berlin 1995, pp. 83–97.

<sup>37</sup> Mielke’s closing remarks at the district delegates’ conference of the Ministry for State Security in preparation for the 10th Party Congress, February 20–21, 1981; BStU, MfS, ZAIG 3967, pp. 1–54, here 13.

<sup>38</sup> Scholz: *Active Measures and Disinformation* (note 31), p. 116 ff.; Bittmann, Ladislav: *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View*. Washington 1983, pp. 28–30; Bohnsack; Brehmer: *Mission Deception* (note 3), pp. 40–43.

disinformation operations were discussed. Such meetings were organized under the umbrella of the “brother agencies”—the state security services of the Warsaw Pact countries, with the exception of Romania.<sup>39</sup> Representatives of the friendly security agencies of Vietnam, Cuba, or Mongolia also occasionally participated in these meetings.

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<sup>39</sup> To date, the BStU files contain only a few documents regarding a multilateral meeting held in Berlin in 1988 (see BStU, MfS, ZAIG, No. 8121 and No. 6082) and a speech by the Deputy Minister for State Security and Head of HV A, Markus Wolf, at the 1982 meeting in Moscow (see BStU, MfS, HA I, No. 16660, pp. 299–316). For a collection of the speeches and an analysis, see Žáček, Pavel: *Socialistická solidarita bratrských rozvědek. Dokumenty z poslední porady náčelníků I. správ v Berlíně, 17.–21. října 1988* [Socialist Solidarity of the Fraternal Intelligence Services. Documents from the Last Conference of the Heads of the First Line in Berlin, October 17–21, 1988] (Czech). In: *Securitas Imperii* 21 (2012) 2, pp. 182–227. In Sofia, in COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, documents from the following multilateral meetings of intelligence agencies can be found: Budapest 1970 (op. 2, a. e. 790), Warsaw 1974 (op. 2, a. e. 791, 792, 793), Prague 1978 (Op. 3, p. 414) and Budapest 1986 (Op. 4, p. 671).

## 2 Introduction

In 1998, the *taz*\*—and they should know!—ranked the theory that the HIV virus responsible for AIDS had been artificially created as a biological weapon on behalf of the U.S. government as number two on its list of the 21 best conspiracy theories of all time.<sup>40</sup> While the ranking is certainly open to debate, this is undoubtedly one of the most persistent conspiracy theories of the 20th and 21st centuries. As this study will show, interest in this conspiracy theory remains undiminished, and its proponents remain incorrigible. Yet the entire “theory” has a small flaw: it was conceived by the Soviet secret service in collaboration with other “pioneers” and disseminated and further developed in a wide variety of ways for nearly a decade. As will be demonstrated here in detail, the GDR’s foreign intelligence service, the HV A, also played a significant role in this. Now, the AIDS conspiracy theory would likely have struggled to make it onto any top-ten list were it not for the long trail of interwoven and highly controversial content and disinformation it drags behind it. For example, as early as 1992, the two HV A officers Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer debunked the entire “theory” in its basic outlines as “active measure” by the HV A/X disinformation unit.<sup>41</sup> So far, so good. But that was far from putting the theory to rest. As late as 2013, the conspiracy theory and the story of its spread were still stirring up controversy. “Disinformation squared,” “conspiracy theories about a conspiracy theory”—so wrote the opponents of the thesis, but persistent defenders, who have recently even begun promoting their views through rap songs, were also heard.

This study will now empirically demonstrate that there was a “real conspiracy” between the KGB and the HV A to spread the Fort Detrick theory regarding the origin of HIV, and that a biologist named Jakob Segal was, as a conscious or unconscious multiplier<sup>(42)</sup> one of its protagonists. In contrast to earlier publications, which based their theses primarily on

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<sup>40</sup> The 21 Best Conspiracy Theories. In: *taz*, Oct. 12, 1998, p. 24. The *taz*\* cited as its source: Ringel, Michael (ed.): *\*Das listenreiche Buch der Wahrheit\**. Frankfurt, 1998.

<sup>41</sup> Bohnsack; Brehmer: *Auftrag Irreführung* (note 3), p. 219 ff.

<sup>42</sup> For the concept of the “conscious or unconscious multiplier,” see the preface.

Based on the findings of former HV A officer Günter Bohnsack<sup>43</sup>, this study draws on sources from the archives of the Bulgarian State Security and the BStU that have become available for the first time. It contradicts the findings of Erhard Geißler and Robert Sprinkle regarding the Stasi's role in the Segal thesis, which states: "The KGB was certainly in the vicinity of the scene of the crime, while the Stasi was nowhere to be seen."<sup>44</sup> This study shows that the Stasi was very much "in the vicinity" of the "scene of the crime" and took action: by assisting in the dissemination and publication of the Segals' thesis, by securing a publication ban against the Segals' East German opponents, through research and other assistance provided by selected informants, by establishing a research center for the couple within the Ministry of Health (MfG) of the GDR, and by co-financing a film for West German and foreign television. The film not only propagated their thesis but also stylized Jakob and Lilli Segal as heroes. The support provided by HV A/X for the 1989 film demonstrated, as she herself emphasized, that she was continuing the AIDS disinformation campaign even though Moscow had abandoned it in favor of disarmament negotiations with the United States.

After 1989, the Segals themselves continued to spread their version of the Fort Detrick theory out of personal conviction, and Jakob Segal linked it to support for unproven alternative therapies for HIV/AIDS. Thanks to a new generation of unwitting propagators and conspiracy theorists, the KGB's Fort Detrick theory and the Segals' version of it continue to this day to have medical and political side effects that endanger physical and political health, sometimes with fatal consequences.

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<sup>43</sup> See, e.g., Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6); Behling, Klaus: Retired Intelligence Officer: The End of GDR Espionage. Stuttgart, Leipzig 2003, p. 253; and Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission Deception (note 3), pp. 219 ff.

<sup>44</sup> "... the KGB was certainly near the crime scene, while the Stasi was nowhere around." Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 76.

### 3 Launch of a Campaign: The KGB's AIDS Disinformation and the "Brother Agencies," 1983–1986

On September 7, 1985, the agency responsible for foreign intelligence First Chief Directorate (First CD) of the KGB to its Bulgarian counterparts in the First Chief Directorate of the Bulgarian State Security (Dyrzhavna sigurnost – DS):

“We are implementing a set of measures in connection with the new dangerous disease that has emerged in the United States in recent years [...] AIDS and its subsequent widespread dissemination in other countries, including those in Western Europe. The aim of these measures is to generate favorable public opinion abroad regarding the notion that this disease is the result of secret experiments by the U.S. intelligence services and the Pentagon with new types of biological weapons that have spiraled out of control.”<sup>45</sup>

The basis for such measures was said to be the “facts” that had already appeared in the Indian press. This referred to an anonymous letter from a supposedly “well-known American scientist and anthropologist” published in the Indian newspaper \*Patriot\* on July 17, 1983, under the headline: “AIDS May Invade India: Mystery Disease Caused by U.S. Experiments.” The KGB-inspired “letter”<sup>46</sup> claimed that the AIDS pathogen was the result of “Pentagon experiments to develop new and dangerous biological weapons” at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland.<sup>47</sup> Although various conspiracy theorists in the U.S. had previously accused the Pentagon, the CIA, or the U.S. government in general of being responsible for the artificial creation of the AIDS virus, the article in “The Patriot” was the first verifiable publication to identify Fort Detrick as the exact point of origin.

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<sup>45</sup> KGB, Report No. 2955 (Russian), Sept. 7, 1985; COMDOS Archives, Collection (F.) 9, file

(op.) 4, a.e. 663, pp. 208 ff., here 208.

<sup>46</sup> There is considerable evidence and indication that the article was inspired by the KGB—among other things, the “Patriot” was regarded at the time in intelligence circles as a mouthpiece of the KGB. See Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), pp. 5 ff.; United States Department of State (US DOS): Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87, Washington 1987, p. 44.

<sup>47</sup> AIDS may invade India: Mystery disease caused by US experiments. Patriot,

July 17, 1983, p. 1 ff. The authors thank Thomas Boghardt for providing his copy of the article.

Now, in 1985, the Bulgarian “sister organization,” following the KGB’s example, was to disseminate the theses of the 1983 article through its “channels in party, parliamentary, socio-political, and journalistic circles in Western and developing countries.”<sup>48</sup> The First Presidium of the KGB listed the key arguments of its nascent AIDS disinformation campaign:

“Judging by these reports [the ‘facts’ in the Indian press, author’s note] and also by the interest the U.S. military has in the symptoms of AIDS, as well as by the speed and geography of its spread, the most likely assumption is that this very dangerous disease is the result of a series of Pentagon experiments with new types of biological weapons. This is also confirmed by the fact that the disease initially affected only certain groups of people (homosexuals, drug addicts, Latinos).”<sup>49</sup>

Another argument to be used is the fact that it is precisely the military—specifically USAMRIID at Fort Detrick—that is making the greatest progress in combating the disease. However, these findings are not shared with civilian institutions, a practice specifically aimed at enhancing the military’s combat effectiveness. As the campaign by the KGB and the “brother agencies” progressed, USAMRIID at Fort Detrick was increasingly replaced by the “Pentagon” in general as the alleged source of the AIDS pathogen.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, the aim was to instill fear of the spread of the virus by the U.S. government and by Americans in general. Thus, the transmission of AIDS through American donor blood was an aspect that was to be highlighted.

This raises the question of why the KGB allowed so much time to pass between the original article in *\*Patriot\** in 1983 and the launch of its large-scale propaganda campaign in 1985. This delay may have been due to the fact that the original article received little attention in the international press. It was based on earlier disinformation from the KGB, according to which a research laboratory at the University of Maryland in Lahore, Pakistan, was a research facility for biological

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<sup>48</sup> KGB, Information No. 2955 (Russian), Sept. 7, 1985, COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9. op. 4, a.e. 663,

pp. 208 ff., here 208.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

had been a matter of warfare.<sup>51</sup> It was originally part of another campaign of active measures by the KGB intended to create tensions between India and Pakistan and, in particular, between India and the United States.

By 1985, however, the situation regarding AIDS had changed, and so the 1983 thesis was revived. Compared to 1983, public attention to AIDS was now much greater, as people were already speaking of an epidemic.<sup>52</sup> There were several reasons why the KGB wanted to go on the offensive in 1985. In the U.S., the right-wing “permanent presidential candidate” Lyndon LaRouche had in his

“Executive Intelligence Review” accused the Soviet Union of having developed the AIDS virus itself as a biological weapon.<sup>53</sup> Moscow and the KGB regarded LaRouche as having close ties to the CIA.<sup>54</sup> In February 1985, a U.S. government report had also accused the Soviet Union of violating the Geneva Conventions by producing biological weapons

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<sup>51</sup> Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 5; Pentagon Said Pursuing CBW Research in Lahore, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English, Dec. 13, 1986. In: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-86-246, December 23, 1986, p. A3.

<sup>52</sup> Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 6.

<sup>53</sup> Zapewalow, Valentin: Panic in the West, or What Lies Behind the Sensation Surrounding AIDS. Literaturnaya Gazeta (LG), Oct. 30, 1985, p. 14 [German: Zapewalow, Valentin: Panic in the West: What Lies Behind the Sensation Surrounding AIDS?] in: BStU, MfS, ZAIG No. 14572, pp. 166–173, here 172; Hamerman, Warren J.: AIDS Epidemic Explodes: What is the Russian Angle? In: Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) 12, Oct. 18, 1985, pp. 52–54. Interestingly, the CIA reportedly received a report from a “reliable source” stating that a “Moscow institution” had been working on a virus in 1981 that was “intended to weaken or destroy the human immune system.” The goal was allegedly defensive, to develop a corresponding antidote. The USSR had also most likely sent a sample of the AIDS virus from Africa to Moscow in the late 1970s for research purposes, according to the CIA. Nevertheless, the CIA ruled out the possibility that the USSR could have developed the AIDS virus through genetic engineering or was behind its spread in the United States. The AIDS virus is an “unlikely candidate” for biological warfare due to the difficulties in developing a corresponding vaccine for its own soldiers. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Science and Weapons Daily Review, February 28, 1985; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland; CIA-RDP86R00254R000301730001-6.

<sup>54</sup> Zapewalow: Panic in the West (note 53), p. 172.

<sup>55</sup> There was thus ample reason for the Soviet Union to strike back with full force.

The public launch of the KGB's expanded and intensified campaign took place on October 30, 1985, with the publication of an article in \*Literaturnaya Gazeta\* by Valentin Zapevalov under the title "Panic in the West: What Lies Behind the Sensation Surrounding AIDS?"<sup>56</sup> The article in the LG, which served as a primary channel for the KGB to disseminate disinformation,<sup>57</sup> followed the points outlined by the First Plenum of the KGB. After initially citing information from the Indian newspaper "Patriot," the text provided further details on the alleged development of the AIDS pathogen. Employees of the American "Centers for Disease Control" (CDC) had allegedly assisted the Pentagon by traveling to Zaire, Nigeria, and Latin America to collect samples of "highly pathogenic viruses" not found in Europe or Asia. These samples were then combined and used to create a new type of virus: HIV. Blood donations from infected individuals, for example, were transmitted to unsuspecting patients during surgeries. Isolated experiments with the new virus were then conducted both in Haiti and among marginalized groups in American society—drug addicts, homosexuals, and the homeless.<sup>58</sup> Zapevalov summarized:

"[...] It is entirely possible that, in the end—as has repeatedly been the case in the past—one of the victims will file a lawsuit against the Pentagon and the CIA, and it will then finally become clear that all AIDS patients are the victims of yet another inhumane experiment."<sup>59</sup>

Zapevalov's article was reprinted shortly thereafter in Kuwait, Bahrain, Finland, Sweden, Peru, and other countries.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 6.

<sup>56</sup> Zapevalov: Panic in the West (note 53), p. 172.

<sup>57</sup> Oleg Kalugin, former head of Line "K" (Counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, writes: "In all the years I was in foreign counterintelligence, Literaturnaya Gazeta was our main channel in the Soviet press for propaganda and disinformation." Kalugin, Spymaster (note 32), p. 178.

<sup>58</sup> Zapevalov: Panic in the West (note 53), p. 170 ff.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>60</sup> Memorandum from [Name redacted], Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, Office of Global Issues, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA: Soviet Disinformation: Allegations of US Misdeeds, March 28, 1986; CREST, NARA, CIA-RDP86TO1017R000100620001-1, 7 pp., here p. 3.

### 3.1 The KGB and Conspiracy Theories in the US: The Cycle of False Information and Disinformation

The KGB's disinformation campaign regarding AIDS did not arise out of thin air. It drew in part on actual facts, but primarily made use of various conspiracy theories about the origins of HIV/AIDS in the United States itself. Consequently, a dynamic developed in which misinformation in the form of conspiracy theories in the U.S. and the disinformation narratives of the KGB and the HV A fed off one another. This cycle of misinformation and disinformation about AIDS continued unabated until the end of the Cold War and beyond—with all its negative consequences.

Soviet disinformation referred to various revelations that came to light in the United States itself during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1975, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee") had exposed the CIA's "MKULTRA" project. In the 1950s, CIA chemist Sidney Gottlieb had tested LSD and other drugs on unsuspecting individuals—often with severe consequences.<sup>61</sup> In 1960, Gottlieb visited Fort Detrick on the orders of Richard Bissell, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans responsible for covert operations, to procure a suitable toxin for a potential assassination of an African head of state—it ultimately targeted Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb delivered the toxin to the CIA station in the Congo, but the assassination became unnecessary after Lumumba was executed by American-backed government troops.<sup>62</sup> In the 1970s, the Tuskegee syphilis study was exposed by the American press. From

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<sup>61</sup> United States, Congress, Senate, <sup>94th</sup> Congress, <sup>2nd</sup> Session, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Foreign and Military Intelligence. Final Report, Book 1. Washington 1976, pp. 389–403. Available online: Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC) Public Library, [http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents\\_church\\_reports\\_book1.htm](http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports_book1.htm).

<sup>62</sup> United States, Congress, Senate, <sup>94th</sup> Cong., <sup>1st</sup> Sess., Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Interim Report. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. Washington 1975, pp. 19–30. Available online: AARC Public Library, [http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents\\_church\\_reports\\_ir.htm](http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports_ir.htm). In the report, Gottlieb was referred to by his birth name, Joseph Scheider.

From 1932 to 1972, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health investigated the effects of syphilis on 399 impoverished African American farmhands who had been infected earlier. This group of people, some of whom were illiterate, was not informed that penicillin had been identified as an effective treatment for the disease in 1947. Nor were they treated with the drug. Many of those affected passed the disease on to their unborn children, and many died before the study was discontinued in 1972.

The sudden outbreak of the HIV epidemic and its initially unexplained origin made the KGB's disinformation seem plausible against the backdrop of such reports.<sup>63</sup> The first reports of an epidemic emerged in 1981, in which healthy gay men in Los Angeles and other U.S. cities suddenly developed opportunistic infections indicative of immune deficiency. It was suspected that a sexually transmitted pathogen was at work, and the disease was originally named "Gay-Related Immunodeficiency Disease" (GRID).<sup>64</sup> When it became clear that more than half of the people exhibiting the same clinical picture were not homosexual men, but rather hemophiliacs, intravenous drug users, and immigrants from Haiti, the disease was officially renamed AIDS by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in 1982.<sup>65</sup> It was not until May 1983 that a group of scientists at the Pasteur Institute, led by virologists Luc Montagnier and Françoise Barré-Sinoussi, isolated a new retrovirus from lymphoid ganglia, which they believed to be the AIDS pathogen. They named it "Lymphadenopathy-associated virus" (LAV). In May 1984, a team of scientists led by virologist Robert Gallo at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States confirmed that the causative agent of AIDS was a virus. They named it "human T-cell leukemia virus" (HTLV).<sup>66</sup> It was not until 1985 that it was determined that LAV and HTLV were the same virus. In May 1986, it was renamed HIV on the recommendation of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses.<sup>67</sup> See

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<sup>63</sup> Harden, Victoria A.: *AIDS at 30: A History*. Washington 2012, pp. 119 ff.; Thomas, Stephen B.; Quinn, Sandra Crouse: *The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932 to 1972: implications for HIV education and AIDS risk education programs in the black community*. In: *American Journal of Public Health* 81 (1991) 11, pp. 1498–1505, passim.

<sup>64</sup> Harden: *AIDS at 30* (note 63), p. 23.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58 ff.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

At that time, HIV was still considered “a mysterious virus of unknown origin,” as the French physician and AIDS researcher Jacques Leibowitch wrote in his 1984 book of the same title.<sup>68</sup>

The revelations about the “imperial presidency”<sup>69</sup> in the U.S. during the 1960s and 1970s, along with the sudden outbreak of the AIDS epidemic among marginalized groups in U.S. society—homosexuals, drug addicts, Haitian immigrants, and African Americans—also served as fertile ground for conspiracy theories in the U.S. This comes as little surprise, since conspiracy theories are often developed and spread by socially marginalized members of a society who have frequently fallen victim to state and societal discrimination and actual conspiracies. They express the despair, anger, and mistrust of such individuals toward political, economic, and social elites and foreign powers (e.g., the “superpowers”).<sup>70</sup> While African Americans could cite several historical grounds for suspicion against the U.S. government, most gay people found the Reagan administration’s response to the AIDS epidemic—in which they saw themselves as the primary victims—far too hesitant. Here, too, there were grounds for suspicion, as many religiously conservative supporters and members of the government viewed the AIDS epidemic as God’s just punishment for the sin of homosexuality. Furthermore, they criticized the alleged focus of medical research on AIDS, a disease they regarded as the result of personal immorality. This, they argued, was at the expense of research into other deadly diseases such as cancer.<sup>71</sup> As the KGB had recognized, it was only a small step from complaining that the government was doing too little to combat AIDS to claiming that the government was somehow behind it.

Quite a few gay newspapers in the U.S. spread such conspiracy theories, such as the “New York Native” and the “Gay

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<sup>68</sup> Leibowitch, Jacques: *AIDS: A Strange Virus of Unknown Origin*. Munich 1986; translation of Leibowitch, Jacques: *Un virus étrange venu d’ailleurs*. Paris 1984.

<sup>69</sup> Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.: *The Imperial Presidency*. Boston 1973, *passim*.

<sup>70</sup> See, e.g., Rödlach, Alexander: *Witches, Westerners and HIV: AIDS and Cultures of Blame in Africa*. Walnut Creek 2006, p. 117 ff.

<sup>71</sup> Harden: *AIDS at 30* (note 63), pp. 98, 101 ff. and 123; Gibson, William E.: Robertson: Stop AIDS by Altering “Aberrant” Habits. In: *Sun-Sentinel*, Oct. 22, 1987, available online: [http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-10-22/news/8702010274\\_1\\_robertson-and-bush-aids-epidemic-aids-victims](http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-10-22/news/8702010274_1_robertson-and-bush-aids-epidemic-aids-victims).

“Community News” in Boston. On July 9, 1983, a week before the “Patriot” article, gay rights activist Charlie Shively published an opinion piece in “Gay Community News” in which he blamed the U.S. government for the emergence of the AIDS epidemic. He cited a theory published in the “New York Native” claiming that the AIDS virus had evolved from the African swine fever virus, which the CIA had allegedly introduced into the Western Hemisphere for biological warfare against Cuba. Given the high cost of combating swine fever for the U.S. government (a \$18 million compensation payment for the culling of pigs in Haiti), Shively posed the question: “Would it be possible that the doctors—starting with \$100 million—would simply decide to kill all queers, Haitians, and intravenous drug users [...]?” In this case, the “doctors” referred to the researchers responsible for AIDS at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), whom Shively erroneously<sup>72</sup>accused of being behind the Tuskegee syphilis study. Shively, however, discussed another possibility for the origin of the AIDS pathogen: that it had been artificially created by the U.S. government n.<sup>73</sup>A then-new book by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman on the U.S. government’s chemical and biological warfare programs contained a statement by an employee of the U.S. Department of Defense, Dr. Donald MacArthur. In 1969, he had spoken before Congress about the potential artificial creation of a pathogen against which the human immune system had no defenses. Furthermore, according to Harris and Paxman, a 1975 U.S. military manual had pointed to the possibility of developing “ethnic chemical weapons” capable of killing members of a specific population group.<sup>74</sup> Shively summarized his opinion: “AIDS sounds like one of those ethnic weapons that destroys the individual’s immunological defense response.” He indirectly pointed to the Pentagon—but not specifically to Fort Detrick, as the “Patriot” did—as a possible site of production.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> The U.S. Public Health Service, which, like the CDC, was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health, had conducted the syphilis study.

<sup>73</sup> Shively, Charley: Speaking Out: The CDC-CIA-AIDS Political Alliance. In: Gay Community News, July 9, 1983, p. 5.

<sup>74</sup> Harris, Robert; Paxman, Jeremy: A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare. London 1982, p. 240 ff.

<sup>75</sup> Shively: Speaking Out (note 73), p. 5.

Conspiracy theories about AIDS in the U.S. and KGB disinformation did not merely draw on the same or similar sources of information and examples. The Eastern disinformation campaign made use of conspiracy theories in the U.S., and conspiracy theorists in the U.S. increasingly referred to disinformation from the East. American government officials responsible for countering Eastern disinformation, for example, received a tip that the KGB derived many of its disinformation narratives on “ethnic weapons” and, presumably, also on AIDS, simply from gay newspapers.<sup>76</sup> African American publications and gay newspapers, which themselves were spreading conspiracy theories about AIDS, began to cite the KGB’s disinformation narratives.

One example of this is the journalistic work of the American psychiatrist Nathaniel S. Lehrman, who—apparently unwittingly—acted as a conduit for the KGB’s disinformation campaign regarding AIDS in the United States. In various articles for the New York-based African American newspaper “Amsterdam News,” he hinted at a possible “AIDS conspiracy” by the U.S. government. In November 1985, he allegedly told the newspaper that the spread of the AIDS epidemic in parts of Africa was a result of bacteriological and chemical experiments conducted by the CIA; that similar experiments were being carried out quite openly on Western homosexuals, drug addicts, and African Americans, and that the Centers for Disease Control had participated in CIA experiments. All three claims aligned with Zapewalow’s article in “Literaturnaya Gazeta” and with the guidance the KGB had provided to the Bulgarians. Going beyond the KGB’s assertions, Lehrman claimed that chemical agents were likely responsible for AIDS and that the associated HTL virus caused only a mild infection.<sup>77</sup> L Lehrman later denied in a letter to the editor of the “Amsterdam News”<sup>78</sup> and in a press release<sup>79</sup> that he had ever made the first three KGB-linked claims.

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<sup>76</sup> Snyder, Alvin A.: *Warriors of Disinformation. How Charles Wick, the USIA, and Videotape Won the Cold War.* New York 1995, pp. 113 ff.

<sup>77</sup> . Browne, J. Zamgba: *Link AIDS to CIA Warfare.* In: *New York Amsterdam News* Nov. 30, 1985, p. 12; also in: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 42.

<sup>78</sup> Lehrman, Nathaniel: *Some minor inaccuracies.* In: *New York Amsterdam News* Dec. 28, 1985, p. 12; also in: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 42.

<sup>79</sup> Lehrman, Nathaniel S., M.D., Clinical Director, Retired, Brooklyn State Hospital: *Media Cover-Up of AIDS?* February 1986. In: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 41–45.

In his February 1986 press release, he focused more on his theory that there might be a chemical pathogen responsible for AIDS.<sup>80</sup> However, in his letter to the editor, he left open the possibility that the “spread of AIDS in Africa could be the result of activities by the U.S. government, including the CIA.”<sup>81</sup> In the press release, he toned down his statement regarding alleged human experiments, which had been summarized in the newspaper report:

“Although our government did conduct such ‘experiments’ on unsuspecting populations, I did not say that they were conducted ‘publicly,’ nor that they were certainly conducted on homosexuals, drug addicts, or Black people, which I do, however, suspect.”<sup>82</sup>

In another article in the *\*Amsterdam News\** in January 1986, he revisited his theory that AIDS was caused by a chemical agent and suggested the possibility that “religious terrorists” or others might be using “gay dust” to kill not only homosexuals but also drug addicts and African Americans. He hypothetically asked whether AIDS in Africa could be the result of the activities of “U.S. government agencies” seeking to bring about a change in leadership there.<sup>83</sup>

The question arises: Did Lehrman work for the KGB? There is no evidence of any significant or deliberate activity on behalf of the KGB. Nevertheless, there were indications of possible indirect influence from Moscow on him. In his letter to the editor of the “*Amsterdam News*,” Lehrman had substantiated his claim of possible CIA involvement in the spread of AIDS by referring to a summer 1982 issue (No. 17) of the Washington-based journal “*Covert Action Information Bulletin*” (CAIB) p.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>81</sup> Lehrman: Some minor inaccuracies (note 78), p. 12.

<sup>82</sup> Lehrman: Media Cover-Up? (note 79), p. 42.

<sup>83</sup> Lehrman, Nathaniel: A “natural” epidemic? In: *New York Amsterdam News* Jan. 18, 1986, pp. 13 and 56; also in: BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, p. 43.

<sup>84</sup> Lehrman: Some minor inaccuracies (note 78), p. 12. The issue of CAIB in question contained articles on American biological weapons and the possible role of the United States in an outbreak of dengue fever in Cuba and Nicaragua—previously propagated by the communist governments of those countries and Moscow. See Lawrence, Ken: *The History of U.S. Bio-Chemical Killers*. CAIB 17 (Summer 1982), pp. 5–8; Wolf, Louis: *The Pentagon’s Other Option*. CAIB 17 (Summer 1982),

The CAIB had a colorful past. Its founding by CIA defector Philip Agee, several left-wing Washington journalists, and disgruntled former CIA employees took place in 1978 at the Announced at the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students in Cuba. According to the notes of defected KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin, the “K” Directorate (Counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB was behind this initiative. According to Mitrokhin’s notes, Agee had long been listed as a KGB agent (code name: PONT), while the other members of the editorial board (KGB code name: RUPOR) of the CAIB knew nothing of this. A working group comprising staff from Line “K” and Service “A” (responsible for active measures) of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB was formed under the leadership of V.N. Kosterin, the deputy head of Service “A,” to supply the CAIB with compromising material on the CIA. In the end, however, the KGB found it difficult to find enough classified material for the quarterly publication. Therefore, the editors sought publicly available materials that could be used against the CIA or U.S. government agencies.<sup>85</sup>

Even if Lehrman unwittingly served as a conduit for the KGB’s AIDS disinformation, the KGB nonetheless used his publications to bolster its own disinformation narrative. In a follow-up article to Zapewalow’s piece, the “Literaturnaya Gazeta” quoted Lehrman on May 17, 1986, under the headline “AIDS: More Questions Than Answers,” Lehrman as an American expert who confirmed the theory of the artificial origin of AIDS. The paper went on to state that he had claimed that AIDS victims “could in some cases be targets of intentional murder,” and named the possible perpetrator—the CIA.<sup>86</sup> “Literaturnaya Gazeta” had not fabricated the quotes; they came from Lehrman’s press release, which was also available to the HV A<sup>87</sup> and presumably to the KGB or at least to “Literaturnaya Gazeta.”<sup>88</sup>

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pp. 8–24; Schaap, Bill: U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic. CAIB 17 (Summer 1982), pp. 28–31.

<sup>85</sup> Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasily: *The Black Book of the KGB. Moscow’s Fight Against the West*. Munich 2001, pp. 327 ff.

<sup>86</sup> SPID: voprosov bol’she, chem otvetov [AIDS: More Questions Than Answers]. In: LG, May 17, 1986, p. 15.

<sup>87</sup> Lehrman: Media Cover-Up? (note 79), p. 41. The press release contained the following sentence: “If non-infectious causes of AIDS do indeed exist, as seems more than possible, its victims may, in some cases, be targets of deliberate murder.”

<sup>88</sup> SPID (note 86), p. 15.

Lehrman was aware that Soviet publications on AIDS cited him as a source. He even mentioned this in his own article on AIDS in the “Covert Action Information Bulletin” from the summer of 1987: “Is AIDS not contagious? The possibility and its implications from a CBW perspective.”<sup>89</sup> In it, he suggested—much like Zapewalow had done before—that AIDS was the intentional or unintentional product of American CBW research. He stated:

“It may seem crazy, but knowledge of the illegal, murderous acts carried out by our government, including the CIA and, most recently, the NSC, and the history of the U.S. government’s involvement in CBR research, should help us understand that the truth is often stranger than fiction.”<sup>90</sup>

In the article, he not only promoted the theories of virologist and AIDS denier Peter Duesberg, who denied that the HIV virus causes AIDS at all,<sup>91</sup> but also Segal’s theory of HIV as a biological weapon,<sup>92</sup> which has since become the most important “argument” in Eastern disinformation regarding AIDS. Lehrman was not the only one to spread the propaganda theories of the USSR and the KGB regarding AIDS and the alleged biological warfare by the U.S. In the same and subsequent issues of CAIB, there was a lengthy article on AIDS by journalist and editorial board member Robert Lederer, who presented several “alternative theories” regarding the origin of the HIV virus e.<sup>93</sup> He wrote not only about the possibility of an artificial origin at Fort Detrick based on the theories of Jakob Segal,<sup>94</sup> but also about other possible modes of origin in connection with plans for the alleged chemical and biological warfare of the U.S. government. The options included indirect dioxin exposure (similar to “Agent Orange”—

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<sup>89</sup> Lehrman, Nathaniel S.: Is AIDS Non-Infectious? The Possibility and its CBW Implications. In: CAIB 28 (Summer 1987), pp. 55–62, here 62. CBW is an abbreviation for chemical and biological weapons.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., pp. 56 ff. and 59 ff.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 61 ff.

<sup>93</sup> Lederer, Robert: Origin and Spread of AIDS (I). Is the West Responsible? In: CAIB 28 (Summer 1987), pp. 43–54. A continuation of the article appeared in the next issue of CAIB. See Lederer, Robert: Origin and Spread of AIDS (II). Is the West Responsible (Conclusion)? In: CAIB 29 (Winter 1988), pp. 52–65.

<sup>94</sup> Lederer: Origin and Spread of AIDS (I) (note 93), p. 46. In this context, Lederer cited Jakob and Lilli Segal.

“in Vietnam”<sup>95</sup>, co-infection with the viruses causing Maruari and dengue fever, in the spread of which the U.S. government was allegedly involved in Cuba,<sup>96</sup> or infection with the African swine fever virus,<sup>97</sup> for whose appearance in Cuba the CIA was allegedly responsible.<sup>98</sup> At the same time, however, Lederer criticized the weaknesses of the various theories, including the Segal thesis.<sup>99</sup> There were “logical difficulties” with Lehrman’s simultaneous support of Segal’s thesis and Duesberg’s assumption that the virus, whether artificially produced or not, could not be considered the cause of AIDS.<sup>100</sup>

A second key proponent of the KGB’s HIV bioweapon theory in the U.S. and Europe, who was also cited in the new LG article, was the English physician John Seale. He, too, was unaware of his role.<sup>101</sup> Seale had testified in support of the theory put forward by the LaRouche magazine “Executive Intelligence Review,” which claimed that the AIDS epidemic in the West brought only benefits to the closed societies of the East, as they were supposedly able to isolate themselves effectively. Nevertheless, at that time Seale still believed in the hypothesis of the American virologist Myron “Max” Essex of the Harvard School of Public Health, according to which HIV had arisen naturally in Africa through the transmission of a similar virus from green monkeys to humans.<sup>102</sup> However, Zapewalow’s article and Soviet propaganda in general had led him to conclude in the fall of 1985 that the virus must be of artificial origin in.<sup>103</sup> He now claimed that HIV was likely

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 47 ff.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 49–53. In this context, Lederer reminded his readers of the CAIB’s accusation that the U.S. government’s biological warfare program was behind an epidemic of dengue fever in Cuba in 1981. Ibid., p. 53, n. 54. For the accusation, see Schaap:

U.S. Biological Warfare (note 84), p. 28. On the corresponding Soviet and Cuban propaganda, see CIA Memorandum, Soviet Disinformation, March 28, 1986, p. 3 (see note 32).

<sup>97</sup> Lederer: Origin and Spread of AIDS (II) (note 93), pp. 52–55.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 47, footnote 17.

<sup>101</sup> Veitch, Andrew: “Germ of Doubt.” In: The Guardian, Dec. 20, 1985, p. 15.

<sup>102</sup> Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 114.

<sup>103</sup> See Seale, John: Response to a letter to the editor by Zhores Medvedev. In: Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine (JRSM) 79 (August 1986), p. 494 ff.

had been created through genetic manipulation of the Visna virus, a retrovirus found in sheep. Although Seale himself considered the Soviet Union far more likely than the U.S. to be the country of origin for the “artificial” virus,<sup>104</sup> he was quoted regarding the alleged artificial origin of the virus in a broadcast by the “World Service” of Moscow Radio in December 1985<sup>105</sup> and again in 1986 in “Literaturnaya Gazeta.”<sup>106</sup> Seale, however, continued to accuse the Soviet Union of creating the virus and supported a LaRouche ballot initiative in California to isolate AIDS patients from society.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Veitch: *Germ of Doubt* (note 101), p. 15.

<sup>105</sup> Seale: *Response* (note 103), p. 494 ff.

<sup>106</sup> SPID (note 86), p. 15.

<sup>107</sup> Burdman, Mark: *Support grows in the U.K. for measures rejected by California voters*. In: *EIR* 13 (1986) 45, pp. 35–37, here 35. Available online: [http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1986/eirv13n45-19861114/eirv13n45-19861114\\_035-aids\\_debate\\_in\\_britain\\_support\\_g.pdf](http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1986/eirv13n45-19861114/eirv13n45-19861114_035-aids_debate_in_britain_support_g.pdf).

## 4 Propagators of the Fort Detrick Theory: the SED, the HV A, and the Segals

The First Central Committee of the KGB informed its Bulgarian counterparts about its own AIDS disinformation campaign not merely as a formality, but because it expected intelligence assistance in spreading its narrative.<sup>108</sup> With the same expectation, it also contacted the First Central Committee in 1985. The KGB explained to the Bulgarian comrades that since 1985

“carried out a series of activities” on this topic jointly “with the German [...] colleagues.”<sup>109</sup> The HV A had been tasked by the KGB with making its own “scientific” contribution to the campaign.<sup>110</sup> The organizational work was handled by Section 1 of the HV A, Department X (HV A/X/1), which was responsible for active measures designed to provoke or exacerbate differences between the U.S. and its NATO allies (OVO “Achse,” XV 173/72), to promote disarmament and the peace movement in the West (OVO “Mars,” XV 1971/75), and to mobilize Third World states against the U.S. (OVO “Vorwärts,” XV 3741/73).<sup>111</sup> Although, according to the KGB, the HV A had already begun its work in 1985, Ingo Dams of the HV A/X/1 did not create a corresponding case file (OVO) titled “Denver” until July 17, 1986.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> KGB, Report No. 2955 (Russian), Sept. 7, 1985, COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 663,

pp. 208 ff., here 208.

<sup>109</sup> Information No. 2742 (Russian), undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, pp. 156–159, here 157. The file folder is titled “Cooperation with the KGB 1987” and otherwise contains exclusively documents for the year 1987.

<sup>110</sup> Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 8, including footnote 42; Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission Deception (note 3), p. 219.

<sup>111</sup> Müller-Enbers: Hauptverwaltung A (note 28), p. 172.

<sup>112</sup> OVO “Denver,” Reg. No. XV 3429/86; BStU, AR 2, MfS, RoHo, F22. The code name of the campaign was not “Infection,” as Boghardt claimed in 2009 based on a reference by Bohnsack. See Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), pp. 8 and 21, footnote 43. There was a joint “Infection” operation by the intelligence departments of the Eastern European state security services against Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), in which the HV A/X also participated with active measures. See Colonel Geyer, HV A/IX: Report, Feb. 18, 1976; BStU, MfS, ZAIG No. 22570, pp. 217–222, here 218; MfS, Draft: Plan of joint or coordinated active measures for 1984, August 23, 1983; Archiv

bezpečnostních složek [Archive of State Security Services, Prague – ABS], A.č. 81282/117, pp. 64–70, here 69 f.

The HV A/X wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues regarding the “Denver” operation:

“To expose the dangers to humanity arising from the research, production, and use of biological weapons, to reinforce anti-American sentiments worldwide, and to instigate domestic political conflicts in the U.S., the GDR side is providing a scientific study and other materials demonstrating that AIDS originated in the U.S. and not in Africa, and that AIDS is a product of U.S. biological weapons research.”

Beyond the stated goals of the KGB, HV A/X also sought to initiate “domestic political disputes in the United States.”<sup>113</sup> At a meeting with his Bulgarian colleagues in September 1986, the deputy head of HV A/X, Wolfgang Mutz, claimed that “Denver” constituted a “significant portion of the AM of the department [HV A/X].”<sup>114</sup>

The study in question—“a major work of scientific value,” according to Mutz—is already complete.<sup>115</sup> It proves, according to Mutz, that “AIDS is the result of a biological weapon developed by the United States” and that it “has been and continues to be used by them [i.e., the HV A] in various countries around the world.” Furthermore, the Americans had reportedly wanted “a copy from the author.”<sup>116</sup> With the study being part of the “Denver” operation described by Mutz, the only manuscript that could be meant was “AIDS – Nature and Origin”<sup>117</sup> by Prof. em. Jakob Segal, his wife Lilli, and chemist Ronald Dehmlow. The brief description of the content matches Segal’s study exactly. It was translated into English

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<sup>113</sup> Plan for joint and coordinated active measures by the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry for State Security of the GDR for 1987 and 1988, Berlin, September 3, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 108–119, here 112.

<sup>114</sup> Lieutenant D. Stankov, Head of Department 8 of the First Directorate of the DS, report (shorthand transcript) on the discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the Main Directorate for Intelligence of the MfS of the GDR, during his stay in Bulgaria from September 16 to 19, 1986 (Bulgarian), Nov. 22, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 121–128, here 123 f.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> See L. Nikolov, Department 8 of the First Central Committee, DS, Report on working consultations with German comrades from September 16 to 19, 1986, in Sofia, and specific agreements on individual joint projects (Bulgarian), October 7, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 103–107, here 104.

<sup>117</sup> The manuscript was completed by early June 1986 at the latest. See letter from

an East German doctor to Jakob Segal, June 2, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, n. p.

<sup>118</sup> distributed as early as during the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Harare in September 1986 as part of a brochure titled “AIDS – USA-home made evil, NOT imported from AFRICA” t.<sup>119</sup> A week before Mutz’s meeting with the Bulgarians, a diplomat from the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin had asked the Segals for a copy of their study.<sup>120</sup> This study and the Segals’ further work on AIDS were discussed by the KGB and the HV A in their exchanges with their Bulgarian colleagues as part of the OVO “Denver.”

The Segals’ manuscript advanced the theory propagated by the KGB in that it contained even more detailed information about the virus’s creation at Fort Detrick, its escape from the laboratory there, and its spread throughout the United States:

- The virus was allegedly created in 1977 at Fort Detrick through the recombination of parts of two other viruses (Visna and HTLV-1).
- The artificially created virus was then tested on prisoners near Fort Detrick, in exchange for the promise of early release from prison.<sup>121</sup>
- Due to the long incubation period of the artificially created virus, the pathogen was dismissed early on by those in charge at Fort Detrick as “insufficiently effective,” and the test prisoners were therefore released as healthy after approximately 12 to 18 months.
- “Criminals who had engaged in homosexual practices during their long prison terms apparently headed for the nearest major city upon their release”—so reads Segal’s manuscript. “It

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<sup>118</sup> Segal, Prof. Dr. Jakob; Segal, Dr. Lilli; Dehmlow, Dr. Ronald: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin. No place, no date, 52 pp. The authors thank Todd Leventhal of the “Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications” of the U.S. Department of State for providing a copy of the original study, which he had received at the time as Deputy , Head of the “Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation” in of the U.S. Information Agency.

<sup>119</sup> Segal, Prof. Dr. sc. Jakob; Segal, Dr. Lilli: AIDS: USA-home made evil, NOT imported from AFRICA, 2nd, revised edition. No place, no date. However, the following information was provided regarding the publication: “published on the occasion of the VIII Non-Aligned Summit in Harare (Zimbabwe) in 1986.”

<sup>120</sup> Information on activities of U.S. agencies in connection with a scientific study on the origin of AIDS, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 36 ff.

<sup>121</sup> Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), p. 12. See also Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 98.

“It is therefore logical that after the end of the incubation period, i.e., around 1979, the first AIDS cases were recorded exclusively among homosexual men in New York.”<sup>122</sup>

– AIDS subsequently spread throughout the world, originating in the gay community in New York.<sup>123</sup>

The Segals’ manuscript and subsequent publications contained numerous factual errors. For example, the genetic engineering technology required to artificially create a third virus from two existing ones<sup>124</sup> had not yet been invented in 1977. Furthermore, blood samples from 1959 existed that contained HIV antibodies, meaning that HI viruses could be detected more than 20 years before their alleged artificial creation. In addition, there were far fewer AIDS cases in the major cities of Baltimore and Washington, D.C., which are closer to Fort Detrick, than in New York. Moreover, there was no evidence whatsoever to support Segal’s claims regarding Fort Detrick itself, the existence of alleged test subjects, or their release from custody. Segal’s thesis was, on the whole, unscientific. Her “unbroken chain of evidence” consisted of “possibilities,” not “facts”; but the “Science demands verifiable facts .”<sup>125</sup> This was stated at the time by Professor Benno Müller-Hill, a leading West German molecular geneticist. He had already explained to Segal in a private correspondence in December 1985: “There is hard evidence that the virus was transmitted from monkeys to humans in Africa in 1979 and spread from there. [...] There is absolutely no evidence to support the claim that AIDS is a product of DNA manipulation.”<sup>126</sup>

Segal’s thesis also exhibited many characteristics commonly found in conspiracy theories, such as logical and heuristic errors. First, it attributed extraordinary capabilities to certain actors. In this case, the U.S. government

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 14 ff. See also Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 98.

<sup>124</sup> The U.S. State Department responded to Segal’s thesis by claiming: “The HTLV-I and VISNA viruses were first cloned in 1983 and sequenced in 1983 and 1985, respectively, several years after Segal claims they were manipulated to ‘create’ HIV-I.” U.S. DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 36.

<sup>125</sup> Müller-Hill, Prof. B.: Possibilities are proven by facts. In: Kruse, Kuno (ed.): AIDS: Pathogens from the Genetic Laboratory? Berlin [West] 1987, pp. 44–46, here 44.

<sup>126</sup> Letter from Müller-Hill to Prof. em. Dr. sc. Jakob Segal and Dr. agr. Lilli Segal, Dec. 12, 1985; quoted from: Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 101.

had to develop and apply specialized knowledge and skills in the field of genetic engineering at an early stage, long before they became publicly known.<sup>127</sup> Second, a large and growing number of people would have had to keep the knowledge of the conspiracy secret<sup>128</sup> —in this case, not only employees of the U.S. Department of Defense, but also the scientists at Fort Detrick and the prisoners used as test subjects. Not least among this group were prison officials who had approved the prisoners' participation in the experiment and their early release, as well as the doctors treating them. The Segals went even further in this direction by viewing all mass media in the U.S. and leading AIDS researchers as part of this conspiracy.<sup>129</sup>

In this context, the Segals highlighted the role of virologist Myron “Max” Essex of the Harvard School of Public Health and his hypothesis that AIDS originated naturally in Africa. He allegedly “launched” his hypothesis—or his “fairy tale”—in the mass media at a time when fears regarding the development of biological weapons and AIDS had created a “tense situation” in U.S. public opinion.<sup>130</sup> The Segals concluded: “His fairy tale was an attempt to misinform the public, which was concerned about the spread of AIDS; the attempt succeeded.”<sup>131</sup> The Segals had discovered an error in Essex’s statements. Although he and his co-researchers had reported in a scientific journal only of a close relationship between a retrovirus in

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<sup>127</sup> Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian: Conspiracy Theories. In: University of Chicago Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series 199 (2008), p. 5. Available online: Social Science Research Network, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1084585](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084585).

<sup>128</sup> Shermer, Michael: Conspiracy Theory Detector. In: Scientific American, December 2010. Available online: <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-conspiracy-theory-detector/?print=true>.

<sup>129</sup> The Segals wrote: “There was a risk of a massive public backlash should the production of biological weapons turn out to be the source of this catastrophe. To avoid ‘panic,’ the media, which had initially predicted five million patients in order to cash in on the sensationalism, soon reduced their estimates to a figure between two and three hundred thousand.” Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), p. 17.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 20 ff.

green monkeys and HIV,<sup>132</sup> Essex presented to the press an “informal hypothesis” that the AIDS pathogen had been transmitted from green monkeys to humans.<sup>133</sup> However, he retracted his “informal” hypothesis within a year, when further experiments showed that the viruses were not, after all, so closely related .

Although the Segals noted Essex’s retraction,<sup>134</sup> they continued to cite the green monkey hypothesis in their work and equated it with the broader theory of the HIV virus’s natural origin in Africa. The Segals used the hypothesis as a “straw man argument”<sup>135</sup> as follows: If one believes in a natural origin of the AIDS pathogen in Africa, one must believe in the (rejected) hypothesis of its origin in green monkeys, which the Segals and others had already proven to be false. If one does not accept this hypothesis, the only alternative is the Segals’ thesis of an artificial origin of the pathogen at Fort Detrick. All other hypotheses and studies pointing to a natural, African origin of HIV were either equated by the Segals with the green monkey theory or dismissed as fabrications intended to mislead the public.<sup>136</sup> The circle of scientists who had participated in the conspiracy or who were

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<sup>132</sup> Kanki, P. J.; Alroy, J.; Essex, M.: Isolation of a T-lymphotropic retrovirus related to HTLV-III/LAV from wild-caught African green monkeys. In: *Science* 230 (1985), pp. 951–954.

<sup>133</sup> Essex claims that he had stated as an “informal hypothesis” that HIV had originated in non-hominid primates in Africa. The press had “made too much of the word ‘green.’” Telephone interview, Myron Essex with Douglas Selvage, Dec. 20, 2013. Nevertheless, the press had directly quoted him at the time regarding the potential origin of the AIDS pathogen in green monkeys. See, e.g., Haney, Daniel Q., AP: Discovery of monkey AIDS virus may speed vaccine development, Apr. 14, 1985; AP News Archive. Available online: [www.apnewsarchive.com/1985/Discovery-Of-Monkey-AIDS-Virus-May-Speed-Vaccine-Development/id-d7f5a8979677d791edb3b04db2395c77](http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1985/Discovery-Of-Monkey-AIDS-Virus-May-Speed-Vaccine-Development/id-d7f5a8979677d791edb3b04db2395c77).

<sup>134</sup> Segal, Jakob; Segal, Lilli: AIDS – Nature and Origin. In: Kruse (ed.): *Pathogens from the Genetic Laboratory?* (note 125), pp. 79–127, here 103.

<sup>135</sup> A “straw man argument” is a logical fallacy in which the opponent’s original thesis in a debate is replaced by another. The substitute thesis, the “straw man,” is then attacked and refuted in place of the original thesis. See Walton, Douglas: *The straw man fallacy*. In: Bentham, Johan van et al. (eds.): *Logic and Argumentation*. Amsterdam 1996, pp. 115–128.

<sup>136</sup> Segal; Segal: *Nature and Origin* (note 134), pp. 103–106.

According to Segal's account, the belief that she had been misled thus became increasingly widespread—and Segal's thesis consequently increasingly improbable.

Scientific work on the African origin of AIDS became a “progressive research program” in the sense of the philosopher and philosopher of science Imre Lakatos: The Africa thesis repeatedly explained new findings regarding the epidemiology of AIDS.<sup>137</sup> New insights into retroviruses among primates and humans in and outside Africa corroborated it. Segal's thesis, by contrast, became a “degenerative research program” in which its proponents defended the original thesis without being able to respond to new developments. This is precisely where a third, typical characteristic of conspiracy theories becomes apparent.<sup>138</sup>

A fourth key characteristic of conspiracy theories was evident in the Segals' unwillingness to falsify their thesis.<sup>139</sup> For example, when faced with the criticism that the nearest major cities to Fort Detrick were not New York but Washington or Baltimore, they did not respond by acknowledging a flaw in their thesis or abandoning it. Instead, they made a minor change to the text: the prisoner-guinea pigs had, upon their release, simply gone to the nearby major city of New York.<sup>140</sup> They did not explain why.

Despite these logical and factual errors, the Segals' manuscript fit well with the KGB's plans to ostensibly provide scientific proof for the Fort Detrick theory—or at least to embellish it—and to “work on a broad front against the United States as the source.”<sup>141</sup> Although the Segals held Soviet citizenship and lived in East Berlin, they were frequently referred to in the Eastern and international press as

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<sup>137</sup> Lakatos, Imre: *Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs*. In: Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.): *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge 1970, pp. 91–196, here 126.

<sup>138</sup> Clarke, Steven: “Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing.” In: *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 32 (2002), pp. 131–150, here 136 ff.

<sup>139</sup> Reinalter: *The World Conspirators* (note 16), p. 17.

<sup>140</sup> Segal; Segal: *Nature and Origin* (note 134), p. 94.

<sup>141</sup> As stated by Ivanov in a bilateral conversation with Colonel D. Stankov at a multilateral meeting of the disinformation departments of the “brother agencies” in Budapest in June 1986. See L. Nikolov: *Report on the meeting held with Soviet friends during the international conference on AM in Hungary, May 11–17, 1986* (Bulgarian); COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4, a.e. 669, pp. 220 ff., here 221.

“French scientists” because they had lived in France in the 1930s and during World War II. This was intended to make the AIDS disinformation spread by the East appear to be supported by “Western” scientists.<sup>142</sup>

Even more crucial to the KGB’s disinformation campaign, however, was the Segals’ challenge to the green monkey hypothesis. Both the KGB and the Segals viewed the public announcement of the vervet monkey theory as an attempt to expose the thesis of HIV’s artificial origin as unscientific and to limit the damage to the U.S.’s reputation resulting from the Fort Detrick theory.<sup>143</sup> An offensive against this theory and the theory of African origin in general was intended to strengthen Soviet foreign propaganda and Soviet influence in Africa. A second article in *\*Literaturnaya Gazeta\** in May 1986 reported on the artificial origin of AIDS, citing a dispute that arose during the international symposium “AIDS in Africa” in Brussels in December 1985. After several Western scientists, including Essex, had presented the theory of the virus’s origin in green monkeys, a group of African researchers published a statement asserting that none of the conference documents contained “specific evidence” for an African origin of the virus. The question of the African origin of AIDS was removed from the agenda because “this version had a strong whiff of racism .”<sup>144</sup> Some African governments had even banned or canceled their scientists’ participation in the symposium. They feared negative effects on tourism if their country were associated with AIDS patients. And they rejected the theory of an African origin of AIDS as racist.<sup>145</sup> This reaction by many African

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<sup>142</sup> US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 35. See also Did AIDS originate in Pentagon laboratories? *Tribuna* [Prague], Oct. 15, 1986, p. 14 ff.; cited in: FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe, FBIS-EEU-86-207, Oct. 27, 1986, p. D5.

<sup>143</sup> See L. Nikolov: Report on the meeting held with Soviet colleagues during the international conference on AM in Hungary, May 11–17, 1986 (Bulgarian); COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 669, pp. 220 ff., here 221.

<sup>144</sup> The article quoted V. P. Sergiev, head of the Main Directorate for Quarantine-Contingent Diseases of the Soviet Ministry of Health, regarding the conference in Brussels. SPID (note 86), p. 15. See also Norman, Colin: Politics and Science Clash on African AIDS. In: Clarke, Loren K.; Potts, Malcolm (eds.): *AIDS Reader*, Vol. 1. Wellesley 1988, pp. 288–291.

<sup>145</sup> See, e.g., Klingholz, Reiner: “Tödliches Puzzle am Äquator.” In: *Die Zeit*, Feb. 28, 1986, <http://www.zeit.de/1986/10/toedliches-puzzle-am-aequator>; Nel-

n countries provided new ground for the Soviets' disinformation campaign. The Segals' position paper also took advantage of these new opportunities. It sought to refute the thesis of Essex and other Western scientists by referring to various follow-up meetings of the Brussels conference and a subsequent conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986, where it compiled corresponding counterarguments.<sup>146</sup>

#### 4.1 Science Between Ideology and Obstinacy: The Segals and Eastern Intelligence Agencies

Starting in 1986, the Segals and their research became the focus of the East German propaganda campaign on AIDS and the United States. Did the Segals work on behalf of the Stasi or the KGB? Or did they attempt to disseminate their thesis independently, only to be exploited for the purposes of East German and Soviet "Chekists" without their knowledge?

If one considers the question solely on the basis of the Segals' past, both possibilities could be considered plausible. As committed communists, Soviet citizens, and fighters against fascism and Western "imperialism," they had no reservations about collaborating with Soviet agencies and the Stasi. During World War II, as partisans in France, they received orders from Soviet government agencies. Due to their membership in the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and their involvement in communist organizations, the Jewish Segals were forced to flee from Germany to France after the Nazis came to power in 1933—

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Son, Harry: "African Nations Shun AIDS Research Reports." *LA Times*, Dec. 1, 1985, [http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-01/opinion/op-5439\\_1\\_aids-research](http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-01/opinion/op-5439_1_aids-research); Kocheleff, Paul: "AIDS in Burundi and South Africa: A Day-to-Day Experience." In: Denis, Phillipe; Becker, Charles (eds.): *The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa in a Historical Perspective*, Online Edition, pp. 143–154, here 146, <http://rds.refer.sn/IMG/pdf/14KOCHELEFF.pdf>; Africans' -resent -blame for AIDS, *St. Petersburg [Florida] Times*, Dec. 6, 1987, p. 1D; Fortin, Alfred J.: *The Politics of AIDS in Kenya*. In: Clarke; Potts (eds.): *AIDS Reader* (note 144), pp. 292–304, here 292–298.

<sup>146</sup> The Segals' paper included a 9-page addendum with quotes from posters at the International AIDS Conference in Paris in June 1986 and from the Brussels conference. See Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: *AIDS – Its Nature and Origin* (note 118), p. 18 and bibliography.

fled. In 1940, when Jakob Segal received his doctorate in biology from the Sorbonne, both Segals took Soviet citizenship. (Jakob Segal's family was originally from Lithuania.) Nevertheless, they remained in France, where they fought in the resistance against Nazi rule. In 1944, Lilli Segal was deported to Auschwitz but survived thanks to a successful escape during a work detail. In 1953, on orders from Moscow, they moved from France to East Berlin. Jakob Segal, who was appointed professor at Humboldt University, founded the Institute of General Biology there in 1953.<sup>147</sup> After their relocation, Captain Heinz Kairies from Section 2 of Department VI of the Stasi—responsible for the security and operational handling of nuclear research facilities in the GDR—contacted them *a f.*<sup>148</sup> Based on the meeting, during which Segal passed on information about West and East German scientists in nuclear research, Kairies' superior demanded: "Prepare S. [Segal] as a GI. Further consolidate contact. Assign tasks."<sup>149</sup> Both Segal<sup>150</sup> and his wife Lilli<sup>151</sup> were subsequently regarded by Kairies as contact persons (KP) in the sense of "trustworthy citizens" of the GDR, "who are approached to solve specific tasks."<sup>152</sup> According to Kairies, both Jakob and Lilli Segal offered to gather secret information for him.<sup>153</sup> On November 5, 1955, Kairies received instructions from the "Comrade Advisor" not to continue—

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<sup>147</sup> Voigt, Annette: Jakob Segal. In: Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship: Biographical Databases, Who Was Who in the GDR? <http://bundesstiftung-aufarbeitung.de/wer-war-wer-in-der-ddr-%2363%3B-1424.html?ID=3253>; Höxtermann, Ekkehard: Segal, Jakob. In: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 24 (2010), p. 159 ff.; available online: <http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd126674272.html>. On the order for their relocation to the GDR, see Segal, Lilli: *From Contradiction to Resistance. Memoirs of a Daughter from a Good Family*. Berlin 1986, p. 252.

<sup>148</sup> Kairies wrote of an earlier meeting with Segal "a quarter of a year ago." See Capt. Kairies, Dept. VI, Report, March 10, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 15–18, here 15. On Department VI/2, see Wiedmann, Roland: *The Service Units of the MfS 1950–1989. An Organizational Overview*. Berlin 2012, p. 50.

<sup>149</sup> See handwritten note on Kairies' report (note 148).

<sup>150</sup> Kairies, Report, Aug. 16, 1955 (note 148), pp. 34–35, here p. 35.

<sup>151</sup> Kairies, Report, Nov. 4, 1955 (note 148), pp. 39–42, here p. 39.

<sup>152</sup> Directive 1/58, Oct. 1, 1958, p. 205.

<sup>153</sup> See Kairies, Report, March 10, 1955, p. 18; Capt. Kairies, Dept. VI/2: Report on the meeting with Prof. Segal and his wife, June 22, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 30–32, here 31.

to hold further meetings with Jakob Segal because the KGB was working with him.<sup>154</sup> This note is so far the only reference to a connection between the KGB and Segal that can be found in the BStU archives. Despite the Soviet advisor's instructions, Kairies held another meeting with "KP Prof. Segal."<sup>155</sup> It would not be until May 22, 1957, that the next documented meeting took place.<sup>156</sup> Following further meetings in 1958 and 1959<sup>(157)</sup> Segal was finally registered in December 1959 by an officer named Jahn from Section 4 of Department VI—which was responsible for research and development facilities—as a secret informant under the code name "Hae[c]kel" (Reg. No. 15405/60).<sup>158</sup> This demonstrates a general willingness on the part of the Segals to cooperate secretly with the Stasi and the KGB.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Kairies, memo, Nov. 5, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, p. 43.

<sup>155</sup> Kairies, Dept. VI/2, meeting report, Nov. 23, 1955; *ibid.*, pp. 44–45.

<sup>156</sup> Major Kairies, Dept. VI/2, memo, May 25, 1957; *ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>157</sup> Only two can be verified. See [illegible], Lieutenant Colonel, Dept. VI/2, report, July 9, 1958; *ibid.*, pp. 49–53, and Major Kairies, Working Group for Guidance and Control, report, October 16, 1959; *ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>158</sup> Informant file "Haekel" [sic!], Reg. No. 15405/60; BStU, AR 2, F22; Informant file "Haek-kel"; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62. For Department VI/4, see Wiedmann: *The Service Units of the MfS* (note 148), p. 50.

<sup>159</sup> At a meeting with Kairies on March 10, 1955, Segal spoke of his earlier work for "the Enlightenment" in France until 1945 and offered to establish contact between the Stasi (Kairies: "us") and scientists who had possessed plans for a nuclear reactor. At the same meeting, he also suggested that the MfS (Kairies: "we") "stage a car accident [sic!]" to "eliminate" a scientist with alleged Nazi connections. Capt. Kairies, Dept. VI: Report on discussion with Prof. Dr. Segal, March 10, 1955; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 15–18, here 15 f. At a second meeting, Segal said "that he had told his wife about his connection to us and that she, too, would very much like to speak with us." Segal attested to her value as a source: "His wife often socializes with the wives of the other scientists and is now serving as an interpreter at the International Trade Union Congress." Kairies, Report on the discussion with Professor Segal on March 16, 1955; *ibid.*, pp. 19–20, here 20. At a meeting with Kairies on June 22, 1955, Jakob Segal denounced scientists who had spoken negatively about Walter Ulbricht's speech at the last Central Committee meeting. Lilli Segal, who was to travel to a women's congress in Lausanne in July 1955, had asked that "if we [i.e., the Stasi] have something to take care of in Switzerland, we give her this assignment for further handling." If the Stasi wished, she would also use her future position as director of the State Library to conduct "valuable investigations" for the Stasi (Kairies: "us") into "patent matters in

On the other hand, they displayed a certain degree of defiance toward the SED and the Stasi. As Soviet citizens and former resistance fighters, they felt free to criticize the SED and its policies.<sup>160</sup> In 1962, the Stasi even severed all ties with Jakob Segal entirely because of his defiance. Contrary to his handler's instructions, Segal had not left his position at Humboldt University to join the German Academy of Sciences. Since his information would have been of only a "general nature" anyway, further cooperation was, according to his handler, "pointless." The Stasi archived the materials on GI "Haeckel" that same year.<sup>161</sup> In 1967, the "Intelligence Administration" of the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR—that is, the military intelligence service—determined that the Segals "do not cooperate with any other agency, not even with Soviet intelligence."<sup>162</sup> There are no indications in Stasi files or index cards of any further registration of Jakob or Lilli Segal as contacts or unofficial collaborators of the Stasi until the mid-1980s.

Jakob Segal displayed the same blend of ideological loyalty and stubbornness in his scientific work. For example, in the 1950s he was one of the staunchest advocates of the Stalinist line in biology in the GDR, which was shaped by Trofim Lysenko's dogma that the hereditary characteristics of cultivated plants are determined by the environment and not by genes. Lysenkoism had already violated all the fundamentals of genetics during the Stalin era and was controversial in the GDR, where genetics was still tolerated and taught despite the official political line.<sup>163</sup> In 1958, Segal was praised by the SED party organ *\*Neues Deutschland\** for his textbook *\*The Dialectical Method in Biology\**, because, among other things, he made "a contribution to our ideological struggle" by "dealing with the false theory of 'science in

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West Berlin and West Germany." See Kairies, Report, June 22, 1955; *ibid.*, pp. 30–32, here 30 f.

<sup>160</sup> See, for example, the characterization of Jakob Segal, former director of the Institute for General Biology at Humboldt University in Berlin, March 18, 1983; BStU, MfS, HA VII/1, ZMA No. 935, pp. 56–66, here 60.

<sup>161</sup> Jahn, Dept. VI/4, decision, January 13, 1962; BStU, MfS, AIM 1459/62, pp. 71 ff., here 72.

<sup>162</sup> Capt. Wilke, Subdivision 12/1, Ministry of National Defense of the GDR, file note, Feb. 24, 1961; BStU, MfS, AVA 5276/75, pp. 167–169, here 168.

<sup>163</sup> Hagemann, Rudolf: How did East German genetics avoid Lysenkoism? In: *Trends in Genetics* 18 (2002) 6, pp. 320–324, here 321; Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin: Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

“deals with.”<sup>164</sup> Professor Hans-Alfred Rosenthal, director of the Institute of Virology at the Charité in East Berlin, later claimed that Segal continued to advocate Lyssenko’s ideas—including the non-existence of genes—even after Lyssenko himself had already abandoned them.<sup>165</sup> A natural science that was not subordinated to ideology or did not serve it seemed inconceivable to Segal.

He evidently relished advocating self-concocted scientific hypotheses against established science, despite all evidence and despite all previous research. After he had turned his back on Lysenkoism, for example, he developed his own “folded drum model” of molecular protein structure, which he contrasted with the generally accepted helix model.<sup>166</sup> When journalist Monika Maron pointed out the opinions of other scientists regarding his theory in an interview, he replied:

“You know, you have to have a certain amount of arrogance and tell yourself: First, I’m right. Second, I have seven Nobel laureates against me, but I’m still right. Third, the others are wrong. It may take two hundred years before they understand that, but I’m right.”<sup>167</sup>

To some East German scientists, Segal was regarded as a “nonconformist”<sup>168</sup>, to others simply as a nuisance. Rosenthal explained in a private conversation in 1987: “Prof. Segal suffers from the compulsive notion that he must always hold a different opinion than the prevailing orthodoxy. [He] proclaims his theories as absolute truths, even though their untenability has long been proven.”<sup>169</sup> This is how Rosenthal explained in 1987 Segal’s insistence on the Fort Detrick theory of the origin of AIDS against all scientific evidence and against the conviction not only of others

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<sup>164</sup> Vogel, H.; Oberlände, K. H.: *The Dialectical Method in Biology*. On an interesting work by Prof. Segal. Neues Deutschland (ND), Dec. 20, 1958, p. 9.

<sup>165</sup> Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin: Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

<sup>166</sup> Löther, Rolf: *Memories of My Academic Career*. In: Jahn, Ilse; Wessel, Andreas (eds.): *Toward a Philosophy of Biology*. Munich 2010, pp. 81–96, here 86.

<sup>167</sup> Maron, Monika: *A Scientist. An Encounter with Professor Jacob Segal*. In: *Wochenpost*, Nov. 8, 1974, p. 16 ff.; cited in: Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 107.

<sup>168</sup> Löther: *Memoirs* (note 166), p. 86.

<sup>169</sup> Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin: Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

scientists in the West, but also his colleagues in the GDR and the Soviet Union.

Based on his earlier research and work, it seems entirely possible that Jakob Segal arrived at his thesis on the origin of HIV independently and championed it as a lone fighter, together with his wife, in the service of combating American “imperialism.” In any case, he was a staunch believer in his own thesis, to which he remained faithful even after the collapse of communism and until his death in 1995.

However, given their background, it cannot be ruled out that the Segals developed and disseminated their thesis in collaboration with or on behalf of the KGB or the Stasi. Former HV A officers Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer claimed in 1992 that the Main Administration A was behind it. The apparatus itself had formulated the theory, which was only later taken up and published by Jakob Segal.<sup>170</sup> Based on his correspondence with the journalist Klaus Behling (who, incidentally, cited Bohnsack as a source for the KGB’s AIDS disinformation in his book), the historian Thomas Boghardt described in somewhat more nuanced terms that the HV A/X had presumably supplied Segal with relevant materials. This was intended to lead him to the—from the HV A/X’s perspective—

“correct conclusion”—that the AIDS pathogen had been artificially produced at Fort Detrick.<sup>172</sup> According to Boghardt’s account, Segal was a “dupe” manipulated and controlled by HV A.<sup>173</sup>

#### 4.2 Research in coordination with Central Committee Secretary Axen, 1985 to 1986

Contrary to the claims made by Bohnsack, Brehmer, and Boghardt, no evidence has yet been found in the archives of the BStU<sup>174</sup> or in the archives of the Bulgarian secret police or intelligence service to suggest that the HV A or the MfS instructed or influenced Jakob Segal to begin his research on AIDS. According to the current state of the files, in the summer of 1985

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<sup>170</sup> Bohnsack; Brehmer: Auftrag Irreführung (note 3), p. 219 ff.

<sup>171</sup> Behling: Retired Scout (note 43), p. 253.

<sup>172</sup> Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 9 and footnote 51.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>174</sup> Geißler: AIDS Conspiracy (note 20).

began his investigations on his own initiative and in consultation with the Central Committee secretary for international relations, Hermann Axen. The first indication in the BStU archives that the HV A had contacted Segal dates from July 1986, by which time the German version of his study—which was used for the brochure in Harare—was already partially complete.

It would not be unusual for Jakob Segal to have come to his AIDS research on his own, and not just because of his background. At the time he began his research, there were several prominent figures in the GDR and in the West who, without any demonstrable influence from the Stasi or the KGB, spoke or wrote about the artificial creation of the AIDS pathogen through genetic engineering or about a conspiracy by the U.S. government to produce or spread it.<sup>175</sup> To name just a few examples: As mentioned above, gay rights activists in the U.S. had already written as early as 1983 about an alleged secret role of the U.S. government in connection with the AIDS epidemic.<sup>176</sup> Erika Hickel,

the “chief genetic engineering critic” of the Green Party, spoke before the Bundestag in January 1985 about the artificial creation of the AIDS pathogen.<sup>177</sup> An IMS agent named “Albert Heim” also put forward the theory of the virus’s artificial creation at Fort Detrick to the Stasi as early as September 1985.<sup>178</sup> Another East German scientist, the biochemist Samuel Mitja Rapoport, sought to publish an essay in the East German press in November 1985 on the alleged origin of HIV at Fort Detrick.<sup>179</sup>

According to current knowledge, Segal began his AIDS research in the summer of 1985.<sup>180</sup> As early as the beginning of October 1985—that is, before Zapewalow’s article—he wrote privately of “suspicious circumstances [...] suggesting that AIDS originated through genetic manipulation at the U.S. biological warfare research center at Fort Detrick.” Furthermore, he noted that broadcasts and articles on the hypothesis regarding the green monkeys

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<sup>175</sup> Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 96 ff.

<sup>176</sup> See, e.g., Shively: *Speaking Out* (note 73), p. 5.

<sup>177</sup> Geißler: “Better AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 96, including footnote 42.

<sup>178</sup> HA XVIII/5, Stasi: Report: Thesis on AIDS, Nov. 19, 1985; BStU, Stasi, HA XVIII, No. 19131, pp. 6–9.

<sup>179</sup> Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 97.

<sup>180</sup> This is what Segal claimed in private to an East German scientist. See letter from Jakob Segal to an East German geneticist, July 16, 1987; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, n. p.

had the task of “misleading the public.”<sup>181</sup> Nevertheless, as he privately admitted, his research was influenced by the articles in *\*Patriot\** and *\*Literaturnaya Gazeta\**, and therefore, at least indirectly, by the KGB as well. His arguments incorporated many points from the two articles—most importantly, the precise localization of the allegedly artificial origin of the HIV virus at Fort Detrick; an additional fabrication by the KGB that went beyond the prevailing conspiracy theories in the U.S. and Europe.<sup>182</sup> Given his prior connection, a direct influence of the KGB on Segal’s research cannot be ruled out, but there is no evidence to date of such influence.<sup>183</sup>

Segal’s first report on the origins of AIDS had already been completed by December 1985.<sup>184</sup> It was presumably a “literature review” on AIDS that he wrote together with his wife. In January 1986, Department 7 of HA VII of the Stasi received a copy by chance—that is, without having requested it—from its informant candidate “Nils.”<sup>185</sup> This is the earliest verifiable date on which the Stasi became aware of Segal’s research.<sup>186</sup> The “literature study” already contained the points listed above, which also became part of the later scientific study and the brochure for Harare.<sup>187</sup>

The Stasi was able to learn a great deal about Segal’s research from “Nils,” who was in fact the chemist Ronald Dehmlow,

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<sup>181</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to a “comrade,” SED-KL, Deutscher Fernsehfunk, Berlin, Oct. 3, 1985; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, n.p.

<sup>182</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to Benno Müller-Hill, Dec. 2, 1985; cited in: Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 114; Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 31.

<sup>183</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 2.

<sup>184</sup> Jakob Segal: 1st Memorandum on the AIDS Issue for the Axen Department, Central Committee of the SED, August 27, 1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, n. p. At the end of August 1986, he wrote to Axen that he had already compiled his first report on the origin of AIDS nine months earlier—i.e., by the end of December 1985.

<sup>185</sup> The MfS’s HA VII/7 received the following “interim report” on the Segals’ research on AIDS on January 21, 1986: On the Origin [sic] of AIDS, Literature Study by Dr. Lilli Segal and Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal, undated; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, vol. 1, pp. 35–47. The “literature study” was handed over to HA VII/7 by informant candidate “Nils” on January 21, 1986. See Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Report on a further contact meeting with the IM candidate “Nils,” January 22, 1986; *ibid.*, pp. 24 ff., here 24.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 45.

<sup>187</sup> Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), throughout.

the co-author of the Segal thesis mentioned earlier. Dehmlow had known Jakob Segal since 1978. As a student at Humboldt University, he began conducting research with Segal on ultraviolet B (UVB) radiation and oxygen therapy (HOT).<sup>188</sup> He continued this joint research, now also on AIDS, at the People's Police Hospital (KHdVP) in Berlin. The Stasi had been aware of Dehmlow for quite some time. During his student years, from 1975 to February 1984, he was registered as an informant "Niels" by HV A/XI/6.<sup>189</sup> Shortly after he was hired at the KHdVP, he was contacted by staff from HA VII/7<sup>190</sup> and, starting in December 1984, registered as an informant candidate "Nils" (now without the "e")<sup>191</sup> and, starting in June 1986, as an informant "Nils" (Reg. No. XV 2987/86)<sup>192</sup> was conducted. Although the officers of HA VII/7 "Nils" primarily to secure their area of responsibility—i.e., the

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<sup>188</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 34.

<sup>189</sup> From 1975 to February 1984, Dehmlow was registered as informant "Niels" (reg. no. XV 1788/75) by Kurt Zeichner (from 1987 under the working name "Kurt Reiss," second working name "Kurt Bender") of HV A/XI/6. Regarding Dehmlow and

"Niels": see BStU, AR 2, MfS, RoHo, F16, and F22, Reg. No. XV 1788/75. The subsequent registration of Dehmlow by HA VII/7 was noted on F16 in RoHo. Apparently, the informant file "Niels" was archived due to the informant's identity being compromised. See Olt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," Aug. 27, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 307 ff., here 308. On Kurt Zeichner/Kurt Reiss, see: Reiss, Kurt; Cadre Index Card (KKK); BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; and the following cards in: BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16: Zeichner, Kurt, Employee (MA) Card; Reiss, Kurt, MA Card; Zeichner, Kurt, Reg. No. XV 1093/62; Bender, Kurt, Reg. No. XV 1093/62. Dehmlow denies ever having worked as an informant for the Stasi. Interview with Dehmlow by Selvage, Oct. 31, 2013.

<sup>190</sup> Dehmlow was not contacted by staff members of HA VII/7 until 1984 regarding a matter he had raised. Because Dehmlow claimed to have worked for three years during the period he was registered as the informant "Niels" for HV A/XI/6 under the cover of a civilian employee of the NVA, Zeichner allegedly promised that these three years would be counted as service time toward Dehmlow's new position at the government hospital. Because these three years were not counted by the KHdVP, Dehmlow contacted Reiss. The HA VII/7, which was responsible for the KHdVP, therefore contacted Dehmlow in October 1984. See Nagel, HA VII/7: Handwritten notes from the meeting with Gen. Dr. Dehmlow, Oct. 26, 1984; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 3 ff.

<sup>191</sup> Major Nagel, HA VII/7: Note on contact meeting with IM candidate "Niels," Dec. 21, 1984; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 5–6. The "e" was

omitted in the next note. See Nagel, HA VII/7: Note, Jan. 31, 1985; *ibid.*, p. 12.  
<sup>192</sup> Theisinger, HA VII/7: Decision: De-archiving due to transfer, April 21, 1988; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, pp. 74 ff.

Government Hospital—to spy on his colleagues,<sup>193</sup> Dehmlow repeatedly provided them with reports and documents on the Segals' AIDS research, even though they had absolutely no interest in it.<sup>194</sup> As he himself recalls, Dehmlow met with Jakob Segal every one to two weeks to discuss the Segals' progress in AIDS research. Because of these regular discussions and his assistance with translating the English version of the study, Jakob Segal would have listed him as a co-author of the study.<sup>195</sup>

From the outset, the purpose of the Segals' AIDS research was not purely scientific. As mentioned above, Jakob Segal did not believe in natural science detached from communist ideology. In a conversation with Dehmlow and his superior, the Medical Director of the KHdVP, Reinhard Uhlig, in June 1986, he admitted that his research was also intended to serve “propaganda purposes.” Such a use fit with his contact at the time with Axen, who was responsible for foreign propaganda. Segal agreed with Uhlig that Dehmlow's name should not be mentioned in such propaganda cases.<sup>196</sup> In the case of the version of his study that appeared in the Harare brochure, Segal adhered to the agreement. The only change to the text was the removal of Dehmlow's name; all that remained of him was a telltale comma after the names of the two Segals.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> For more on the focus of “IMS,” see Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: “Unofficial Collaborator for Political-Operational Penetration and Securing of the Area of Responsibility (IMS).” In: Engelmann et al. (eds.): *MfS Lexicon* (note 27), p. 174. At a meeting in August 1987, Theisinger instructs “Nils” that his “priority” should be “defensive work.” Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting Report: IMS “Nils,” Aug. 27, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 307 ff., here 308.

<sup>194</sup> In a report on a meeting with “Nils” in September 1986, Theisinger wrote: “During the meeting, the IMS was clearly informed that not all academic issues he brings to our agency are of operational interest.” Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting report, IMS “Niels,” Sept. 10, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 132 ff., here 133.

<sup>195</sup> Interview with Dehmlow by Selvage, October 31, 2013.

<sup>196</sup> Segal and Uhlig further agreed that Dehmlow's name and place of work (KHdVP) would be mentioned only in joint scholarly publications in the GDR. In scientific publications abroad, he could be named, but not his place of work, the KHdVP. Nagel, HA VII/7: Report on a brief meeting held with IMS “Nils,” June 5, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 72 ff., here 73.

<sup>197</sup> Segal; Segal: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin, p. 1. In: Segal; Segal: AIDS: USA-home made evil (note 119).

As early as the spring of 1986, Segal began disseminating his research findings internationally for propaganda purposes. On March 12, 1986, for example, he sent his findings to a Japanese professor in Hiroshima with the following recommendation:

“We hope that you will be able to publish this material in Japan, either in its entirety—which would be best, since only the full set of arguments constitutes sound evidence—or in the form of materials for public lectures, short articles in the press, and so on. The people of Japan are certainly interested in knowing the origin of this new plague, whose casualties will soon surpass those of Hiroshima, with the promise of a death even more dreadful than that caused by radiation.”<sup>198</sup>

On the same day, he sent a German version to Prof. Volkmar Sigusch, director of the Institute for Sexual Research at Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. Segal had learned of Sigusch’s plan to publish an anthology on the origin of AIDS.<sup>199</sup> Segal wrote regarding the manuscript:

“There is currently a tendency to downplay the dangers of biological warfare compared to the nuclear threat. Knowledge of the actual origin of AIDS could help make the public more vigilant regarding this source of danger, which is by no means any less significant.”<sup>200</sup>

On June 17, 1986, Jakob Segal attempted to convey his thesis to a scientist in Cameroon with the help of a mutual friend:

“[...] You have probably already heard from [our mutual friend] that I have conducted a study with my colleagues on the origin of AIDS, which clearly shows that AIDS originated in the United States and that an African origin of this epidemic is completely ruled out. I assume that medical professionals and journalists in your country would be interested in these findings. I therefore ask you to forward the enclosed material to interested parties. [...]

In the event that biologists or medical professionals are interested in our work, please inform them that a new edition of the study is in preparation.

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<sup>198</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to a Japanese professor, March 12, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, Japan, n. p.

<sup>199</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation Squared (note 9), p. 19.

<sup>200</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to a West German scholar, March 12, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 13, n. p.

“It will take into account the specialist literature up to April 1986 and contain a complete bibliography.”<sup>201</sup>

His correspondence suggests that Segal was equally interested in the publication of his study in various languages as a brochure or in excerpts in newspapers—i.e., for propaganda purposes—and in scholarly journals. This means that even before the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, he was a deliberate disseminator of the Fort Detrick thesis in coordination with Axen in the SED Central Committee and indirectly on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, which dictated the line of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in foreign propaganda, including on the question of the origin of AIDS. Despite its use for propaganda purposes, Segal did not view his own thesis as disinformation, but rather as an uncomfortable truth that confirmed his own image of the enemy as U.S. “imperialism.”

#### 4.3 The Segals, the HV A, and the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, September 1986

While, according to current knowledge, Segal began his AIDS research independently of the MfS, the HV A contacted him prior to the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare. According to a report by Dehmlow and the comments of his case officer, the HV A took an interest in his research and offered him advice on it. It stands to reason that Segal was aware that the Stasi was using his study for propaganda purposes in the run-up to and during the summit.

On July 31, 1986, Dehmlow, operating as IMS “Nils,” urgently reported to his handler, Lt. Axel Theisinger, that Segal had “compromised his cover” with him. During a discussion with Dehmlow about his AIDS research, Segal had stated that “the comrades in security had advised him to do so.” Until then, Segal had always referred to the “Party” as his client. Theisinger further reported: “The IMS [i.e., Dehmlow] realized [...] that the professor might be in contact with the ‘friends’ [i.e.,

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<sup>201</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to a Cameroonian scientist in Yaoundé, June 17, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, folder: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy, n. p.

the KGB] or the MfS.”<sup>202</sup> Yet Theisinger himself knew full well for whom Segal was conducting his research at that time. He noted that Segal “was positively registered with HV A and was conducting AIDS research on behalf of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Axen, and HV A, and was undertaking trips in this context [context] to New South Wales.”<sup>203</sup> However, the unit that had positively registered Segal was not HV A/X, but Section 5 of Department XIII in the Science and Technology Sector of the HV A (HV A/SWT/XIII/5).<sup>204</sup> The wording “Positively registered” was a term used by the Stasi to describe a person who worked for the Stasi.<sup>205</sup>

On behalf of HV A/X, Mutz informed his Bulgarian counterpart in September 1986 that HV A/X was “cooperating with the operational department on the [AIDS] issue” in the preparation of disinformation.<sup>206</sup> The “operational department” responsible for espionage activities in the field of AIDS and biotechnology or genetic engineering was Unit HV A/SWT/XIII/5, headed by Lutz Thielemann.<sup>207</sup> He was the superior of

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<sup>202</sup> Theisinger, HA VII/7: Information on Prof. Dr. Segal, Jakob, recorded by HV A/SWT/13, Gen. Tiedemann [actually Thielemann], July 31, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 113 ff., here 114.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>204</sup> Theisinger, Information, July 31, 1986, p. 113.

<sup>205</sup> See, for example, the memo from HA I/Department MfNV, Special Administrations Section, to the Dresden Regional Office, Cadres and Training Department, November 21, 1968; BStU, MfS, KS 21175/90, p. 160; Capt. Förster, Dept. III/2, memo, Feb. 2, 1976; BStU, MfS, AP 14313/76, pp. 37 ff.; memo from Lt. Col. Berndt, deputy head of HV A/II/4, to Gen. Palme, Dept. III of the MfS, Feb. 9, 1976; BStU, MfS, AP 14313/76, pp. 39 ff.; Förster, Dept. III of the MfS, order for archiving, Sept. 3, 1976; BStU, MfS, AP 14313/76, p. 144.

<sup>206</sup> Lieutenant D. Stankow, Head of Department 8 of the First Directorate of the DS, report (shorthand transcript) on the discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance of the Stasi of the GDR, during his stay in Bulgaria from September 16 to 19, 1986 (Bulgarian), Nov. 22, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 121–128, here 123 f.

<sup>207</sup> The most successful informants (IMs) of HV A in the fields of Western AIDS research and genetic engineering were, however, not managed by HV A/SWT/XIII/5, but by Department XV of the BV Berlin. Their most prolific informant, providing information on West German AIDS research, was IM “Katharina.” From 1985 to 1989, “Katharina” provided at least 68 pieces of information on AIDS research and genetic engineering to the MfS. (Search query: “QUA.RG NR=”XV/349/85” yields 68 reports in SIRA-TDB 11. See

BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/2, SIRA-TDB 11.) The informant "Harry" (XV/2329/74), a

Lieutenant Colonel Dieter van de Sand, for whom Jakob Segal was registered. Lilli Segal was also registered by the HV A/SWT/XIII/5 unit.<sup>208</sup> The “Security” department’s advice to Jakob Segal would have been channeled through the registering unit, HV A/SWT/XIII/5.

After the Stasi had made contact with Jakob Segal, he and his wife Lilli served as advocates for the Fort Detrick theory of the KGB and HV A during the summit in Harare. In the run-up to and during the summit, a mimeographed brochure containing the aforementioned English version of their study, “AIDS – Its Nature and Origin,” was distributed. The brochure, which listed the Segals as authors, bore the title, “AIDS: USA-made evil, NOT Imported from AFRICA.” The brochure

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An employee at Schering AG in West Berlin, he was arguably the most successful informant in the field of Western and West German genetics and biotechnology. Between 1975 and 1989, he demonstrably provided 729 pieces of information to HV A on these and other topics—primarily internal, confidential documents from Schering AG. (The search query “QUE.RGNR=”\*/2329/74” yields a total of 426 pieces of incoming information in SIRA-TDB 11 and a total of 303 in SIRA-TDB 12. See BStU, MfS, SIRA-TDB 11, and SIRA-TDB 12. Regarding “Harry,” see also Reg. No. XV/2329/74; BStU, MfS, RoHo F16.) Much of the information from

“Harry” was forwarded by HV A to the KGB.

<sup>208</sup> On October 23, 1986, Colonel Oldenburg forwarded a report from HV A/IX/C regarding the American diplomats’ visit to the Segals to HA II/3, the department responsible for counterintelligence. In the report, the Segals were described as “a couple of scientists registered with DE HV A/SWT/XIII.” See memo from Colonel Oldenburg, Deputy Head, HV A/IX/C, to OSL Häseler, HA II/3, October 23, 1986, with attachment, report on activities of the U.S. agency in connection with a scientific paper on the origin of AIDS, Undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 50–52, here p. 51. The surveillance of Jakob Segal was specified in greater detail in a report from Department XX/3 of the Berlin Regional Office of the MfS dated March 25, 1987: “HV A XIII/5/183.” See Dept. XX/3, Berlin Regional Office, report on Prof. Segal’s activities regarding the dissemination of his views on the origin of the AIDS virus (LAV), March 18, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, Vol. 7101, pp. 304 ff. Van de Sand’s agent number in HV A was 183. See van de Sand, Dieter, MA file; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16. Van de Sand was also registered under his birth name, Dieter Bahr, as informant “Behrend” (XV 6331/81) by HV A/XIII/5 from 1981 to 1985 (as a HIM starting in 1983) and received a false ID from the MfS under the alias “Dieter Behrend.” BStU, AR 2, RoHo F 16 for Bahr, Dieter, Reg. No. XV 6331/81 and for Behrend, Dieter, Reg. No. XV 1093/62; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16; for van de Sand, Dieter, KKK; BStU, AR

2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM.

also included an introduction by an anonymous author,<sup>209</sup> who summarized their arguments in a somewhat more propagandistic manner. The \*Sunday Mail\* of Harare published an article on Segal's thesis on its front page. It quoted from the introduction but cited the Segals ("French scientists") as the source. The hypothesis about the green monkeys was a "massive and racist deception" by the U.S. and represented an attempt to "sweep the white man's latest filth onto the black man's doorstep."<sup>210</sup> Furthermore, a review of the brochure appeared in the Zimbabwean journal "Social Change and Development," which was widely circulated, particularly in African media, following the summit and served as an additional channel for popularizing the Fort Detrick thesis.<sup>211</sup> In the Federal Republic of Germany, the "Evangelische Pressedienst" (epd) included the review as a "document" in its epd-Entwicklungspolitik news service. The epd editorial team commented positively on this: "The French doctors Jakob and Lilli Segal present compelling reasons why the AIDS virus did not originate in Africa, but in U.S. laboratories conducting research on biological weapons."<sup>212</sup> In the second edition of the mimeographed brochure "AIDS: USA-home made evil," an excerpt from the review in "Social Change and Development" was printed on the back cover along with the journal's address.<sup>213</sup>

The author of the introduction and the publisher of the brochure remain unknown to this day. In March 1987, Jakob Segal wrote to a Japanese professor about the mimeographed brochure: "African journalists had it [i.e., Segal's study] transformed into a brochure, werry [sic!] cor-

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<sup>209</sup> See the introduction, "AIDS in Africa," n. p. In: Segal; Segal: AIDS: USA-home made evil (note 119). In the introduction, the author referred to the Segals in the third person as "scientific experts" and to "their" study.

<sup>210</sup> US germ warfare blunder started AIDS, say scientists. In: Sunday Mail (Harare) Aug. 24, 1986, p. 1.

<sup>211</sup> Book Review: "AIDS – USA – Home-Made Evil, Not Imported from Africa." In: Social Change and Development 14 (1986), pp. 34–37. The authors thank Prof. Geißler for providing a copy of the review. Because Prof. Geißler had not received a copy of the brochure for review by that time, he originally concluded that this four-page review of the same name was distributed in Harare in the form of the aforementioned brochure. See Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), pp. 124, 128 ff.

<sup>212</sup> AIDS – Not from Africa, but from the U.S. In: epd-Entwicklungspolitik 3 (1987), pp. r–t. The editorial commentary can be found on page "r".

<sup>213</sup> See Segal; Segal: AIDS: USA-home made evil (note 119).

“home-made.”<sup>214</sup> In a public statement in 1992, Segal spoke of “African experts” who had compiled the brochure.<sup>215</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know who the “African journalists” or “Experts”—if such people even existed. Even if the individuals in question had compiled or distributed the publication, this does not rule out the involvement of the HV A, the KGB, or their “sister agencies,” particularly since it was standard practice to use journalists outside the Eastern Bloc as “channels” for their disinformation. An active role by the HV A/X in the publication of the brochure cannot be ruled out, especially since it regarded the international dissemination of Segal’s thesis as part of its “Denver” operation.

The same applies to the distribution of the brochure in the run-up to and during the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare.<sup>216</sup> Boghardt claimed, based on his correspondence with Bohnsack,<sup>217</sup> that two officers from HV A/X had traveled to Harare specifically to monitor the distribution of the brochure: the HV A/X officer responsible for disinformation within the NPG movement (“Vorwärts II,” Reg. No. XV 3741/73), deputy head of the HV A/X/1 division, Captain Hans Pfeifer,<sup>218</sup> presumably

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<sup>214</sup> Letter, Jakob Segal to a Japanese professor, March 2, 1987; BArch, NY 4516, prelim. K. 12, n. p. Based on this letter, Geißler concluded that the brochure contained only a summary of Segal’s study. See Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 128.

<sup>215</sup> Prof. Jakob Segal, Public Statement, Jan. 30, 1992; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 7, n. p.

<sup>216</sup> L. Nikolov, Department 8 of the First Central Committee, DS, Report on working consultations held with German comrades from September 16 to 19, 1986, in Sofia, and specific agreements on individual joint projects (Bulgarian), October 7, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 103–107, here 104. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence (or counterevidence) regarding the distribution of the study on HV A in the files of the BStU, because the documents pertaining to OVO “Denver,” like most of the HV A holdings, have been destroyed or have disappeared. In any case, based on the current state of the files, an involvement of HV A/X in the distribution cannot be ruled out. See Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 114.

<sup>217</sup> Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 22, footnote 56.

<sup>218</sup> Vorwärts II, Reg. No. XV 3741/73; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8242043; Pfeifer, Hans; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; Pfeifer, Hans; MA card; BStU, MfS, RoHo, F16. The HV A described “Vorwärts” as follows: “Measures to support the anti-imperialist character of the NPG.” See MfS: Draft: Plan for joint or coordinated active measures—

under his working name “Hans Glaser,”<sup>219</sup> and the experienced, long-time HV A/X employee Horst Schötzki (OibE “Schatz”), presumably under his cover as a journalist for the East German magazine “Horizont.”<sup>220</sup> The “Denver” operation fell within Pfeifer’s area of responsibility. Even if neither of them had been in Harare,<sup>221</sup> the HV A could have drawn on sufficient personnel through its legally covered residency (LAR) there at the GDR embassy. For the year 1986, there is documentation of six OibE and IM who provided reports to the HV A via the LAR—including the presumed HV A resident in Zimbabwe, Gerhart Hofmann (OibE “Joachim,” Reg. No. XV 327/73, HV A/III/8), operating under the cover of First Secretary of the GDR Embassy in Sim-

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measures for 1984, Aug. 23, 1983; ABS, A. No. 81282/117, pp. 64–70, here 64. See also Bohnsack, Günter: *Die Legende stirbt*. Berlin 1997, p. 37.

<sup>219</sup> “Hans Glaser,” Reg. No. XV 1093/62; BStU, MfS, RoHo F16.

<sup>220</sup> Schötzki, Horst; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; BStU, AR 2, Dept. Fin./Dept. 6-BSK-HIM/OibE; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16, Reg. No. XV 313/69; BStU, AR 2, RoHo F22, Reg. No. XV 313/69; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV 8243824. On

Schötzki, see also Stadt, Jochen; Voigt, Tobias; Wollé, Stefan: *Feind-Bild*. Springer: Ein Verlag und seine Gegner. Göttingen 2009, p. 141. Schötzki published a firsthand account of the summit meeting in “Horizont.” See Schötzki, Horst: *Bewegung mit wachsendem Gewicht*. *Horizont* 19 (1986) 10, p. 22 ff. It is possible that Schötzki provided two pieces of information to the MfS on September 25, 1986, based on conversations in Harare—one “on the situation in the Philippines” and the second “on the situation in South Africa.” See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12, SE8607335 and SE8607336.

<sup>221</sup> By interviewing five conference participants, Geißler and a co-author claimed to have determined that neither Schötzki nor Pfeifer had attended the NPG conference. Geißler: *AIDS and Its Pathogens* (note 13), p. 129. Geißler’s unfounded equating of a possible presence of Geißler and Pfeifer in Harare during the summit with a presence at or on the sidelines of the summit is likely attributable to Boghardt’s erroneous assertion that Segal’s thesis, or at least AIDS, were topics of discussion at the summit and were mentioned in the meeting’s final document. As Geißler has already shown, this was simply not the case. *Ibid.* Boghardt could easily have verified his erroneous claim by consulting the summit’s final document. See *Final Document for the Eighth NAM Presidential Summit*, Sept. 1–6, 1986. In: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS): *Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Database*, NAM Summits, Official Documents; available online: [http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official\\_Document/8th\\_Summit\\_FD\\_Harare\\_Declaration\\_1986\\_Whole.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/8th_Summit_FD_Harare_Declaration_1986_Whole.pdf)

Zimbabwe<sup>222</sup> and OibE “Alexander” of HV A/III/8, Axel Juch, under the cover name “Abdek-kung” as second secretary of the embassy.<sup>223</sup> Even the GDR ambassador to Zimbabwe, Hans-Georg Schleicher, was registered as informant “Henry” of HV A/III/8.<sup>224</sup> In the run-up to the summit, the head of HV A/X, Wolfgang Wagenbreth, and his deputy Mutz were already speaking of a completed “activation” of the LAR for active measures during the summit.<sup>225</sup>

Whatever role HV A may or may not have played in disseminating Segal’s thesis during the summit, the First HV of

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<sup>222</sup> BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8205606; Hofmann, Gerhart; BStU, MfS, RoHo F16; Hofmann, Gerhart; BStU, AR 2, HA II/Dept. 14-VSH. During his assignment in Zimbabwe, more information (at least 77 items) was received under the registration number of the suspected resident agent Hofmann than from any other source. Furthermore, Hofmann was directly supervised by the head of the department responsible for Africa and South America, HV A III/8, Lieutenant Colonel Jürgen Gehrlich. (See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8205606; and regarding Gehrlich, see Müller-Enbergs: Headquarters A (note 28), p. 86.) The files of other verifiable OibE and IM agents in the residency, with one exception, were maintained by the HV A III/8 officer responsible for Zimbabwe, Ulrich Härtel. (IMA “Theo,” Reg. No. XV/766/83, ZV8223048; IMA “Jörg,” Reg. No. XV/2709/78, ZV8240235; IMA “Palmer,” XV/4500/86, ZV8226315; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21).

<sup>223</sup> See Juch, Axel, Reg. No. XV 1972/75; BStU, MfS, RoHo, F 16; PNA “Alexander,” Reg. No. XV 1972/75; *ibid.*, F22; Juch, Axel, cadre index card; BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; and regarding his assignment at the embassy in Zimbabwe: Juch, Axel; BStU, AR 2, HA II/14-VSH.

<sup>224</sup> See Schleicher, Hans-Georg, Reg. No. VIII 1854/64; BStU, MfS, RoHo, F 16; IM “Henry,” Reg. No. VIII 1854/64; *ibid.*, F22. The file on “Henry” was also maintained by Härtel in 1986.

<sup>225</sup> Section 36 of the 1st Plenary Session of the FMdI of the ČSSR: List of Negotiations with the GDR (Czech), undated; ABS, A. No. 81282/117, pp. 289–292, here 289 f. The flow of information within HV A regarding the NPG summit indicates close coordination. The two verifiable reports from the LAR of HV A in Harare regarding the NPG summit were sent directly to HV A/X. See SE8602690 (On the state of preparations for the 8th NPG Summit Conference in Harare, April 1986) and SE8606994 (Initial assessment of the course and results of the 8th NPG Summit Meeting, September 9, 1986); BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12. The fact that HV A/X received all 19 verifiable pieces of incoming information from the KGB regarding the summit meeting indicated close coordination between HV A/X and Moscow. See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12: SE8630167, SE8630381, SE8630615, SE8630674, SE8631088, SE8631087, SE8631090, SE8631096, SE8631095, SE8631123, SE8631124, SE8631189, SE8631207,

SE8631227, SE8631232, SE8631233, SE8631234, SE8631235, SE8631275.

The KGB was very satisfied with the results and with the subsequent publications by the Segals. It wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues that the East German thesis

»“met with considerable resonance in African countries [...] which stubbornly reject as racist the theory propagated by the Americans that the AIDS virus originated in African green monkeys. [...] By demonstrating the defeat of the ‘African version,’ anti-American sentiment is being whipped up in the countries of the continent.”<sup>226</sup>

#### 4.4 The U.S. State Department intervenes: the Segals and the contact person “Diagnosis” of HV A/SWT

Although Jakob Segal was demonstrably aware of the Stasi’s interest in his research, the surviving files of HV A in the BStU archives contain no details regarding his registration by HV A/SWT/XIII/5. Since both Segals were registered by HV A, there must have been index cards for them in the HV A files as well. However, the corresponding files are missing from the BStU’s “Rosenholz” database.<sup>227</sup>

However, it is thanks to a visit by two U.S. diplomats to the Segals in September 1986 that we have records from other units of the Stasi documenting some details of the couple’s relationship with HV A. These records indicate that the Segals had closer ties to HV A/SWT/XIII/5. The meetings with the diplomats were significant for the Segals and their future work. For the course of the meetings reinforced the Segals’ belief that the American government was behind the theory of the African origin of AIDS and that the

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<sup>226</sup> Information No. 2742 (Russian), undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, pp. 156–

159, here 157.

<sup>227</sup> If the Segals were listed as Soviet or French citizens, it is possible that the CIA did not hand over the corresponding files in “Rosenholz” to the German government. In accordance with CIA guidelines, only copies of files on German nationals from the former HV A files were transferred to the Federal Republic of Germany as part of the Rosenholz files. See Müller-Enbergs: “Rosenholz” (note 11), p. 52. It is also possible, however, that the files on the couple had previously been removed from the registry by the HV A or destroyed. One can only speculate as to what happened to the files.

wanted to cover up the truth about its origin at Fort Detrick.<sup>228</sup> The meetings led them to conclude that Washington wanted to suppress their study. J. Segal later used the visit of the alleged “CIA agents” to generate greater public attention for his thesis in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Western countries: He disseminated facts that U.S. agencies allegedly sought to cover up n.<sup>229</sup>

The meetings with the diplomats took place as part of the U.S. government’s efforts to counter Moscow’s AIDS disinformation campaign. It did not want to simply stand by and watch as Moscow damaged the U.S.’s reputation with its AIDS disinformation. As early as 1981, the Reagan administration had established an interagency task force within the State Department to counter Soviet active measures in general.<sup>230</sup> Coordinated by this task force, Washington initially attempted to dissuade the USSR from its campaign through diplomatic channels. The U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, protested Zapevalov’s article in an unpublished letter to the editor of *\*Literaturnaya Gazeta\**. According to Hartman, the article had called into question the Soviet Union’s desire to cooperate internationally in the fight against infectious diseases and, above all, in the fight against AIDS. Hartman had sent further letters of protest to “*Literaturnaya Gazeta*” and “*Sovetskaya Rossiya*” after both papers repeated the Fort Detrick thesis in 1986.<sup>231</sup> The American ambassador in Prague took similar action after a Czech newspaper published an article presenting the theories of the “French scientists” Jakob and Lilli Segal.<sup>232</sup> When the Fort Detrick

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<sup>228</sup> Lilli Segal wrote to an East German journalist in Tanzania who was working to publicize the Segal thesis in the local press: That “two extremely cultured and well-informed diplomats [...] wanted to know where we had obtained our material. In other words, they assume there is a leak somewhere.” Letter from L. Segal to an East German journalist, Dar es Salaam, undated; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, n. p. On the activities of the East German journalist, see his letters to the Segals, Nov. 24, 1986, and undated; *ibid*.

<sup>229</sup> See, for example, the comments by J. Segal in: Lee, Alfred: “AIDS ‘Made in Lab’ Shock.” In: *Sunday Express*, Oct. 26, 1986, p. 22 ff.

<sup>230</sup> Boghardt: *Operation INFEKTION* (note 6), p. 15.

<sup>231</sup> U.S. DOS: *Soviet Influence Activities* (note 46), pp. 48 ff.

<sup>232</sup> Did AIDS originate in Pentagon laboratories? *Tribuna* (Prague), Oct. 15, 1986, p. 14 ff. Quoted from: *FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe*, FBIS-EEU-86-207, Oct. 27, 1986; As

the theory began to spread in the press of the non-socialist world, the American embassies in the respective countries intervened with the relevant editorial offices to secure a retraction or at least a counterstatement. The Soviet Union, for its part, made vigorous efforts to f ward such attempts by the U.S.<sup>233</sup>

As it turned out, the U.S. government viewed Segal's thesis, not without reason, as part of Moscow's AIDS disinformation campaign, which needed to be countered. Kathleen Bailey, head of the Office of Counter-Soviet Disinformation at the U.S. State Department, publicly described the "Segal Report" as an "impressive addition" to the Soviet disinformation campaign. Because it was full of "technical jargon," "a layperson could not assess its accuracy," and "to anyone inclined to believe the disinformation, it appears convincing ."<sup>234</sup>

With the alleged aim of pointing out "fallacies" in the Segals' report, two diplomats from the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin were therefore tasked with contacting the Segals.<sup>235</sup> On

On September 12, 1986, John Monroe Koenig, the Second Secretary of the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin, visited Lilli Segal at her home after making an appointment in advance.<sup>(236)</sup> Koenig asked her how she and her husband had come to choose the topic of her study in the first place. She replied that her "husband, as a biologist, found the 'stories'

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Report that caused Displeasure, *Rude Pravo*, Nov. 21, 1986, p. 7. Quoted from: FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe, FBIS-EEU-86-227, Nov. 25, 1986, p. D2.

<sup>233</sup> U.S. Department of State: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), pp. 41 ff. and 49; Williams, Philip: "Soviet disinformation on AIDS alarms U.S.," *Ottawa Citizen*, Dec. 20, 1986, p. B16.

<sup>234</sup> Bailey, Kathleen; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Soviets Sponsor Spread of AIDS Disinformation. *LA Times*, April 19, 1987,

See E2. The two U.S. diplomats who visited the Segals actually existed. Boghardt, with Bohnsack's support, claimed that two HV A officers had posed as CIA agents under diplomatic cover in order to frighten the Segals and reinforce their theory. Despite Bohnsack's confirmation, this claim was entirely fabricated. See Boghardt: Operation INFEKTION (note 6), p. 12. Geißler had noted this fact earlier. See Geißler, Erhard: "The AIDS disinformation campaign continues and bears rotten fruit, Part II." In: *ASA Newsletter* 10-2 (137), pp. 16-19, here 17. Bailey noted the visit in her opinion piece in the *LA Times* of April 19, 1987.

<sup>235</sup> Bailey: Soviets Sponsor Spread of AIDS Disinformation (note 234), p. E2.

<sup>236</sup> Information on activities of U.S. agencies in connection with a scientific paper on

the origin of AIDS, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 36 ff.

found the African origin and the ‘green monkey’ [sic, meerkats] so nonsensical that he had seriously examined the biological aspects of the issue.” At his request, she gave him a copy of her scientific study—a fact that HV A/X later denied to her Bulgarian colleagues. Koenig had allegedly promised

“to study the material as soon as possible and get back to us”—as Lilli Segal reported in a memo sent to the Stasi. Koenig had also raised the possibility of a publication in the U.S., but that—according to Lilli Segal—might have been “part of the diplomatic game.”<sup>237</sup> A second meeting subsequently took place in mid-October 1986 at an East Berlin restaurant between the Segals, Koenig, and a second staff member of the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin, Gregory W. Sandford. According to a second report by Lilli Segal, the U.S. diplomats spoke at length with her husband about his theories and his work, which they now criticized based on the research of Western scholars.<sup>238</sup> According to Lilli Segal’s reports, the diplomats also wanted to bring the Segals into contact with Western scholars. This was presumably intended to dissuade him from his thesis or, if necessary, to publicly expose him.

Thanks to the two reports by Lilli Segal on the U.S. diplomats, which were sent to HV A/SWT/XIII/5 and forwarded from there to HV A/IX, the department responsible for external defense,<sup>239</sup> it is possible to

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<sup>237</sup> Report on contact initiated by staff of the U.S. Embassy in the GDR, Undated; BStU, MfS HA II, No. 22082, pp. 39 ff. Koenig, the current U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, confirmed that he received a copy of the study from the Segals, although he could not recall at which meeting or from which of the Segals he received it. Email from John Monroe Koenig to Douglas Sel-vage, Oct. 28, 2013. Regarding the claim by HV A/X that the diplomats had not received or would not receive a copy, see L. Nikolow, Department 8 of the First HV, DS, Report on working consultations held with the German comrades from September 16 to 19, 1986, in Sofia and specific agreements on individual joint AM (Bulgarian), October 7, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 103–107, here p. 104.

<sup>238</sup> Supplement to the information on activities of U.S. agencies in connection with a scientific study on the origin of AIDS, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 46–48.

<sup>239</sup> Memo from Colonel Oldenburg, Deputy Head of Division HV A/IX/C, to OSL Häsel, HA II/3, Oct. 23, 1986, with attachment, information on activities of U.S. agencies in connection with a scientific study on the origin of AIDS, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 50–52, here 50; report

Draw conclusions about the relationship between her and her husband and HV A. The two reports were entered into the HV A database with van de Sand as the sender. A contact person (KP) was cited as the source for both “Diagnosis,”<sup>240</sup> which was recorded in the larger surveillance operation (SVG) “Wind” conducted by van de Sand.<sup>241</sup> “Wind” targeted individuals in the fields of genetic engineering, the pharmaceutical industry, and AIDS research in the two German states. It stands to reason that Lilli Segal was recorded under the “Diagnosis”

“Diagnosis,” perhaps her husband as well, or perhaps both were recorded to simplify record-keeping.

Further information from the Communist Party “Diagnosis” can also be linked to the Segals. On July 28, 1986, HV A noted in its database for the first time an information delivery from the Communist Party “Diagnosis”: a 54-page, English-language assessment of the HIV testing equipment then available from the British Department of Health.<sup>242</sup> The connection between “ ” and the Segals is evident: the Segals visited Great Britain in June,<sup>243</sup> where they received this very English-language assessment

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Regarding contact initiated by staff of the U.S. Embassy, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 39 ff.; Supplement to the information on activities of U.S. agencies in connection with a scientific paper on the origin of AIDS, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 46–48.

<sup>240</sup> Entries from the KP “Diagnosis” reports on Koenig and Sandford, Oct. 16 and 17, 1986; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/5, SIRA-TDB 14, SE8607428 and SE8607429. The description in SIRA corresponds to the two reports by Lilli Segal. The categorization of “Diagnose” as a KP can be found in: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/2, SIRA-TDB 11, SE8607838 and SE8962195.

<sup>241</sup> The SVG “Wind” was established by van de Sand on September 6, 1985. See BStU, AR 2, RoHo F22, Reg. No. XV 3824/85. See also BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8200503.

<sup>242</sup> See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/2, SIRA-TDB 11, SE8607838. The entry listed the English title of the report: “Public Health Service and Department of Health and Social Security Evaluation of Commercial Anti-HTLV III /LAV Assay Kits.” It was apparently a 90-page brochure published by the British “Department of Health and Social Security” in the same year. See Mortimer, P. P. et al.: Public Health Laboratory Service and Department of Health and Social Security Evaluation of Ten Commercial Anti-HTLV III/LAV Assay Kits. London 1986.

<sup>243</sup> In the second half of June, the Segals visited London and Cambridge, among other places, to meet with Dr. Abraham Karpas of Cambridge University and discuss his AIDS test with him. See letter from Jakob Segal to an English doctor, May 29, 1986; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 13, n. p.; Segal, Jakob; Segal, Lilli:

received, as evidenced by the file of the informant “Nils”<sup>(244)</sup> On November 17, HV A entered another piece of information from van de Sand into its database under the code name “Diagnosis”: a report on Heym and the American diplomat Sandford.<sup>245</sup> Both Segals had already been in contact with Sandford and, at that time, also with Heym.

However, the latest information from “Diagnose” was not entered into the HV A database under the SVG “Wind,” but rather under a new file: the Operational Personnel Check (OPK) “Diagnose” (Reg. No. XV/4983/86).<sup>246</sup> In 1986, the case officer van de Sand removed the contact person “Diagnose” from this operational group and created a separate OPK file. Further evidence of the registration of one or both of the Segals as the KP “Diagnosis” can be found shortly after this re-registration: a relative of the couple was registered months later—and not as the primary subject—under the OPK “Diagnosis.”<sup>247</sup>

The timing of the OPK’s creation corresponds to the phase in the fall of 1986 when the Segals became more important to HV A. Following Koenig’s visit to Lilli Segal, a “coordinating consultation” took place in October 1986 between Thielemann and van de Sand of HV A/SWT/XIII, as the officials responsible for the Segals, and Major Sattler and Lt. Meyer of HA II/3, as the officials in charge of monitoring

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KARPAS screening test. Assessment based on the visit to Cambridge, Undated; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 1, pp. 158–163, here 158, 161, and 163.

<sup>244</sup> The Segals attached the evaluation to the expert opinion they had written on the Karpas screening test for AIDS. Segal; Segal: KARPAS Screening Test (note 243), p. 158. The English report was not archived as an attachment in the IM file of “Nils.” As a result of the report, on July 2, Dehmlow received his first verifiable assignment at the request of the HVA/SWT/XIII from his case officer Theisinger (HA VII/7)—namely, the “preparation of a qualified expert opinion” on the Karpas screening test and “the necessity of purchasing it.” Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7: Meeting Report: IMS

“Nils,” July 2, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 97 ff., here 98. Dehmlow took his time responding. It was not until October that he submitted Segal’s report, which was already on file with HV A/SWT/XIII/5, along with his own positive assessment. Theisinger, meeting report, IMS “Nils,” July 22, 1986, p. 101; Segal; Segal: KARPAS Screening Test (note 243), pp. 158–163. HA VII/7 forwarded the “Nils” report to HV A/SWT/XIII in November. See memo from Colonel Bethge, Head of HA VII/7, to the Head of HV A/SWT/XIII, Nov. 6, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 155–157.

<sup>245</sup> BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/5, SIRA-TDB 14, SE8707031.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

<sup>247</sup> BStU, AR 2, MfS, RoHo, F16, Reg. No. XV/4983/86.

of the American diplomats. Thielemann first explained to the defense officers who Professor Segal was from the HV A's perspective. He was preparing "a scientific paper on the causes and effects of AIDS [...], in which he provides scientific proof that the origin of the currently emerging AIDS virus lies in the laboratories of U.S. psychological warfare research" and was "currently seeking publication in one of the world's leading medical journals."<sup>248</sup> The officers of HV A/SWT and HA II/3 agreed that "in the interest of the U.S. administration, efforts are being made by the embassy to keep the damage to its image as minimal as possible."<sup>249</sup>

In connection with the bilateral meeting between Jakob Segal and Koenig, Segal was even referred to as "the informant," who, according to Thielemann, could be "instructed" by his unit.<sup>250</sup> Despite the term "informant" used in the conversation, Segal, according to current

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<sup>248</sup> Olt. Meyer, HA II/3, note on consultation, Oct. 10, 1986; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 25 ff., here p. 25.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>250</sup> According to the memo, the "IM" was to be "instructed" to expose Koenig and "possibly his companion" as alleged intelligence agents by presenting "technical details" about AIDS. The IM was also to attempt to involve an IM named "Martin Bartsch" from HA II/3 in his contact with Koenig so that Bartsch could extract information from Koenig in the future. Segal no longer seemed suitable to HV A/SWT for further, more strenuous intelligence operations due to his age. *Ibid.*, p. 26. According to a report by Lilli Segal and the recollection of Gregory Sandford, only the Segals, Sandford, and Koenig were present at the second meeting. According to Sandford, Jakob Segal did most of the talking, and a third person—e.g., informant "Martin Bartsch"—was not present. See Supplement to the Information on Activities of U.S. Agencies in Connection with a Scientific Paper on the Origin of AIDS, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 46–48; telephone interview, Douglas Selvage with Gregory W. Sandford, June 18, 2013. John Monroe Koenig, now the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, recalled, however, a third person present during the conversation with both Segals, but had forgotten who it was. Email from Ambassador John Monroe Koenig to Douglas Selvage, October 27, 2013. Sandford, however, wrote: "I think I probably would have been aware of any third person, though, since I would have assumed he or she was there as an ideological 'watcher' and might be influencing what Dr. Segal had to say, and I do recall being impressed that Segal apparently believed what he was saying and had arguments to back it up that he thought were convincing." Email from Gregory W. Sandford to Douglas Selvage, October 28, 2013.

The file records can only be regarded as KP. Assuming that Jakob Segal had been registered as KP “Diagnose” since 1985, the planned surveillance of Koenig beginning in the fall of 1986 could explain why a separate OPK case was opened under the same code name in November 1986. An OPK case could take on the character of a preliminary step toward recruiting an informant (IM) at HV A.<sup>251</sup>

Overall, the current file situation points to a division of labor within the HV A. While the HVA/X was responsible for the international dissemination of Segal’s theses as part of its AIDS disinformation campaign (OVO “Den-ver”), van de Sand and his department head Thielemann in the HV A/SWT/XIII/5 were in charge of the Main Administration’s covert contacts with the Segals as KP “Diagnosis.”

#### 4.5 Publication in the West: the Heym interview

The HV A—primarily the HV A/SWT/XIII/5—helped the Segals behind the scenes, in cooperation with other MfS units, to advance their research and publish it in the West. It also supported them by imposing a publication ban on scientific critics of their thesis from the GDR in East German and foreign journals.

In his dealings with Axen and Seidel at the SED Central Committee, Jakob Segal gave the impression that he had to take it upon himself to ensure the publication of his thesis.<sup>252</sup> This was indeed the case when it came to publication in the GDR, as Party and state leader Erich Honecker had opted for a restrictive policy on AIDS information.<sup>253</sup> Even the Stasi could do nothing to change this. The fact that an interview between Stefan Heym and Jakob Segal was published in the West Berlin “taz” in February 1987, however, was due to the assistance of HV A, as will be shown below d.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> Müller-Enbergs: “Rosenholz” (note 11), pp. 58 and 75, footnote 187; 3rd Commentary on Directive 2/79. The Recruitment of Unofficial Collaborators by the Intelligence Units of the Stasi. In: Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, Part 2 (note 23), pp. 585–632, here 631.

<sup>252</sup> Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), pp. 99 ff.

<sup>253</sup> Kurt Hager, Internal memo to Comrade Seidel, Sept. 25, 1986, BArch, DY 30/26444, n. p.

<sup>254</sup> Gast, Wolfgang: Barschel Letters, IMF, or AIDS Propaganda—the Stasi Tried to Get Involved. In: *taz*, Dec. 30, 1992, p. 5.

The contact initiated by American diplomats in September and October 1986 spurred the Segals to publish their study as soon as possible. In her report on the first meeting with Koenig in September, Lilli Segal had already addressed a sore spot:

“He [Koenig] didn’t ask why we hadn’t published the material here yet.”<sup>255</sup> Yet she knew the answer herself: there was a restrictive policy in the GDR regarding publications on AIDS<sup>256</sup>, and that policy also applied to the Segals’ theory, which was favored by the KGB. Jakob Segal attempted to break through this blockade and, to that end, sought an appointment with his acquaintance and “client” Hermann Axen. Axen, however, forwarded the request on September 3 to the Central Committee secretary for health issues, Karl Seidel.<sup>257</sup> Seidel, who met with Segal on September 17, 1986, was personally enthusiastic about the possibility of publishing Segal’s study in the GDR. Five days later, he wrote to the Central Committee secretary for culture and ideological affairs, Kurt Hager:

“The view presented by Comrade Prof. Segal regarding the origin and spread of AIDS, if confirmed—or even if only partially confirmed—would amount to an exposure of steps taken by U.S. imperialism in preparation for biological warfare, a matter of the highest political sensitivity. In particular, the well-founded polemic against the *vervet monkey theory of the origin of AIDS* is likely to intensify anti-imperialist sentiments and activities among numerous political forces in Africa, who must view this theory as an insult and denigration resulting from the machinations of U.S. imperialism.

It is therefore considered appropriate, with regard to the discussion or publication of the views expressed by Prof. Segal, not to recommend restraint if this is done in an appropriate manner [...]»<sup>258</sup>

In this respect, Seidel’s thinking resembled that of the First Plenum of the KGB. However, on November 25, 1986, Hager reminded Seidel—citing “Comrade Erich Honecker”—of “our restrictive information policy on AIDS,” which was to be “maintained.” Segal was still not allowed to publish his thesis in the GDR, but he was given the green light to do so abroad. Hager wrote:

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<sup>255</sup> Report on contact initiated by staff of the U.S. Embassy, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 39 ff., here 40.

<sup>256</sup> Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 92.

<sup>257</sup> Note from Jakob Segal to Axen, August 26, 1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, n. p.

<sup>258</sup> K. Seidel, Health Policy Department, memo regarding a conversation with Comrade Prof. Jakob Segal on September 17, 1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, n. p. The passages highlighted in italics were underlined, presumably by Hager.

“Since Comrade Segal himself speaks of a hypothesis, publications in official GDR publications might need to be avoided. To what extent his conjectures can be published in relevant foreign journals [...] I do not know. They would, of course, have to be the responsibility of Comrade Segal himself as a scholar.”<sup>259</sup>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfAA), for its part, announced that foreign journalists did not need to obtain permits to conduct interviews with the Segals. The official justification: Both were emeritus and therefore did not need to apply for a permit.<sup>260</sup> For most ordinary pensioners in the GDR, however, such freedom of speech vis-à-vis Western media did not apply. The SED, as well as the Stasi, evidently wanted to support the international dissemination of Segal’s thesis by any means necessary.

In private circles, however, the Segals did not merely complain about their “publication ban” in the GDR.<sup>261</sup> They also portrayed themselves as being left to their own devices when it came to potential publications of their thesis and journalistic activities in Western countries. In April 1987, Lilli Segal even claimed that they had to organize and finance their lecture tours to the Federal Republic of Germany themselves.<sup>262</sup>

The first major breakthrough for the Segals and their theory regarding Harare was likely not the result of work by the Stasi or the KGB. On October 25, 1986, the \*Sunday Express\* in London published an article on its front page titled “AIDS ‘Made in Lab’ Shock” by Alfred Lee. The subtitle stated: “The deadly AIDS virus was artificially created by American scientists in the course of laboratory experiments that ultimately had catastrophic consequences. To this day, this secret has been withheld from the world through a massive cover-up.” The article cited Seale, Segal, and a third “scientist,” the Kali-

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<sup>259</sup> Kurt Hager, Internal memo to Comrade Seidel, September 25, 1986, BArch, DY 30/26444,

n. p.

<sup>260</sup> Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (informant report “Maria” dated April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, Appendix, Vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 34.

<sup>261</sup> Deputy Minister of Health Prof. Dr. Schneidewind; conversation with Comrade Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal, professor emeritus at Humboldt University of Berlin, on October 2, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 317 ff., here p. 317.

<sup>262</sup> Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (informant report “Maria” dated April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, attachment, Vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 37. Lilly Segal reportedly told informant “Maria” that she and her husband had been permitted to “do whatever they deemed appropriate in this matter, but without the support of the GDR government.” Ibid., p. 34.

the Forni doctor Robert Strecker, regarding the artificial origin of HIV.<sup>263</sup> Strecker, who, together with his brother Theodore, had begun researching the spread of AIDS as early as 1983, was likely influenced by Seale's writings to incorporate the Fort Detrick theory into his own conspiracy theory about AIDS.<sup>264</sup> His brother Theodore had already written about an artificial origin at Fort Detrick in March 1986, before the Segals disseminated their version with the help of the HV A. The Strecker brothers claimed that the AIDS pathogen arose from a recombination of the Visna virus from sheep with the bovine leukemia virus (BLV) on the orders of the World Health Organization (WHO), which had been infiltrated by communists, in collaboration with the U.S. National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The virus was allegedly spread in Africa by the WHO through vaccines and among homosexuals in the U.S. through the hepatitis B vaccine.<sup>265</sup>

The article in the *\*Sunday Express\** was followed by a wave of articles and reports in the Western media “from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the Pacific”—including in the *\*Canberra Times\** (Australia), *\*La Stampa\** (Italy), *\*Ethnos\** (Greece), as well as in Brazil, Sweden, and Spain.<sup>266</sup> The U.S. government suspected Victor Louis, a well-known KGB disinformation specialist and informant for the “Sunday Express,” of being responsible for the publication,<sup>267</sup> but the KGB claimed to its Bulgarian counterparts that the article had appeared “independently” of its own efforts.<sup>268</sup> According to Jakob Segal, Seale was behind the article; the

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<sup>263</sup> Lee: “AIDS ‘Made in Lab’ Shock” (note 229), p. 1. The quotation is a working translation by the MfS from English, undated; BStU, MfS, HA II, No. 22082, pp. 29–34, here 29.

<sup>264</sup> Strecker was familiar with at least one of Seale's earlier letters to the editor in the JRSM and was presumably also familiar with the others. See Strecker, Robert B.: “Letter to the Editor.” In: JRSM 79 (1986), pp. 559 ff. Strecker hinted to another AIDS conspiracy theorist, Leonard Horowitz, that he had been influenced by Seale's research. See Horowitz, Leonard G.; *Emerging Viruses: AIDS & Ebola. Nature, Accident or Intentional?* Rockport 1996, p. 104.

<sup>265</sup> Strecker, Theodore A.: This is a Bio-Attack Alert, March 28, 1986. Available online: [http://www.umoja-research.com/bio-attack\\_doc.htm](http://www.umoja-research.com/bio-attack_doc.htm).

<sup>266</sup> Godson, Roy: Outlook. In: The Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1987, p. B1.

<sup>267</sup> Williams: Soviet Disinformation (note 233), p. B16.

<sup>268</sup> Information No. 2742 (Russian), undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, pp. 156–

159, here 157.

he concluded from his conversations with the journalist Lee, who called him three times with questions about it. Segal thanked Seale.<sup>269</sup> Whatever the reason the “Sunday Express” published the article, the Soviet “Chekists” were pleased that this lent

“additional credibility and authority.”<sup>270</sup>

Jakob Segal, who was interviewed for the article, also took advantage of the visits by the American diplomats to popularize his research in the West. The “Sunday Express” quoted him:

“The two men showed me their letters of recommendation. One said he was a historian, and the other that he was a [political] consul. But I’m pretty sure they were from the CIA, and that they were very concerned that the veil of secrecy surrounding the origin of AIDS should be lifted. I told them everything I knew and everything I believed.”<sup>271</sup>

After the article was published, the Segals received numerous interview requests from foreign journalists. They were pleased by the renewed attention. Although they had noted that the brochure

“AIDS: USA-made evil” had “spread” across Africa, and the article in the “Sunday Express” had “the greatest impact.” This is what Lilli Segal wrote to an East German journalist she knew in Dar es Salaam:

“For 14 days, journalists from various countries came and went in a constant stream.”<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 41.

<sup>270</sup> Information No. 2742 (Russian), undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, pp. 156–159, here 157.

<sup>271</sup> Working translation from English, p. 31.

(<sup>272</sup>) [L. Segal], Reply to a “Comrade,” undated; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, AIDS+Nazi Crimes, GDR, n. p. It was written in response to the following letter: Letter from an East German journalist, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 24, 1986, or

an earlier letter from the same person; *ibid.*

However, in the fall of 1986, there were several indications that HV A was in the process of paving the way for additional publications by the Segals in Western countries. Following the article in the *\*Sunday Express\**, for example, the Segals were contacted by the Indian journalist Kunhanandan Nair.<sup>273</sup> Nair had been an accredited correspondent for the Indian newspapers *\*Blitz\** and *\*Patriot\** in East Berlin for many years,<sup>274</sup> which were known for publishing Soviet disinformation.<sup>275</sup> Nair was also a key figure for the HV A. In the run-up to the summit in Harare, the HV A/X had authored a book that “exposed” and harshly criticized the CIA’s policy toward the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World in general, using a mix of facts and disinformation theories from the KGB and the Eastern “brother agencies.”<sup>276</sup> The book was alternately used by HV A/X as an active measure “*Spiegel*”<sup>277</sup> or “*Jungle*”<sup>278</sup>. At an international press conference on August 21, 1986, in New Delhi, where the Executive Committee of the Non-Aligned Movement was meeting in preparation for the summit in Harare, the book was presented to the global public for the first time: “*Devil and his Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World*” (German edition: “*CIA Conspiracies Against the*

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<sup>(273)</sup> [L. Segal], reply letter to a “comrade,” undated; *ibid.*

<sup>274</sup> Nair was a staunch communist and supporter of the SED regime. In an interview with *\*Neues Deutschland\** in 1962, he stated: “The anti-fascist protective wall of the GDR has rendered extraordinary service to the cause of peace during its first year of existence: It has prevented the Cold Warriors’ march into the East. It has put an end to the massive economic sabotage against the GDR. It has forced the Western powers to recognize the existence of the GDR.” “Protective Wall Serves the Cause of Peace.” In: ND, Aug. 9, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>275</sup> U.S. Department of State: *Soviet Influence Activities* (note 46), p. 43, footnote 43, and p. 44.

<sup>276</sup> Plan for joint, coordinated political-active measures for the year 1986, Nov. 28, 1986; ABS, A. No. 81282/117, pp. 293–295, here 295.

<sup>277</sup> Plan for joint and coordinated active measures by the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry for State Security of the GDR for 1987 and 1988, September 3, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 108–119, here 113.

<sup>278</sup> Plan for joint, coordinated political-activist measures for 1986 [with the ČSSR], p. 295. Since the “*Spiegel*” operation was aimed at discrediting Western intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, it presumably fell under the “*Jungle*” operation (XV 2139/67) of HV A/X/5 under the leadership of Herbert Brehmer.

See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8256438; Müller-Enbergs:  
Hauptverwaltung A (note 28), p. 178.

“Third World”). Nair appeared as the author of the book,<sup>279</sup> which was subsequently distributed by HV A during the summit in Harare.<sup>280</sup>

Following his successes in Harare and the article in the *\*Sunday Express\**, Nair now interviewed Jakob Segal. Although the interview did not appear in “Blitz” until July 2, 1987, under the title “AIDS – A U.S. Military Monster: Yankee Business, not Monkey Business,” it had already been published earlier in the “Nairobi Sunday Times” without mentioning the author and reprinted in the Senegalese “Le Devoir.”<sup>281</sup> In India, an English version of Segal’s study was published in book form in 1989, together with Nair’s interview.<sup>282</sup>

In late 1986, a Brussels-based freelance West German journalist, Heimo Claafen, also contacted Jakob Segal. As a journalist, he reported not only on politics in Brussels, primarily within the European Community, but also on developments in Africa, where he traveled frequently. According to his own account, his interest in the origins of AIDS arose during a trip to Zaire in 1984.<sup>283</sup> The HV A had opened the informant file “Joachim” (XV 4735/63) on Claafen in 1963. Since 1983, the “Joachim” informant case had been handled by Hans Pfeifer, whose department

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<sup>279</sup> Nair, Kunhanandan: *\*Devil and His Dart. How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World\**. New Delhi 1986. Mutz disclosed the exact English title of the book during a meeting held from September 16 to 19, 1986, with the Disinformation Department of the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior. See Lieutenant D. Stankov, Head of Department 8 of the First Directorate of the DS, report (shorthand transcript) on the discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at Directorate A, during his stay in Bulgaria from September 16 to 19, 1986 (Bulgarian), Nov. 22, 1986; COM-DOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 121–128, here 121 f. Regarding the press conference for the English first edition, see the front cover of the German edition: Nair, Kunhanandan: *CIA Conspiracies Against the Third World*. Berlin [East] 1987.

<sup>280</sup> Lieutenant D. Stankov, Head of Department 8 of the First Central Committee of the DS, report (shorthand notes) on discussions with Comrade Wolfgang Mutz, Deputy Head of the AM Department at the First Central Committee, during his stay in Bulgaria from September 16–19, 1986 (Bulgarian), November 22, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 121–128, here 121 f.

<sup>281</sup> US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), pp. 37 ff.

<sup>282</sup> Segal, Jacob; Segal, Lilli: *The Origin of AIDS*, Trichur 1989. When the Segals arranged for a Japanese translation of their study based on the Indian edition in 1992, Jacob Segal wrote to the Japanese translator that his interview with Nair should not be translated or reprinted because it contained “many errors.” See letter from Jacob Segal to a Japanese translator, Sept. 2, 1992; BArch, NY 4516,

file K. 12, Japan.

<sup>283</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 74.

HV A/X/1 was also responsible for “Denver.”<sup>284</sup> Between 1969 and 1987, HV A documented 40 information deliveries, which it attributed to “Joachim,” and which it used in at least 16 cases as sources of outgoing information to the East German party and state leadership. The incoming and outgoing information primarily dealt with topics of European integration and the European Community from the perspective of Brussels, as well as developments in African countries.<sup>285</sup> Among other things HV A/X recorded several reports from “Joachim” on the situation in Zaire in 1984.<sup>286</sup>

After the first meeting with Segal, Claassen introduced him at the end of 1986 to the West German author “Booby Hatch,” who operated under a pseudonym.<sup>287</sup> “Hatch” described himself as a Doctor of Natural Sciences, a molecular biologist, and a former researcher at a genetic research center in California.<sup>288</sup> As early as 1984, he published an article in the West German scientific journal “Wechselwirkung,” in which he expressed the fear that the AIDS pathogen had been transmitted from monkeys to humans due to negligent safety precautions in laboratories conducting biomedical research with retroviruses and other viruses.<sup>289</sup> Dehmlow later claimed that Segal had been influenced by “Hatch’s” publications.<sup>290</sup> That may well have been the case. “Hatch” had already written

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<sup>284</sup> See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8237870; BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16 and F22, Reg. No. XV 4735/63.

<sup>285</sup> The search query “QUA.RG NR=“\*/4735/63” yields 3 incoming reports in SIRA-TDB 11 and 37 incoming reports and 2 outgoing reports in SIRA-TDB 12. The incoming information served as sources for 14 outgoing reports to the party and state leadership. See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 11.

<sup>286</sup> See the following entries in: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 11: New activities of OTRAG, SE8305200; On activities on the former OTRAG site in Zaire, SE8401024; Activities of the Bundeswehr in Zaire, SE8401025; On the situation at the border between Angola and Zaire, SE8404887. OTRAG was the abbreviation for Orbital Transport- und Raketen Aktiengesellschaft, a West German company that had been working on an alternative propulsion system for rockets. Among other things, OTRAG conducted test flights in Zaire.

<sup>287</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Operation AIDS, p. 73.

<sup>288</sup> Sigusch, Volkmar; Gremliza, Hermann L. (eds.): Operation AIDS. Konkret Sexualität. Hamburg 1986, p. 3.

<sup>289</sup> Hatch, Booby: AIDS. Accident, Coincidence, or No Coincidence? In: Wechselwirkung 23 (Nov. 1984), pp. 38–41.

<sup>290</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 30.

Before Segal, he highlighted the possibility that the AIDS virus had originated from a laboratory accident, emphasized the similarity between the AIDS virus and the Visna virus, rejected the African hypothesis regarding the origin of AIDS in favor of an American origin, and, until 1986, left open the possibility that HIV had emerged from a recombination of other viruses in a genetic laboratory.<sup>291</sup> Later, as “Hatch” became more convinced that the AIDS pathogen had arisen naturally from non-human primates, the differences of opinion between the two grew.<sup>292</sup> By the end of 1986, however, Segal and “Hatch” agreed to Claassen’s proposal to collaborate with him on a book with the working title “AIDS from the Genetic Laboratory?” Claassen then took steps to find a left-wing publisher in the West. This publisher apparently turned out to be Rotbuch-Verlag, with whom Segal corresponded in 1987 regarding such a publication. Claassen handed over a copy of Segal’s study to the editor of “Wechselwirkung,” Reinhard Behnisch, who expressed interest in publishing it.<sup>293</sup> Claassen’s efforts to secure a publication (or publications) in the West aligned with the goals that Pfeifer and Dams were pursuing in the “Denver” operation. Despite these efforts, neither an article by Segal appeared in “Wechselwirkung” nor was the planned anthology published by Rotbuch-Verlag.

Instead, the Segals and HV A received help from an unexpected source. By pure chance, the East German writer and regime critic Stefan Heym learned of the Segal thesis from his doctor on October 9, 1986.<sup>294</sup> The thesis convinced Heym, and following the article in the “Sunday Express,” he recorded an interview with Segal on November 8 for publication in the West. Heym offered the interview to the weekly magazine “Der Spiegel,” which, however, showed no interest.<sup>295</sup> Although “Der Spiegel” reported on Segal’s thesis on November 10, but alongside strong counterarguments from Western experts in genetic and AIDS research.<sup>296</sup> The green monkey theory was no longer relevant, according to the experts, but “most retrovirologists nevertheless suspected” that “AIDS had existed for decades, possibly centuries, in small Central African settlements as a local village disease (‘Village disease’)”

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<sup>291</sup> Hatch, Booby: Is AIDS a Laboratory Accident? In: Sigusch; Gremliza (eds.): Operation AIDS (note 288), pp. 32–37; here 34 f.

<sup>292</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation Squared (note 9), p. 30 ff.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>294</sup> Geißler: “Better AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 112.

<sup>295</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation Squared (note 9), p. 54.

<sup>296</sup> AIDS: Parents Wanted. In: Der Spiegel, Nov. 10, 1986, pp. 272, 275, and 278.

<sup>297</sup> “Der Spiegel” mentioned Jakob Segal’s interview with the “Sunday Express” on the occasion of the visit by the American diplomats (or alleged “CIA men”), but in the context of a larger struggle between the KGB and the CIA. According to “Der Spiegel,” both intelligence agencies had attempted to shift the blame for the artificial creation of HIV onto the other side.<sup>298</sup> After failing to secure a deal with “Der Spiegel,” Heym offered his interview to the weekly newspaper “Die Zeit” and the magazine “Quick,” but both also declined.<sup>299</sup>

One gets the impression that Heym was able to conduct his interview with Segal in West Germany solely because HV A/SWT/XIII was operating behind the scenes. Heym was under constant surveillance and frequently hindered in his work as a writer by HA XX/9 of the Stasi, which was monitoring him as part of the “Diversant” operational case.<sup>300</sup> Without further justification, HA XX/9 could have prevented the publication of the interview in the West. But Heym’s contact with the Segals had led Tustanowski, the HA XX/9 officer in charge of the OV “Diversant,” to inquire with HV A/SWT regarding their jurisdiction over the Segals. On October 28, 1986, he met with van de Sand to learn more about the meetings between the Segals and the Heyms. If van de Sand had not already made it clear at that time, Colonel Jesse, head of the HV A/SWT/XIII department, informed him no later than

November 12: It was noted that HV A had an “operational interest [...] in ensuring that Prof. Segal’s theory—that the AIDS virus is a product of American biological weapons research—is disseminated in the NSW.”<sup>301</sup> In other words: HA XX/9 was not to take any action to prevent the publication of the Heym–Segal interview. Subsequently, HA XX informed the Deputy Minister for State Security, Rudi Mittag, of the HV A’s “operational” interest in having Heym’s interview with Segal published in the West.<sup>302</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> Ibid., pp. 275 and 278.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., p. 275. The evidence of disinformation on the part of the CIA, however, had been rather weak. \*Der Spiegel\*, like \*Literaturnaya Gazeta\* before it, equated LaRouche’s views with those of the CIA.

<sup>299</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation Squared (note 9), p. 54.

<sup>300</sup> Walther, Joachim: Security Sector Literature. Writers and State Security in the German Democratic Republic. Berlin 1996, p. 91.

<sup>301</sup> Memo from Colonel Jesse, Head of HV A, SWT/Department XIII, to the Head of HA XX/9, November 12, 1986; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, Attachment, Vol. 19, pp. 203 ff.

<sup>302</sup> See HA XX, Information regarding the planned publication of an interview between the writer Stefan Heym and Prof. Dr. Segal on the origins of AIDS—

Since Heym had still not managed to publish his interview with Segal even after several months, HV A/X lent a hand behind the scenes. Joachim Nölte, a major and special operations officer (OibE) with HV A/X/4,<sup>303</sup> working under the cover of an employee in the press department of the GDR Foreign Ministry, informed Arno Widmann of the “taz” that Stefan Heym had a “blockbuster story” on AIDS. For Heym, Widmann’s contact in early 1987 must have been a relief after so many disappointments. At Heym’s request, Widmann promised to print the interview in its entirety. It then appeared in the “taz” on February 18, 1987.<sup>304</sup> Segal’s thesis was very well received by leftists in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin, the paper’s core readership at the time.<sup>305</sup>

Although (or perhaps even because) Heym had done the hard work, HV A also claimed the publication as its own success. This is understandable,<sup>306</sup> even if Bohnsack exaggerated the role of HV A.<sup>307</sup> The active measures departments of the Eastern bloc secret police measured the success of their AM operations, among other things, by whether their disinformation narratives took on a life of their own and were disseminated by others—i.e., independent multipliers—with little or no secret service assistance behind the scenes ( ).<sup>308</sup> If this could be achieved, the active measure had proven effective. By this standard, the

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Virus, Nov. 25, 1986; BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, No. 6443, pp. 112–114, here 112 and 114.

For the original version of the information with the sender (i.e., HA XX), see BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, attachment, vol. 19, pp. 206 ff.

<sup>303</sup> Nölte, Joachim: BStU, AR 2, HA KuSch/AKG-KA HM; Nölte, Joachim, Reg. No. XV 2553/80: BStU, AR 2, RoHo F16; OibE “Tell”, Reg. No. XV 2553/80: BStU, AR 2, RoHo F22; Payroll Master Card, Reg. No. XV 2553/80: BStU, AR 2, Dept. Fin./Dept. 6-BSK OibE.

<sup>304</sup> Feddersen, Jan; Gast, Wolfgang: How the AIDS virus came to Fort Detrick. In: taz, Jan. 9, 2010, <http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/digitaz/artikel/?ressort=hi&dig=2010/01/09/a0021&cHash=7c6cade87e/>.

<sup>305</sup> Feddersen and Gast wrote: “The left-wing scene eagerly embraced the theory: Finally, it was perceived, the disease not only had a name but also a culprit: the U.S., under then-President Ronald Reagan, enemy number one anyway.” Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Bohnsack; Brehmer: Mission Misinformation (note 3), p. 220.

<sup>307</sup> Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 130.

<sup>308</sup> See Selvage, Douglas: Operation Synonym. Czechoslovak State Security, Soviet-Bloc Active Measures, and the Helsinki Process, 1976–1983. In: Wegener Friis, Thomas; Bułhak, Władysław (eds.): Need to Know: Intelligence and Politics, Western and Eastern Perspectives. Odense 2014 (forthcoming), p. 14.

Heym's personal commitment to Segal's version of the Fort Detrick thesis was a success—both for the HV A and for the KGB. From a “Chekist” perspective, Heym therefore served as an unwitting multiplier of their disinformation thesis. He himself, of course, viewed the situation differently. He claimed to have supported Jakob Segal in the publication of his thesis—which provided further evidence of the dangers of the U.S. arms program—against the resistance of Western agencies and the (alleged) censorship of the SED. The publication of the Heym interview and the actions taken as part of Operation “Denver” were certainly a topic of discussion between the HV A/X and the KGB. One week after the publication in the “taz,” Pfeifer flew to Moscow under his working name “Glaser,” accompanied by the Soviet liaison officer to the HV A/X in Berlin, Yevgeny Dichenkov, for a “short-term consultation” with the First Directorate of the KGB regarding active measures.<sup>309</sup>

Another unplanned success for the HV A/X came when Kuno Kruse of the \*taz\* decided to publish an anthology in the \*taz\* containing the Heym interview, Segal's study, and comments on them by other scholars—including “Hatch.” The Stasi learned of Kruse's plans by May 1987 at the latest.<sup>310</sup> In his introduction to the brochure

“AIDS: Pathogen from the Genetic Laboratory?”, which appeared in June 1987, Kruse left open whether, in his view, Segal's study corresponded to the truth or not. He justified its publication, however, with an argument frequently found among supporters of conspiracy theories: Everything must be open to discussion. In this case, he stated: “As long as [...] clear evidence [for the Africa theory] cannot be presented, the question of whether the novel pathogen was created in a laboratory [...] must also be open to discussion when thinking aloud about its origin.” Furthermore, the scientists' alleged “assumption” that

“the virus [...] originated in the sweltering swamps of the Dark Continent” was part of “Eurocentric thinking.” Therefore, this thesis aligned with the major concerns that the Greens and other peace and environmental activists in West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany harbored regarding genetic engineering, biological weapons, and their potential alliance. Kruse wrote:

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<sup>309</sup> Note from Colonel Wagenbreth, Head of HV A/X, to the Head of Dept. X, Major General Damm, February 12, 1987; BStU, MfS, Dept. X, No. 1123, p. 36. On Ditschenkow, see Müller-Enbergs: Hauptverwaltung A (note 28), p. 171.

<sup>(310)</sup> Information G/019264/12/05/87/02, May 13, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, vol. 20, pp. 49 ff.

“Regardless of the outcome of the debate summarized in this book, Prof. Segal certainly already deserves credit for having drawn attention—which the topic of AIDS rightly attracts—to another potential threat to humanity: the alarming prospects of the development of new biological weapons through genetic engineering.”<sup>311</sup>

The brochure ultimately consisted of Heym’s interview with Segal,<sup>312</sup> criticisms of Segal’s thesis by Western scientists,<sup>313</sup> a response by Jakob Segal to the criticisms<sup>314</sup> and the slightly revised original text “AIDS – Nature and Origin.”<sup>315</sup> It also contained several articles on related topics—such as criticism of genetic engineering and other theories regarding the artificial origin of the AIDS pathogen.<sup>316</sup>

It was not only peace activists in the Federal Republic who defended Segal’s thesis at that time, arguing that even if it were false, it at least drew attention to the dangers of genetic engineering. The East German peace activist and civil rights advocate Ehrhart Neubert, then AIDS advisor to the Evangelical

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<sup>311</sup> Kruse, Kuno: Foreword. In: Kruse (ed.): *Pathogens from the Genetic Laboratory?* (note 125),

p. 5 ff., here p. 6.

<sup>312</sup> Jakob Segal in conversation with Stefan Heym. *AIDS – man-made in the USA*. In: *ibid.*, pp. 15–30.

<sup>313</sup> Prof. Meinrad Koch in an interview. *Genetic engineering—an imitation of nature*. In: *ibid.*, pp. 31–35; Burger, Rudolf: *A miracle of technology*. In: *ibid.*, pp. 36–43; Müller-Hill: *Possibilities are proven by facts* (note 125), pp. 44–46; Röhl, Roland: *Frankenstein’s Serious Flaws*. In: *ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 48–58.

<sup>315</sup> Segal; Segal: *Nature and Origin* (note 134), pp. 79–127. This German version was not the “original text,” but a slightly revised version of the German text, which is held in the BStU files in a French translation reflecting the state of research as of August 1986. See Segal, Prof. Dr. Jakob; Segal, Dr. Lilli: *Le SIDA – sa nature et son origine* (state of knowledge as of August 1986); BStU, MfS, HA VII/1, ZMA No. 935, pp. 90–139. The German version in Kruse’s anthology, for example, included a new passage regarding Essex’s distancing himself from the green monkey theory in December 1986. Segal; Segal: *Nature and Origin* (note 134), p. 103.

<sup>316</sup> Hatch, Booby (pseud.): *AIDS – A Legacy of Research?* In: *ibid.*, pp. 59–67; Bullard, Linda: *The New Living Weapons*. In: *ibid.*, pp. 68–71; Sander, Uwe:

Experimenting with Viruses, pp. 72–78.

The Church in the GDR.<sup>317</sup> He defended Segal's thesis, which he knew from the Heym interview and from the news service "epd-Entwicklungspolitik," against criticism from Erhard Geißler. It was not a matter of "pinning something on the genetic engineers," as Geißler had allegedly claimed, " , however, to identify the dangers and draw social conclusions."<sup>318</sup> Nevertheless, Neubert did not believe in the laboratory "accident theory" of AIDS's origin—whether proposed by Segal or "Booby Hatch"—<sup>319</sup> nor in the Africa theory, which he rejected as racially motivated.<sup>320</sup> In 1987, he formulated his own alternative conspiracy theory:<sup>321</sup> The " " clinical picture "AIDS" had been invented in the U.S. by conservatives in order to "emancipatory movements" of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>322</sup> The dissemination of the "AIDS myth" by the mass media is said to have "reinforced old, latently effective sexist prejudices by identifying 'risk groups' (homosexuals, bisexuals, promiscuous individuals, and drug addicts) and made them seem plausible through the use of scientific language." Through "various monkey theories" regarding the origin of AIDS, "the pejorative 'chain of infection'—monkey–Black person–homosexual" was also established, thereby reinforcing racist prejudices.<sup>323</sup> Although Neubert left open the possibility of a genuine AIDS disease, he implied that it did not exist. He wrote in 1989: "AIDS, if this definition can hold up at all, is at best one disease among others. On this, a

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<sup>317</sup> On Neubert's status as the Evangelical Church's AIDS liaison, see Geene, Raimund: AIDS-Politik. Ein Krankheitsbild zwischen Medizin, Politik und Gesundheitsförderung. Frankfurt/M. 2000, p. 306.

<sup>318</sup> Neubert referred to Segal's thesis, together with the "Booby Hatch" thesis, as the (laboratory) "accident theory" for the origin of the AIDS pathogen. He wrote: "The value of this accident theory lies above all in its highlighting of the dangers of genetic engineering." Neubert, Ehrhart: Between Fear and Acceptance. Social-Ethical and Theological Aspects of AIDS. Berlin 1989, p. 150, fn. 31. The quotation is from Geißler, Erhard: Frankenstein's Death – Remarks on a Discussion. In: Sinn und Form 38 (1986) 1, pp. 158–177, here 168.

<sup>319</sup> Neubert: Between Fear and Care (note 318), p. 24 ff.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>321</sup> Schröder, Richard: AIDS. Critical Remarks on Ehrhart Neubert's AIDS Study. In: Zeichen der Zeit 43 (1989) 3, pp. 68–73, here 69. Schröder used the term "conspiracy theory."

<sup>322</sup> Neubert: Between Fear and Care (note 318), pp. 21–24. See also Neubert, Ehrhart:

AIDS Education. In: *Zeichen der Zeit* 43 (1989) 3, pp. 62–68, here 62–63.  
<sup>323</sup> Neubert: Aufklärung über AIDS (note 322), p. 63.

“A disease that has not yet made a significant appearance either statistically or in any other parameters.”<sup>324</sup> In 1987, he wrote:

“Christian doctors and medical institutions should never diagnose AIDS, but rather name the diseases from which the patients actually suffer.”<sup>325</sup>

Neubert thus drew criticism from the Protestant theologian and philosopher Richard Schröder, who wrote in 1989:

“[...] aside from the fact that theologians should never dictate diagnostic guidelines to medical professionals, the diagnosis of AIDS is by no means useless, for it identifies the hidden cause of the various diseases from which patients are evidently suffering, and thus opens up avenues—albeit, unfortunately, not yet to therapy, but already to disease prevention.”<sup>326</sup>

With his thesis, Neubert became a pioneer among the AIDS deniers associated with the American molecular biologist Peter Duesberg, who not only dispute the clinical picture of AIDS but also deny that the HIV virus alone causes AIDS.<sup>327</sup> John Lauritsen, a writer for the gay newspaper “New York Native” and one of the most prominent AIDS deniers in the U.S., quoted Neubert approvingly in 1991: “It is not the virus, but the [AIDS] diagnosis that kills.”<sup>328</sup> As will be shown below (Section 6.5), such AIDS denialism led to catastrophic consequences for the prevention and treatment of AIDS.

Although the Stasi apparently had no interest in Neubert’s thesis, the HV A/X was particularly pleased with Kruse’s brochure. On June 29, 1987, it wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues regarding active

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<sup>324</sup> Neubert: *Between Fear and Care* (note 318), p. 133 ff.

<sup>325</sup> Neubert, Ehrhart: *Case Study: AIDS. A Socially Critical Investigation*. Berlin 1987 (Theological Studies Department of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, Contributions B. Social Diaconia; 15). For internal church use only, p. 12. The complete study is filed in: BStU, MfS, HA XX/4, No. 1181, pp. 1–125.

<sup>326</sup> Schröder: *AIDS* (note 321), p. 68.

<sup>327</sup> See Neubert’s afterword on Duesberg’s work in: *Neubert: Between Fear and Care* (note 318), p. 164.

<sup>328</sup> Lauritsen, John: *HIV Voodoo From Burroughs-Wellcome*. In: *New York Native* Jan. 7, 1991. The article is available online on Peter Duesberg’s website, “Duesberg on AIDS”: <http://www.duesberg.com/media/jlvoodoo-2.html>. In 1991, Lauritsen cited an essay by Neubert: Neubert, Ehrhart: “Artificial Product ‘AIDS’ in Difficulty, *Raum & Zeit*, Special Issue 4 (October 1990), pp. 98–102. This special issue of the “naturopathic-science-critical” journal was titled, “‘AIDS’—the disease that doesn’t even exist.” Geene: *AIDS-Politik* (note 317), p. 308.

Operation “Detrick,” which apparently was a continuation of the “Denver” project:

“The active campaign to discredit the United States by exploiting the AIDS issue continues to be carried out successfully. Media publications in more than 50 countries have been documented to date, and the campaign has had a strong positive impact, particularly on political leadership circles in Africa. U.S. statements on the campaign assume that the U.S. has suffered serious damage to its foreign policy and that the U.S.’s reputation has declined, particularly in developing countries [...]. The intention is to continue the AIDS campaign and direct it even more specifically against the most aggressive circles of U.S. monopoly capital:

- against the preparation and planning of a biological weapons war by the U.S.,
- against U.S. military bases abroad (thesis: AIDS is spread by U.S. military personnel),
- to disrupt U.S. foreign policy relations, and
- toward the initiation of political conflicts within the U.S.

Support is requested for the further implementation of the measure. In this regard, reference can be made, among other things, to a publication produced in the FRG or West Berlin, which appeared in June 1987 under the title: “AIDS Pathogen from the Genetic Laboratory?”<sup>329</sup>

To this end, HV A/X sent a copy of the freshly printed brochure to the Bulgarian “comrades.” They viewed this publication as part of their active operation “Detrick.”<sup>330</sup>

According to the criteria of HV A/X, even the mention of Segal’s thesis in Johannes Mario Simmel’s bestselling novel *\*Doch mit den Clowns kamen die Tränen\** (1987) could be counted as a success. The fact that the novel’s protagonist ultimately refuted the thesis should not have been regarded by HV A as a “spectacular own goal.”<sup>331</sup> The departments for active measures, for example, also considered it a success when Western governments publicly contradicted their disinformation theories, because such denials generated new publicity for the original disinformation.<sup>332</sup> For them, the principle “No publicity is bad publicity” had long since applied. This attitude was not fundamentally wrong. The Simmel novel itself addressed “directly the Fort Detrick hypothesis and specifically Segal’s interview by Stefan

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<sup>329</sup> Record (presumably from the A/X General Meeting), June 29, 1987; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 676, pp. 46–47

<sup>330</sup> Ibid.

<sup>331</sup> See Geißler: AIDS Conspiracy (note 20).

<sup>332</sup> Selvage: Operation “Synonym” (note 308), p. 14.

Heym ein”<sup>333</sup> and presumably created a new audience for both. Following the 1990 film adaptation of the novel, newspaper articles appeared that addressed the potential dangers of Western genetic engineering, also with reference to the activities of the U.S. government.<sup>334</sup>

Although the HV A/X has long since ceased to exist and can no longer celebrate this success, the article aligned with the objectives cited in the “Den-ver” case file, namely the “exposure of the dangers to humanity arising from the research, production, and use of biological weapons, and the reinforcement of anti-American reservations.”<sup>335</sup> Without the publication of the Heym interview in the “taz,” for which the HV A had provided covert assistance, Simmel would not have learned of Segal’s thesis. Simmel even called Heym to express his concerns, whereupon Heym defended Segal’s thesis.<sup>336</sup> Later, Heym would advocate for the publication of the novel in the GDR, not least because he saw in it an exposure of “the misanthropic and inhuman policies and practices of imperialism”—including in the realm of “genetic warfare.”<sup>337</sup> In both Heym and Simmel, the HV A found unwitting multipliers for its disinformation thesis, who were active, and useful without any further intervention by the HV A.

#### 4.6 Support from the Stasi and the SED: Silencing East German Critics

Behind the scenes, the Stasi provided support to the Segals against other East German scientists who questioned their thesis. And there were quite a few of them. On November 21, 1986, the Segals participated in a colloquium organized by Professor Niels Sönnichsen, head of the

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<sup>333</sup> Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 231.

<sup>334</sup> Lilli Segal, for example, kept such an article in her private archive, but without any indication of which issue or publication it came from. See Genforschung: Hier entsteht der Stoff, aus dem die Alpträume sind. BArch, NY 4516, file K. 12, n. p.

<sup>335</sup> Plan for joint and coordinated active measures by the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic for 1987 and 1988, Berlin, September 3, 1986; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 670, pp. 108–119, here 112.

<sup>336</sup> Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 231.

<sup>337</sup> HA XX/7, Information on Stefan Heym’s current behavior, October 30, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, vol. 20, pp. 123 ff.

organized by the AIDS Advisory Group of the GDR Ministry of Health. Sönnichsen later reported to the GDR Minister of Health, Ludwig Mecklinger, that “an extremely lively and controversial, at times even polemical discussion [...] took place, in which all speakers (except Segal) expressed the view that while there might be some indications supporting Prof. Segal’s theory, no conclusive evidence was available. “Prof. Segal could not be dissuaded from his opinion.” Sönnichsen was aware of the political dimension of the thesis. He reported to Mecklinger:

“The speakers in the discussion unanimously took the position that there is no doubt about the aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism and that it undoubtedly employs all means at its disposal. However, if the claim is made that HIV was genetically engineered in the U.S. for biological warfare, this must be proven beyond a doubt. Otherwise, it can only have negative consequences for the GDR and the other socialist countries.”<sup>338</sup>

Rosenthal, also a member of this AIDS advisory group, shared Sönnichsen’s assessment of the meeting. He warned that Segal was “making East German science a laughingstock internationally.” Segal’s thesis was “below high school level,” according to Rosenthal. Segal’s claim that genetic recombination of viruses in nature was impossible and that the AIDS virus must therefore be a product of artificial creation was, in particular, “of the utmost primitiveness.”<sup>339</sup> Lilli Segal recalled that Prof. Erhard Geißler, then head of department at the Central Institute for Molecular Biology in Berlin-Buch and also a member of the advisory group, had “attacked the thesis quite fiercely” at the colloquium.<sup>340</sup> Shortly after the publication of the Heym interview, Sönnichsen criticized her thesis in *\*Der Spiegel\**. In response to a question from *\*Der Spiegel\**, he stated: “What Segal says is a hypothesis—not an original one, by the way. Others have already put it forward before him. If we open Meyer’s *Lexicon*, under ‘Hypothesis’ it says—

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<sup>338</sup> Sönnichsen, Niels: To the Minister of Health, Gen. Prof. Dr. sc. med. Ludwig Mecklinger, November 24, 1986, with attachment: Report on a colloquium at the Dermatology Clinic of the Charité, November 21, 1986; Federal Archives Lichtenberg (BAL), DQ 1/12727, cited in: Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 101.

<sup>339</sup> Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin, Report: Prof. Segal, March 17, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 306 ff., here 306.

<sup>340</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation Squared (note 9), p. 66.

sex: “A hypothesis is an unproven opinion. That is my comment.”<sup>341</sup> Although Sönnichsen left the question of the origin of the HI virus open, Geißler and Rosenthal wanted to publish an article in the GDR opposing Segal’s thesis.<sup>342</sup>

Against this backdrop of opposition to Segal’s position within academic circles in the GDR, Department 1 of the HA XX of the MfS, which was responsible for public health, contacted Kurt Seidel, head of the Health Policy Department of the Central Committee of the SED. Following the meeting, HA XX/1 reported that Seidel was “aware of the implications of the publication of Prof. Segal’s views on the AIDS problem” and that he “supported them.” Seidel had immediately recognized that “an internal discussion of Segal’s hypotheses” by critical East German scientists “undermines the political objectives of these publications and must be prevented.” Seidel would “inform Sönnichsen accordingly that no publicity-generating activities regarding AIDS may take place without his [Seidel’s] consent.”<sup>343</sup> This not only reaffirmed the SED’s GDR-wide publication ban on the origin of the HI virus. It was also extended to foreign countries for Segal’s opponents. As a result, Segal, as an East German scientist, effectively gained a monopoly on publications regarding the origin of AIDS abroad, exactly as the Stasi intended.

HA XX/1 had little reason to worry that Seidel would not take their concerns into account. Seidel, who had been recruited in 1967 by the Dresden Regional Office of the Stasi as an informant under the code name “Fritz Steiner,” was taken over by HA XX/1 as an informant in 1971 when he was appointed director of the Charité’s psychiatric clinic in Berlin. After he took up a full-time position at the Central Committee of the SED in 1978, his activity as an informant ended due to the ban on conducting secret police operations against the party apparatus. Consequently, it was agreed between HA XX/1 and Seidel to “maintain official contact [...] in the future.”<sup>344</sup> As the informant “Fritz Steiner” and later as a department head in the SED Central Committee, Seidel worked closely with the Stasi and Soviet authorities

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<sup>341</sup> Bickerich, W.; Schwarz, U.: “You Can’t Prevent Anything with Punishments”: An Interview with East Berlin Dermatologist Niels Sönnichsen on AIDS in the GDR. In: *Der Spiegel*, March 9, 1987, pp. 31–40, here 40.

<sup>342</sup> Geißler: “Lieber AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 106.

<sup>343</sup> HA XX/1, Memorandum, March 11, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, Attachment, Vol. 20, p. 19.

<sup>344</sup> Lt. Jaekel, Final Report on the IM Case “Fritz Steiner,” Nov. 7, 1983; BStU, MfS, AIM 13788/83, Vol. 1, p. 198; Seidel’s declaration of commitment, Oct. 23, 1967;

ibid., p. 41a.

points of contact in defending Soviet psychiatry against accusations and condemnation by the World Psychiatric Association for political abuse.<sup>345</sup> Even before the emergence of the AIDS issue, Seidel thus had experience in assisting the MfS and Moscow with joint projects.

After his conversation with the Stasi, Seidel warned the scientists Geißler and Rosenthal. Geißler recalled: “If we publish this, we must assume that we are conducting business for the CIA.”<sup>346</sup> Jakob Segal later wrote of a compromise under which neither he nor his numerous critics in East German academia were permitted to publish on the origin of the AIDS pathogen in the GDR.<sup>347</sup> However, Seidel, the Stasi, and Segal also sought to prevent the publication of critiques of Segal’s thesis by East German scientists outside the GDR. For this reason, and due to the popularization of his thesis outside the GDR, Segal can be regarded as a beneficiary of both the Stasi and the Central Committee of the SED.

Yet the AIDS experts in the GDR did not abandon either their private criticism of Segal or their attempts to overturn the Central Committee’s publication ban. Sönnichsen, for example, told an Stasi informant shortly after Seidel’s decision:

“It is considered an undisputed fact that Prof. Segal has backing; otherwise, it would be impossible for him to operate effectively in this manner without hindrance. He is a Soviet citizen (with a passport) who has, however, lived in the GDR for about 30 years and now travels around as a retiree. Prof. Sönnichsen’s opinion: The person who backs him must discipline him.”<sup>348</sup>

Interestingly, Sönnichsen and Segal’s critics seemed to have won over the staff of Department XX of the Berlin District Administration, who were responsible for monitoring the Charité, to their cause,<sup>349</sup> but

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<sup>345</sup> See Süß, Sonja: *Politically Abused? Psychiatry and State Security in the GDR*. Berlin 1998, pp. 182 ff., 584–589, 593–600, 603–611, 615–619, and 628–632.

<sup>346</sup> Geißler: “Better AIDS ...” (note 7), p. 106.

<sup>347</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to the Deputy Minister of Health of the GDR, Ulrich Schneidewind, October 3, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, p. 319.

<sup>348</sup> Drewitz, Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin, Report, March 16, 1987; BStU, BV Berlin, Dept. XX, No. 3822, pp. 30 ff., here 31.

<sup>349</sup> See, e.g., Dept. XX/3 [of the BV Berlin], Information: Activities of Prof. Segal regarding the dissemination of his views on the origin of the AIDS virus (LAV), March 18, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 304 ff.

which had no verifiable impact on the support provided by HV A or the higher-level MfS offices for the Segals' work.

In the fall of 1987, there were signs that the ban on publications by critics of Segal's thesis was beginning to crumble. On October 2, Segal complained to Deputy Health Minister Ulrich Schneidewind about various publications in the GDR by AIDS experts who "claim practically the opposite of what Segal considers provable" (Schneidewind). Among other things, he cited a publication by Rosenthal in the East German CDU's daily newspaper *\*Neue Zeit\**.<sup>350</sup> The newspaper became a platform for opponents of Segal's thesis. One day after Segal's conversation with Schneidewind, the newspaper quoted Geißler, who had "vehemently" rejected the claim that "the HIV virus, the causative agent of AIDS, had been created through genetic manipulation."<sup>351</sup> The HV A switched to a defensive stance. It commissioned Dehmlow, alias "Nils," via HA VII/7 to prepare an article for the "Neue Zeit," which was intended to serve as a "counterargument to Prof. Rosenthal." Dehmlow fulfilled the assignment in December 1987,<sup>352</sup> but the article was apparently never published in the "Neue Zeit."<sup>353</sup> In January 1988, the newspaper even published an interview with the leading American AIDS researcher Robert Gallo, who spoke openly about the virus's natural origin and its transmission from monkeys to humans.<sup>354</sup> Despite Segal's massive protests<sup>355</sup> the publication ban in effect in the GDR regarding the origin of the HIV virus was not lifted against him—nor against his opponents.

Geißler, on the other hand, achieved a personal success when, in early 1989, he attended the conference of the "American Association for the Advancement of Science"

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<sup>350</sup> Deputy Minister of Health Prof. Dr. Schneidewind, conversation with Comrade Prof. Dr. Jacob Segal, emeritus professor at Humboldt University of Berlin, Oct. 2, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 317 ff., here 317.

<sup>351</sup> Klages, Eberhard: Ethical Issues in Genetic Engineering: Study by Prof. Dr. Erhard Geißler in "Hefte aus Burscheidungen." In: *Neue Zeit*, Oct. 3, 1987, p. 7.

<sup>352</sup> Olt. Theisinger, Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," Dec. 3, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, pp. 17 ff.

<sup>353</sup> Full-text searches for "Neue Zeit" in the Journal Information System (ZEFYS) of the Berlin State Library did not yield any relevant articles. See <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/>.

<sup>354</sup> The Year Five After the Discovery: A Conversation with American AIDS Specialist Prof. Dr. Robert Gallo. In: *Neue Zeit*, Jan. 14, 1988, p. 7.

<sup>355</sup> Schneidewind, conversation with Segal, Oct. 2, 1987, p. 317 ff.; letter from Segal to

Schneidewind, Oct. 3, 1987; BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, p. 319.

in San Francisco, USA. The German Press Agency (dpa) quoted his statement on the sidelines of the congress that Segal's thesis was a "a distasteful political thriller" and "utter nonsense."<sup>356</sup> After Geißler returned to Berlin, he was summoned to the Central Committee. Seidel informed him that he had been denounced by Segal to Axen: "I was supposedly traveling around the heartland of the class enemy and slandering him, the good communist Segal." Seidel, who was also having trouble with Segal by then, listened to Geißler's criticism of Segal's thesis. Geißler believed he had convinced Seidel. In the end, Segal's denunciation had "no adverse consequences" for Geißler. Nevertheless, the ban on publishing research on the origin of the AIDS pathogen remained in effect officially until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and Segal was never "called to order" by the SED.<sup>357</sup> This remained the case, even though in the spring of 1989 Seidel assured Prof. Rüdiger von Baehr, the director of the Institute for Medical Immunology at the Charité and, alongside Sönnichsen, one of the leading AIDS researchers in the GDR, that "this campaign [on AIDS] is now to be ended" and that "Segal is no longer to appear in this form."<sup>358</sup> Both Segal and the HV A apparently disagreed.

#### 4.7 The Segals as Beneficiaries of the HV A/SWT, 1987–1989

While there is no documentary evidence for the years 1985 to 1986 that would prove support for the Segals and their research and lecturing activities by the MfS, the situation is different for the period after 1987.

The first evidence of such assistance dates back to a meeting on August 27, 1987, between Dehmlow (IMS "Nils"), his commanding officer in HA VII/7, Theisinger, and Thielemann from HV A/SWT/XIII/5. During this meeting, Thielemann explicitly tasked Dehmlow with providing "scientific support to Prof. Segal." In addition, "Nils" was instructed by Thielemann to "develop scientifically grounded counterarguments against the prevailing theory" regarding the artificial creation of the AIDS pathogen

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<sup>356</sup> dpa report, Jan. 17, 1989; reprinted in: Geißler, Erhard: *Anthrax and the Failure of the Intelligence Services*. Berlin 2003, p. 249 ff.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>358</sup> Major Dewitz, Dept. XX/3, BV Berlin, Report: *Cooperation with the FRG in the Field of AIDS Research*, May 11, 1989; BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, Dept. XX, No. 3855, pp. 21 ff., here 22.

through genetic engineering and to “investigate Prof. Segal’s circle for possible enemy attacks as well as for individuals who might support the aforementioned theory,”<sup>359</sup> During the meeting, Thielemann even offered Dehmlow a new position at an institute of the Academy of Sciences in Berlin-Buch. The position would have been linked to the IM’s takeover by HV A/SWT/XIII/5. However, Dehmlow, supported by Theisinger, declined the offer.<sup>360</sup>

The job offer was presumably the response of HV A/SWT/XIII/5 to Dehmlow’s mounting professional difficulties. His position at the People’s Police Hospital had become increasingly precarious as a result of the harsh criticism directed at Segal’s thesis at the colloquium held at the Charité in November 1986.<sup>361</sup> One of Dehmlow’s superiors had decided after the colloquium that Dehmlow should cease his research on “all sorts of unimportant problems, such as AIDS, UVB, etc.” at the People’s Police Hospital and his collaboration “with the senile old Professor Segal”<sup>362</sup> in general. The supervisor wanted Dehmlow’s labor to be devoted to his own research project.<sup>363</sup> He had even claimed to Dehmlow that “the intelligence service”—i.e., the HV A—had tasked him with “putting the brakes on Segal and, in particular, on me [Dehmlow], we had already caused enough damage—through our activities, we had exposed a source of the ‘A’ who was very close to the top.”<sup>364</sup> Dehmlow reportedly replied to his superior that the “Prof. Segal’s activities are supported by Comrade Axen both at home and abroad.”<sup>365</sup> Following Dehmlow’s “consultation with Dieter” (van de Sand?)<sup>366</sup>, Segal and Dehmlow approached Uhlig in January 1987, the

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<sup>359</sup> Oln. Theisinger, HA VII/7, meeting report: IMS “Nils,” Aug. 27, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 307 ff.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 308.

<sup>361</sup> At van de Sand’s request to HA VII/7, Dehmlow, under the alias “Nils,” had prepared and submitted a report on the colloquium. See memo from Colonel Bethge, Head of HA VII/7, to the Head of HVA/SWT/13, January 6, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 177–189, here 177.

<sup>362</sup> Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7, file note, January 21, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 222 ff., here 222. See also informant “Nils,” HA VII/7, report, Nov. 26, 1986; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 175 ff.

<sup>363</sup> See the handwritten notes by “Nils,” undated; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 192 ff., here 193.

<sup>364</sup> In “Nils,” HA VII/7, Report, Nov. 26, 1986; *ibid.*, pp. 175 ff., here 175.

<sup>365</sup> Handwritten notes by “Nils,” undated; *ibid.*, pp. 192 ff., here 193.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.

Medical Director of the KHdVP. Uhlig, who had also participated in the colloquium in November 1986, confirmed his support for Segal's thesis and offered to create a new position for Dehmlow at the government hospital outside the purview of his dissatisfied superior at the KHdVP. Dehmlow was to continue his previous research with Segal and contact Uhlig directly if he encountered further difficulties.<sup>367</sup> Uhlig was presumably aware of the secret police connections because he was listed as an OibE by HA VII/7.<sup>368</sup> Despite the claims of the superior who was dissatisfied with Dehmlow, there were no signs that the "Aufklärung" or at least HV A/SWT/XIII/5 had withdrawn its support for Segal's work. The problems at the KHdVP were not permanently resolved, and Dehmlow repeatedly came into conflict with his superior.<sup>369</sup> Dehmlow continued to hope for support from the MfS for his proposal to establish a research position for medical biophysical chemistry—to continue his previous research on UVB, HOT, and AIDS—at the government hospital.<sup>370</sup> This could explain why he declined the position at the Academy of Sciences offered by HV A/SWT.

Despite his problems within the KHdVP, Dehmlow carried out the assignment from HV A/SWT/XIII/5 to support Jakob Segal in his academic work.<sup>371</sup> And he was by no means alone in this. On October 11, 1987, Dehmlow, alias "Nils," provided an assessment of a person in the Segals' circle.<sup>372</sup> "Nils" wrote about the target, a "new acquaintance of Prof. Segal":

"He is extremely attentive and helpful toward Prof. Segal and his wife (even driving them to the train station when they travel, etc.) [...]. His personal interest in AIDS is

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<sup>367</sup> IM, HA VII/7, Information, Jan. 7, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 197 ff.,

here 197.

<sup>368</sup> See Uhlig's Stasi personnel file: BStU, Stasi, KS 29084/90, in particular pp. 2–3 and 31–44.

<sup>369</sup> Theisinger, file note, Jan. 21, 1987, pp. 222 ff.; "Nils," handwritten note, May 20, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, p. 266.

<sup>370</sup> See draft concept for a research center for medical biophysical chemistry, undated; *ibid.*, pp. 224–233; Olt. Theisinger, HA VII/7, meeting report, IMS "Nils," Jan. 7, 1987; *ibid.*, pp. 190–191, here 191.

<sup>371</sup> Lt. Theisinger, Meeting Report: IMS "Nils," Sept. 30, 1987; *ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 312 ff., here 313.

<sup>372</sup> Theisinger, HA VII/7/3, Information, Assignment HV A, Nov. 12, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, p. 5.

still understandable—even with regard to operational tasks—however, the immediate effort expended (assistance with purchasing the computer, setup, running it in, creating disks, organizing programs, library work even in West Berlin, involving one of his archivists, etc.) is unusual.”<sup>373</sup>

Dehmlow concluded that the Segals’ new helper “must, with a probability bordering on certainty, [...] be an employee of our security agencies.”<sup>374</sup> That was indeed the case. The helpful individual was registered as IMA “Jörg” for HV A/SWT/XIII/5 starting in February 1986, and the case was handled by van de Sand beginning in April 1987.<sup>375</sup> From 1987 to 1989, HV A/SWT/XIII/5 recorded the receipt of at least 39 pieces of information from “Jörg” regarding genetic engineering, pharmaceutical research, AIDS, and Western medications.<sup>376</sup> For his part, Dehmlow saw good prospects for cooperation with “Jörg” in 1987: “A good professional collaboration is developing between us that may extend beyond the AIDS issue in the narrower sense.”<sup>377</sup>

Starting in April 1988, Dehmlow was able to devote himself fully to Segal’s research and other assignments from HV A/SWT/XIII/5. He was appointed head of a research unit for medical biophysical chemistry, which perfectly matched his vision. He reported to the Deputy Minister of Health of the GDR, Ulrich Schneidewind. Thielemann indicated to Theisinger that he had been instrumental in creating the position.<sup>378</sup> When Dehmlow took up his new post, Thielemann officially took over the file on IMS “Nils” from Theisinger and handed it over to van de Sand shortly thereafter.<sup>379</sup> Jakob Segal was hired under Dehmlow as “scientific director” of the research center, and his wife Lilli as “documentation consultant.”<sup>380</sup> Jakob Segal wrote in May 1988 to

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<sup>373</sup> “Nils,” Initial Brief Remarks on [Target Person], Nov. 10, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, p. 6.

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>375</sup> See BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16 and F22, Reg. No. XV 1229/77, IMS “Jörg”.

<sup>376</sup> See results for the search query “QUA.RGNR=\*1229/77” in: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 11. The last verifiable information from “Jörg” was sent to van de Sand on May 3, 1989. See SE8962255 in: *ibid.*

<sup>377</sup> “Nils,” Initial Brief Remarks, November 10, 1987; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, p. 7.

<sup>378</sup> Lt. Theisinger, Meeting Report: IMS “Nils,” March 3, 1988; *ibid.*, pp. 47–48, here 48.

<sup>379</sup> Theisinger, HA VII/7, Decision: Removal from the archives due to transfer, April 21, 1988; *ibid.*, p. 75; Entry for informant “Nils,” Reg. No. XV 2987/86; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8815425.

<sup>380</sup> Letter from Lilli Segal to an acquaintance, August 13, 1988; BArch, NY 4516, Box 12, n.

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an acquaintance: “We’ve been promised generous funding for staff, facilities, and equipment, and we’ve very slowly and carefully begun looking for young, interested people.”<sup>381</sup> According to Lilli Segal in an interview with the “taz,” the new research center was intended to conduct “basic AIDS research.”<sup>382</sup> The new arrangement corresponded to Dehmlow’s plan.<sup>383</sup> It made van de Sand’s work easier because he knew that Jakob Segal, whom he had “recruited,” Lilli Segal, whom he had recruited, and the informant “Nils,” whom he had taken on, were all working in the same environment. He could more easily pass information on to them and more easily gather information from them and about them. Apparently, Dehmlow, as “Nils,” had continued to serve the Segals’ research and the defense against “attacks” against the Segals on behalf of HV A/SWT/XIII/5. Through the same channel, he had also procured other scientific information on behalf of HV A/SWT. For the year 1989, HV A recorded a total of 15 pieces of information from “Nils” to van de Sand regarding biotechnology and AIDS.<sup>384</sup> Among these was an “interactive program for the visualization of protein molecule models.”<sup>385</sup> Such acquisitions could be useful both for the Segal research unit at the MfG and for the information needs of the HV A/SWT. Van de Sand received further information from a communist party member “Bianca” as part of the “Wind” security operation (she mainly provided public U.S. government documents on AIDS and Fort Detrick)<sup>386</sup>, which could also have been useful for Segal’s research.

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<sup>381</sup> Letter from Jakob Segal to a professor in Frankfurt am Main, May 26, 1988; BArch, NY 4516, file K. 13, no page number

<sup>382</sup> Böhm, Charlotte: “We Remain on the Barricades”: On the Autobiography of Biologist, AIDS Researcher, Resistance Fighter, and Jew Lilli Segal. In: taz, January 7, 1989, p. 9.

<sup>383</sup> Draft: Concept for a Research Center for Medical Biophysical Chemistry, undated; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. I, pp. 224–233.

<sup>384</sup> See results for the search query “QUA.RGnr=‘\*/2987/86’”; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 11.

<sup>385</sup> See *ibid.*, SE8962429.

<sup>386</sup> See the entries for incoming information from KP “Bianca” under SVG “Wind” (XV 3824/85): BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 11, SE8804673, SE8804674, SE8804675, SE8807521, SE8808066, SE8808880, SE8809393, SE8809394, SE8861596, SE8962192. In 1988, van de Sand recorded “Bianca” in an IM preliminary report (XV 726/88). See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21,

ZV8815074.

Journalist Klaus Behling claims that HV A provided further research assistance to the Segals that cannot be substantiated by the informant file on “Nils.” Specifically, the HV A is said to have obtained a report from a U.S. congressional committee dating from 1969 and passed it on to Segal for his publications.<sup>387</sup> During that congressional committee hearing, a Dr. Donald MacArthur from the U.S. Department of Defense had stated:

“Molecular biology is a field that is making very rapid progress, and eminent biologists believe that within a period of five to ten years it would be possible to produce a synthetic biological pathogen that does not exist in nature and against which no natural immunity can be developed.”<sup>388</sup>

For the Segals, the report served as clear proof that the U.S. government had planned and funded the creation of the AIDS pathogen in advance.<sup>389</sup> However, no evidence has yet been found in the BStU archives that the Segals received the report or an excerpt from it in English or in a German translation from the HV A.

In the case of a second document—a petition from the American environmental organization “Foundation for Economic Trends” (FET) to U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci III, which the Segals published in translation—<sup>390</sup> it can be proven that HV A forwarded a German translation of this document to the “sister organizations,” along with the Segals’ latest research findings for the campaign on AIDS and Fort Detrick.<sup>391</sup> The FET’s request aimed to elicit information from the U.S. Department of Defense as to whether the Pentagon had ever attempted to develop the virus described by MacArthur.<sup>392</sup>

Whether one should now believe the claims of Bohnsack, Behling, and Boghardt regarding earlier research assistance provided by the HV A to the Segals

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<sup>387</sup> Behling: Retired Scout (note 43), p. 253. See also Boghardt: Operation INFECTION (note 6), p. 17 and footnote 100.

<sup>388</sup> Segal, Lilli; Segal, Jakob: AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon. 2nd, expanded ed., Essen 1990, p. 122.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., pp. 125–128.

(<sup>391</sup>) List of materials handed over by the German comrades at the working consultation in Sofia in 1988 (Bulgarian), undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 109–111.

<sup>392</sup> Segal; Segal: AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–128.

Whether or not it was a gift: at least starting in 1987, there is documented support from HV A/SWT/XIII/5 for the Segals' research, for example the contracts awarded by HV A/SWT/XIII/5 to Dehmlow, the assistance provided by IM "Jörg" for them, and the establishment of the special research center for medical biophysical chemistry at the MfG, under whose auspices the Segals and Dehmlow were able to advance their investigations. It is quite possible that the Segals knew nothing of this support. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Jakob Segal told journalist Kuno Kruse that he had learned of one of his assistants' collaboration with the Stasi. He and his wife had "felt exploited by the Stasi" and had been "very disappointed" in this employee.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>393</sup> Telephone interview with Douglas Selvage and Kuno Kruse, January 29, 2014.

## 5 The Limits of the Campaign: The Segals, the Soviet Union, and AIDS Disinformation, 1987–1989

It was not only Segal and HV A/X who had trouble recruiting scientists in the GDR for their thesis. Mutz, deputy head of Department HV A X, and Pfeifer, deputy head of Section HV A X/1, informed their Bulgarian colleagues in September 1988 that despite the efforts of the “Soviet comrades,” scientists in the USSR were also not inclined to support the Segal thesis.<sup>394</sup> The Bulgarian “Chekists,” for their part, had similar problems with Bulgarian scientists.<sup>395</sup> But it was even worse: In their counter-propaganda, the Americans were able to cite many leading scientists from the USSR who rejected an artificial origin of the HIV virus, considered an African origin likely, or, contrary to Segal’s thesis, dated the emergence of the virus to before 1977.<sup>396</sup> The KGB had failed in its goal of controlling “everything” that was to be published on the subject of AIDS in the USSR and of preventing “the launch of versions of AIDS that are favorable to the USA (such as those regarding the monkey origin of the disease).”<sup>397</sup>

The statements by Soviet scientists against specific points of Segal’s hypothesis served, as the Stasi and Seidel had foreseen in the case of the GDR, to help the U.S. government reject the thesis. In August 1987, the U.S. State Department published a report exposing Soviet active measures, in which Moscow’s AIDS disinformation campaign was one of the central themes. With regard to the GDR, the Americans only had to

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<sup>394</sup> D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First Main Directorate: Record of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 86–98, here 92.

<sup>395</sup> Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from September 26 to 29, 1989, October 10, 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 184–196, here 189.

<sup>396</sup> US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), pp. 36 ff.

(<sup>397</sup>) This is how Ivanov had put it to his Bulgarian colleagues in May 1986. See L. Nikolov: Report on the meeting held with Soviet friends during the international conference on AM in Hungary, May 11–17, 1986 (Bulgarian); COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4, a.e 669, pp. 220 ff., here 221.

They quoted Sönnichsen's comments to *\*Der Spiegel\** to cast doubt on Segal's thesis. In contrast, they devoted an entire section of their report to the comments of Dr. Viktor Shdanov, director of the Virology Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the leading AIDS expert in the USSR. Just five weeks after Zapewalow's article, he had stated in an interview with *\*Sovetskaya Kultura\** that AIDS originated in Central Africa, and in an interview with *\*Literaturnaya Gazeta\** in May 1986, he had further explained that the AIDS pathogen could have existed in nature for centuries. At the Second International Conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986, Shdanov had further stated that data from his institute showed that AIDS already existed in the USSR in 1974 or—according to the U.S. State Department—“three years before Segal claimed that the AIDS virus was ‘manufactured’ [in the U.S.]”<sup>398</sup> Jakob Segal was aware of Shdanov's opposing position and had complained to Axen about it in June 1986: “So far, there is a very justified suspicion that AIDS is a product of Fort Detrick, USA. Prof. Shdanov's statement directly encourages people to pin the blame for AIDS on the Soviet Union.”<sup>399</sup>

To make up for the failure of their thesis on the Soviet front and to build on the success of the Heym interview, the Segals visited Moscow in late February 1987—one week after Pfeifer's meeting with his KGB colleagues. They were there at the official invitation of the Soviet Ministry of Health. Apparently, the aim was to persuade Soviet scientists to issue a public statement in support of their thesis. Such a move would also have fit in with the plans of the KGB and HV A/X regarding AIDS disinformation. As an “immediate measure,” the Segals proposed to the medical officials at the Soviet Ministry of Health “that as extensive an article as possible be published in the *\*Literaturnaya Gazeta\** based on our reports, but if possible by a Soviet author. Furthermore, a detailed article was to appear in a professional journal, this time by J. and Lilli Segal.” Although the Soviet “comrades” had allegedly agreed to this “in principle,” none of the publications ever appeared.<sup>400</sup> The Segals also visited Zhdanov's Virological Institute, but

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<sup>398</sup> US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 36.

<sup>399</sup> Segal, 1st Memorandum, Aug. 27, 1986; BArch, DY 30/26444, n. p.

<sup>400</sup> Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal and Dr. Lilli Segal, Report on the Trip to Moscow, February 23–27, 1987, undated; BStU, BV Berlin, Dept. XX, No. 3822, pp. 16–18, here p. 17.

Zhdanov himself, whom the Segals described as “a staunch opponent of our ideas and a proponent of the ‘green monkey’ theory and the African origin of AIDS,” had sent his apologies due to illness. Although the members of the institute who were present had argued with the Segals about their thesis, the discussion was “conducted in the Soviet manner—sharp but objective and comradely—in any case, much more objective than here in Berlin,” according to the Segals.<sup>401</sup>

The Segals apparently had better luck with the Soviet press. It seems that Soviet authorities now intended to make use of the publications promoted by the Stasi and the KGB in the West as part of their open or “white” propaganda. The Novosti Press Agency (APN) played a central role in the USSR’s “white” propaganda; it sent a journalist to the Segals in East Berlin to interview them for the Soviet press. Jakob Segal reportedly tried to prevent the journalist from publishing the interview in a Soviet military journal. He feared, according to Segal, that there would otherwise be “a flood of slander in the direction of KGB propaganda.” Subsequently, various articles on the Segal thesis did indeed appear in the Soviet press, not only in the APN’s “Moscow News” but also in the aforementioned military journal. Lilli Segal told an informant of the MfS that “shortly thereafter, a clamour of KGB propaganda came from over there,” and her husband “raged and ranted against Novosti.” Jakob Segal accused Novosti of “being unable to think.” He wanted to prevent his thesis from being dismissed as KGB propaganda.<sup>402</sup>

The scope for Soviet propaganda and the chances of winning over Soviet scientists as multipliers for the Segal thesis narrowed further as Soviet-American relations improved noticeably following the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986. Pressure from Washington on Moscow to halt the AIDS disinformation campaign grew.

Initially, American efforts had little effect. Just two weeks after the summit, *\*Pravda\** published October 31, 1986, a notorious cartoon in which an American officer mistakes a scientist for a test tube full of AIDS viruses, which take the form of

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<sup>401</sup> Ibid., p. 16. In private, Lilli Segal stated that Shdanov was “regarded in professional circles as an idiot in his field.” Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (informant report “Maria” dated April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, attachment, vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 35.

<sup>402</sup> Major Jahnke, HA XX/9: Transcript (informant report “Maria” dated April 10, 1987), April 15, 1987; BStU, MfS, AOP 26320/91, Appendix, Vol. 20, pp. 33–37, here 34.

featuring small swastikas (see cover illustration). This provoked another public protest from Ambassador Hartman.<sup>403</sup> At a meeting of the joint U.S.-USSR Health Committee in Washington in April 1987, U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop made it clear that there would be no cooperation between the two countries on AIDS research until the disinformation campaign ceased.<sup>404</sup> A meeting in Moscow in June 1987 between Charles Wick, the head of the United States Information Agency (USIA), and Valentin Falin, the head of Novosti, ended abruptly when Falin defended a new report by his agency claiming that the CIA had developed ethnic weapons for use against Africans. Falin claimed that the information for the press release came from Western media reports—a procedure commonly used for active measures. A few days later, Falin even confirmed the content of the report on “ethnic weapons” in an interview with “Moscow News.”<sup>405</sup>

A turning point was reached in October 1987 during a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Gorbachev in Moscow, where they discussed the upcoming summit in Washington. Gorbachev pulled the August 1987 U.S. State Department report on Soviet active measures from a stack on his desk and began to criticize it vehemently. Shultz defended the report, which criticized and documented the AIDS disinformation campaign.<sup>406</sup> As a result of the meeting, the Soviet Academy of Sciences publicly and officially distanced itself from the Fort Detrick theory in November 1987,<sup>407</sup> and during the summit in Washington, Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev agreed with USIA Director Wick to cease mutual disinformation. There were to be regular meetings in the future to address incidents of disinformation

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<sup>403</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 26.

<sup>404</sup> U.S. DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 42.

<sup>405</sup> Snyder: Warriors of Disinformation (note 76), p. 116 ff.

<sup>406</sup> Atlas, Terry: “Dirty tricks” file upsets Soviets. Gorbachev angered by U.S. report on disinformation. In: Chicago Tribune, Oct. 27, 1987, [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-10-27/news/8703200908\\_1\\_soviet-efforts-disinformation-kathleen-bailey](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-10-27/news/8703200908_1_soviet-efforts-disinformation-kathleen-bailey); Shipler, David K.: Little Report, with Right Spin, Makes Big Splash. In: The New York Times, Nov. 5, 1987, p. A32. The report that alarmed Gorbachev was US DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46).

<sup>407</sup> Soviets reject own press charge that AIDS originated as a U.S. plot. In: Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 3, 1987, p. A7.

discuss.<sup>408</sup> Following several further incidents of AIDS disinformation, the president of the Academy of Sciences, Vadim Pokrovsky, issued an official statement in the summer of 1988 regarding the theory that AIDS originated in the United States. He stated that there was “not a single Soviet scientist, not a single medical or scientific institution, that shares this position.”<sup>409</sup>

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The First Plenum of the KGB was hit hard by the statement. It told its Bulgarian colleagues: “They [the Americans] put it this way: If you write about AIDS like that, then no cooperation in the medical field! Pokrovsky had to give an interview under pressure.”<sup>(410)</sup>

The First Directorate of the KGB itself came to the conclusion that if it wanted to continue its AIDS disinformation campaign, it had to proceed in a “more substantiated and tactical” manner and focus primarily on the areas surrounding American military bases. After the summit in Harare, the

I. The KGB set itself and its “sister agencies” the next task of “intensifying anti-base sentiment in countries with U.S. military forces, using the slogan that U.S. soldiers are the most dangerous carriers of the virus.”<sup>411</sup> Following Zapewalov’s article, which had hinted at a supposedly high number of AIDS cases among U.S. military personnel,<sup>412</sup> the “Literaturnaya Gazeta” provided further “black propaganda.” In April 1986, it had reported on an alleged decision by the Honduran parliament to relocate U.S. military bases to isolated areas so that soldiers would not spread the virus among the local population

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<sup>408</sup> White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Working Luncheon with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Dec. 10, 1987, 12 pp., p. 8. In: Savranskaya, Svetlana; Blanton, Tom (eds.): *The INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] Treaty and Washington Summit: 20 Years Later*. In: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (NSAEBB) 237 (2007). Available online: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/usdocs/Doc%2019%20%28Working%20Lunch%20Reagan%20Gorby%2012.10.87%29.pdf>.

<sup>409</sup> Snyder: *Warriors of Disinformation* (note 76), p. 182 ff.

<sup>410</sup> D. Stankov, Record of discussions with Department “A” of the First Main Directorate of the KGB in Moscow from October 25 to 28, 1988, regarding cooperation with Department 8 of the First Main Directorate of the DS (Bulgarian), November 28, 1988. In: Kiryakova; Angelova (eds.): *KGB and DS* (note 29), pp. 1870–1903, here 1884.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>412</sup> Zapevalov: *Panic in the West* (note 53), p. 172. A scientific study in the U.S.,

however, found that the prevalence of AIDS among U.S. military personnel was lower than among the general population.

can.<sup>413</sup> In May 1986, she reported on alleged concerns from other countries that “the U.S. had not taken effective steps to implement quarantine measures against the spread of AIDS outside the U.S.” In this context, she pointed to public appeals in Japan, where, out of fear of infection with the AIDS virus, ships of the American fleet were to be kept out of Japanese ports.<sup>414</sup> The KGB counted it as a success that in 1988 there was a large demonstration calling for the closure of American bases in Seoul due to the alleged AIDS threat. The next target was to be Western Europe. The “Soviet friends,” according to the Bulgarian State Security, had “[...] prepared corresponding leaflets with caricatures and data on the number of American military personnel and distributed them in Western European countries.”<sup>415</sup> The Bulgarians were also supposed to contribute, according to the KGB, by using their “channels of communication” to Turkey to “stir up” the “anti-American, anti-base sentiment” there.<sup>416</sup> The A/X Directorate also pressured the Bulgarians to initiate corresponding measures in Turkey, Greece, and the Arab countries.<sup>417</sup> It remains unclear, however, whether the Bulgarian Department for Active Measures, Section 8 of the First Directorate of the DS, played a significant role in

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<sup>413</sup> Vesinski, Vladimir: *Epidemia so severa? [Epidemic from the North?]*. In: LG Apr. 1, 1986, p. 9. The claim that the AIDS epidemic in Honduras originated at U.S. military bases is scientifically disputed and likely false. See Smallman, Shawn C.: *The AIDS Pandemic in Latin America*. Charlotte Hill 2007, pp. 153–154.

<sup>414</sup> SPID (note 86), p. 15; on the campaigns in Japan, see Sabatier, Renée: *Blaming Others. Prejudice, Race and Worldwide AIDS*. London et al. 1988, p. 115.

<sup>415</sup> D. Stankov, Record of discussions with Department “A” of the First Directorate of the KGB in Moscow from October 25 to 28, 1988, regarding cooperation with Department 8 of the First Directorate of the DS (Bulgarian), November 28, 1988. In: Kiryakova; Angelova (eds.): *KGB and DS* (note 29), pp. 1870–1903, here 1884.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*; D. Stankov, Deputy Head of the First General Meeting of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First General Meeting, report on our discussions with representatives of Service “A” of the First Directorate of the KGB regarding the situation in several countries and the tasks of intelligence in the field of AM (Bulgarian), Nov. 19, 1987. In: Kiryakova; Angelova (eds.): *KGB i DS* (note 29), pp. 1756–1780, here 1772.

<sup>417</sup> Plan for joint and coordinated active measures by the intelligence agencies of the Ministry of the Interior of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic for 1989 and 1990, undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 104–108, here 105 f. See also

record (presumably from HV A/X), June 29, 1987; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 676, pp. 46–47, here 47.

in this area.<sup>418</sup> Nevertheless, the HV A and the KGB regarded the dissemination of disinformation about AIDS in connection with the ongoing campaign against U.S. military bases as a success. The HV A/X wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues regarding the Fort Detrick thesis:

“The dissemination of this viewpoint is very damaging to the political prestige of the U.S., has a negative impact on U.S. relations with other countries, and worsens the situation of U.S. military bases abroad (American soldiers are accused of being responsible for the spread of AIDS in countries with U.S. military bases).”

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Kathleen Bailey, head of the State Department’s Office for Countering Soviet Disinformation, publicly admitted in August 1987 that the AIDS disinformation campaign had “complicated negotiations for the renewal of lease agreements for American military bases in the Philippines and Greece.” To her annoyance, Dan Rather, the anchor of the evening news program on one of the three largest U.S. television networks at the time, had reported on allegations in the Soviet press regarding the alleged origin of HIV at Fort Detrick without seeking comment from the U.S. government.<sup>420</sup>

Although the KGB continued to disseminate AIDS disinformation specifically targeting U.S. military bases in third countries,

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<sup>418</sup> The head of the 8th Division, D. Stankow, informed his colleagues in HV A/X in September 1989 that the DS had made “attempts” to “do something in this regard in Greece and Turkey, including distributing leaflets against the American bases, but so far the results have been modest.” Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from September 26 to 29, 1989, October 10, 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e.

691, pp. 184–196, here 189. In October 1989, Department 8 asked its Soviet colleagues for relevant information on AIDS cases among American military personnel in Turkey and Greece for its “Pandem” operation. According to the AM, it had been “difficult” to “find even a few cases of such patients.” See Information on joint work with Soviet friends on the US, NATO, and Western Europe front within the AM in 1989 (Bulgarian), Oct. 10, 1989. In: Kiryakova; Angelova (eds.): KGB and DS (note 29), pp. 2020–2027, here 2022.

<sup>419</sup> Translation from the German (Bulgarian), Feb. 29, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a. e. 676, pp. 49–52.

<sup>420</sup> Gillete, Robert: Soviets Suggest Experiment Leaks in U.S. Created the AIDS Epidemic. In: LA Times, Aug. 9, 1987, p. D15.

Despite objections from the Soviet news agencies TASS and Novosti (particularly Falin), the Soviet press continued to spread propaganda about the alleged American origin of AIDS,<sup>421</sup> ceased in September 1988.<sup>422</sup> Around this time, according to his own account, Jakob Segal was invited to a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. The cultural attaché reportedly apologized to him that his thesis would no longer be published in the USSR “alongside the classical theories.” Reagan had allegedly threatened to call off the next summit meeting with Gorbachev if the USSR did not stop these “insulting slanders.” The USSR had by no means “less sympathy” for Segal and his research, but nuclear disarmament was a top priority for Moscow.<sup>423</sup>

## 5.1 AIDS Disinformation by HV A/X and Segal’s Thesis

The U.S. exerted pressure not only on Moscow but also on East Berlin. The goal was to put an end to the AIDS disinformation. As in the case of Hartman in Moscow, John C. Kornblum, deputy commander of the American sector of Greater Berlin, protested in a letter to the editor of the “taz” against the publication of the Fort Detrick thesis in the form of the Heym interview.<sup>424</sup> In January 1988, the U.S. Ambassador to East Berlin, Francis J. Meehan, lodged an official protest with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the GDR, Kurt Nier, against the ongoing activities of Jakob Segal.<sup>425</sup> East German physicians involved in AIDS research warned that Segal’s activities could bring scientific research in the GDR into disrepute and jeopardize opportunities for cooperation with the West in AIDS research.

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<sup>421</sup> Snyder: *Warriors of Disinformation* (note 76), pp. 115 ff. and 181 ff.; TASS’s Shishkin Interviewed on US Visit, Moscow Domestic Service in Russia, 0945 GMT, May 13, 1988. In: FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-88-094, May 16, 1988, pp. 12–14.

<sup>422</sup> USIA: *Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation*, Oct. 6, 1989, cited in: Gordievski, Oleg; Andrew, Christopher: *KGB. The History of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. Munich 1992, p. 812, fn. 44.

<sup>423</sup> Klaus Hartmann spoke with Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal. *AIDS – Where Does the Disease Come From and How Should It Be Treated?* In: *Freidenker 1* (1994), pp. 8–19, here 11.

<sup>424</sup> Kornblum, John C.: *False and Malicious*. In: *taz*, March 3, 1987, p. 18.

<sup>425</sup> Prof. Dr. Segal, Jakob, in: *BStU, AR 2, MfS, HA II/AKG-DOK*.

The HV A/X, however, was unimpressed by the U.S. government's countermeasures. On the contrary: the U.S. State Department report—which had so angered Gorbachev and highlighted Jakob Segal's role in the KGB's disinformation campaign,<sup>(426)</sup>—was seen by MfS staff as confirmation of the effectiveness of their own active measures. In the HV A's assessment, the State Department had downplayed the damage the AIDS disinformation campaign had caused the U.S., particularly in Western Europe. The HV A wrote to its Bulgarian colleagues:

“Perhaps to mitigate the impact of the thesis in NATO member states, the U.S. State Department did not report much in the study about the reaction of the mass media and political activity in NATO member states (reports in the press and on the radio in Italy and the FRG, publications in professional journals in the FRG, manuscripts in the FRG).”<sup>427</sup>

In September 1988, Mutz and Pfeifer personally handed over to their Bulgarian colleagues in Sofia the next, revised version of Segal's study from the left-wing Munich journal *\*Streitbarer Materialismus\**<sup>428</sup> for further use in active operations. According to the Stasi officers, the article was a “revised version of the book [sic] by [the] Prof. [redacted] [...], in which he took into account the latest research findings and argued against all opponents.” The HV A/X assessed the article as “good material, relatively peaceful, but convincing.”<sup>429</sup> The “German comrades” declared confidently: “Regardless of their hostile reaction, the Americans are unable to refute Professor [redacted]'s hypothesis regarding the origin of the AIDS virus.”<sup>(430)</sup> Mutz and Pfeifer handed over their

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<sup>426</sup> U.S. DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 33.

<sup>427</sup> Original document in Bulgarian, based on a translation from German. Feb. 29, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a. e. 676, pp. 49–52, here 51.

For the German translation of the section of the American report on active measures regarding AIDS, see BStU, MfS, HA XX, No. 7101, pp. 228–284.

<sup>428</sup> List of materials, undated, p. 110. For the article, see Segal; Segal; Dehmlow: AIDS – Its Nature and Origin (note 118), pp. 7–68.

<sup>429</sup> D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First Central Committee of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First Central Committee: Record of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 86–98, here 94. The professor's name was redacted by COMDOS-Arch-R.

<sup>430</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

Bulgarian colleagues presented three additional documents regarding the continuation of the AIDS disinformation campaign as part of Operation “Detrick” (Bulgarian code name: “Pandemic”). First, they presented an article from the magazine “Horizont” with an English translation about “criminal experiments.” Although the article does not deal directly with AIDS, according to HV A/X, it exposes “the criminal experiments of American scientists,” “who began conducting experiments on soldiers regarding the effects of radiation even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki and have since developed the latest biological weapons.” The article is based on revelations from the U.S. Congress in 1986, according to which the U.S. government had in some cases secretly irradiated soldiers and civilians without their knowledge in order to measure and document the short- and long-term effects. As a second document, they submitted an article from the “Frankfurter Rundschau” dated

August 13, 1988: “With regard to AIDS, the prospects for effective protection through immunization are limited.” According to HV A/X, what makes the article interesting is that it rejects “the African origin of AIDS” and points to an “artificial origin” e.<sup>431</sup> As a third document, HV A/X submitted a petition from the American environmental organization “Foundation for Economic Trends” (FET) to U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci III, calling for “a complete review of the project to create a synthetic chemical agent for biological warfare.” In this context, FET cited MacArthur’s testimony before the U.S. Congress in 1969.<sup>432</sup>

The materials shared once again reflected how closely the East’s AIDS disinformation was linked to developments in the U.S. Both the article in “Horizont”<sup>433</sup> and the Segals’ publications<sup>434</sup> cited revelations from 1986 hearings of the U.S. Congress regarding illegal radiological experiments on

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<sup>431</sup> List of materials, undated, p. 110. The article mentioned was written by Marion Kunze: “Criminal Experiments: A Documentary Report.” In: *Horizont* 19 (1986) 7, p. 30.

<sup>432</sup> *Ibid.* The HV A/X also submitted a working translation of the petition in German. For a German translation of the petition, see Segal; Segal: AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–128.

<sup>433</sup> Kunze: Criminal Experiments (note 431), p. 30.

<sup>434</sup> Jakob Segal in conversation with Stefan Heym, pp. 12–13; Segal: Response, p. 55.

unwitting American citizens.<sup>435</sup> For example, in November 1988, the leadership of HV A/X referred to information from the American “Foundation on Economic Trends” (FET).<sup>436</sup> In September 1986, the FET had filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to halt the development and production of pathogens that could be used for biological warfare. Although, according to the Department of Defense, the pathogens were intended for the development of antidotes and therefore for defensive purposes, the FET argued in a statement of reasons for its lawsuit that they could just as easily be used offensively and posed a danger in and of themselves. It further claimed that by 1985, the DOD had conducted approximately 15 genetic engineering experiments on various highly dangerous pathogens such as anthrax, salmonella, and meningitis viruses. Even more dangerous, claimed Dr. Niel Levitt, a former microbiologist at USAMRIID in Fort Detrick, was the fact that 2,352 ml of a solution containing Chikungunya viruses had disappeared from the laboratory.<sup>437</sup> Although the FET’s statement of grounds made no mention of AIDS, the alleged genetic manipulation of toxins, their potential offensive use, and the accidental disappearance of the viral solution from Fort Detrick fit the KGB’s propaganda thesis regarding the origin of AIDS.

The FET’s petition was made in the context of the testimony given by its president, Jeremy Rifkin, in 1988 as a witness before a U.S. congressional committee on the testing of biological weapons. He had cited MacArthur’s 1969 testimony before Congress and then asked hypothetically how it could be that the Department of Defense, at the “dawn of genetic engineering,” could have even dreamed of “developing an AIDS-like virus.” Rifkin made it clear that both he and “scientific experts around the world”

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<sup>435</sup> See U.S. Congress, <sup>99th</sup>Cong., 2nd Sess., Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives: American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decades of Radiation Experiments on U.S. Citizens. Washington 1991, passim.

<sup>436</sup> Report on our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line (Bulgarian), Nov. 11, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9 op. 4 a.e. 691, pp. 86–94, here 93.

<sup>437</sup> See the excerpts from the statement of reasons in: “Fighting biological weapons research in the courts.” In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (1987) 1, pp. 45 ff.

believed the AIDS virus to be a “naturally occurring virus.”<sup>438</sup> Nevertheless, Rifkin had opened the door for conspiracy theorists and disinformation specialists, who could now use MacArthur’s 1969 statement to claim that the U.S. Department of Defense had already planned to create the AIDS pathogen through genetic engineering as early as 1969. This was all the more the case because the FET submitted its request for clarification regarding the research proposed by MacArthur at the time to Carlucci. The HV A/X seemed, likely based on the request, to hope that the U.S. government would be forced to acknowledge its alleged culpability in the AIDS epidemic.<sup>439</sup>

It is not known whether the Bulgarians made use of the FET proposal that HV A/X handed over to them. Jakob Segal referred to it. In September 1989, he undertook a lecture tour through West Germany “to remind people of his theories, which had by then largely fallen into oblivion.” From the 1969 hearing transcript, he cited “clear evidence” that the “AIDS virus was developed as a prospective biological weapon on the orders of the Pentagon and funded by Congress.”<sup>440</sup> In doing so, he ignored the fact that MacArthur had never promised to develop such a virus and had made it clear that the Pentagon had not conducted any relevant research on the matter.<sup>441</sup>

A complete translation of the FET’s petition, which corresponded to the one that HV A/X had handed over to the Bulgarians, was published by the Segals in their 1990 book *\*AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon\**.<sup>442</sup> It also included a translation of part of MacArthur’s 1969 statement.<sup>443</sup> The publication of the book

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<sup>438</sup> U.S. Congress, 100<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2nd Sess.: Biological warfare testing. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services. Washington 1988, p. 77.

<sup>439</sup> Stankow, transcript of testimony, Nov. 10, 1988, p. 93.

<sup>440</sup> Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), p. 294.

<sup>441</sup> Geißler: AIDS and Its Pathogens (note 13), p. 122.

<sup>442</sup> Segal; Segal: AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–130.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116–124. One final piece of evidence in the book is somewhat unconventional: an anonymous letter from a person who quoted an anonymous American from the “top of the ‘military intelligence establishment’” who stated that the Segals’ account of the artificial creation of the AIDS virus was correct. The alleged

took place only after the dissolution of the Stasi and the HV A. The Segals had to handle the promotion of their book on their own. They did so together with the Green Party politician Manuel Kiper, who had written his own contribution on the danger of bioweapons research—primarily in the U.S.—for the book \* \*.<sup>444</sup>

## 5.2 “Monkey Business”: The HV A/X Takes Over

During a visit to their professional colleagues in Bulgaria from September 26 to September 29, 1989, Mutz and Pfeifer announced that they would continue to pursue the active measure “Detrick” in connection with the “theory of the emergence and spread of AIDS as a result of American experiments.” Pfeifer, who had since been promoted to head of the “Disarmament, USA, Peace Movement, Non-Aligned” division (HV A/X/1), expressed the view that,

“contrary to some viewpoints, this topic is still relevant.” Both he and Mutz believed “that we should not distance ourselves from the initiative,” as there was no reason to do so. Segal’s thesis had “now also been endorsed by a number of other scholars.” These other scholars remained unnamed, but Mutz and Pfeifer requested once again—in vain—that the First General Assembly of the DS “seek out respected defenders of the thesis.”<sup>445</sup>

Interestingly, the people with a different “point of view” that Pfeifer referred to were to be found in the Soviet Union, or more specifically, within the KGB. The Bulgarian “Chekists” summarized the comments of their Stasi colleagues:

“The Soviet comrades believe that the idea [i.e., the Fort Detrick thesis] has run its course, but they [the HV A/X] disagree, and they are taking new measures while also continuing the old ones, believing that they are yielding good results. In their opinion, the campaign has not yet reached its climax.”<sup>446</sup>

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The letter concludes: “My God, it’s so easy to get paranoid about these things. Those bastards!” Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>444</sup> Kiper, Manuel: Biological Warfare. In: *ibid.*, pp. 249–300.

<sup>445</sup> Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from September 26 to 29, 1989, October 10, 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 184–196, here 188.

<sup>446</sup> Ibid., p. 189.

Major General Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov, head of “Service A” of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, which was responsible for disinformation, had visited Wagenbreth in Berlin a week earlier.<sup>447</sup> Presumably, at this meeting, the Fort Detrick theory was declared “exhausted” by the KGB.

According to Pfeifer and Mutz, one sign of the AIDS campaign’s success was the fact that they had “produced a film about AIDS” that “was shown three times in West Germany” and in which “many countries” had expressed interest.<sup>448</sup> Even during their visit to Bulgaria a year earlier, Mutz and Pfeifer had spoken of the film project as part of the “De-trick” operation. At that time, it was stated that HV A/X had requested “the production of a film.”<sup>449</sup> The film was “a matter for their operational channel (illegal).” They went on to say:

“The film that the comrades in West Germany are preparing on the AIDS issue will be a production of their operational channel (illegal). This channel has already signed a contract with West German television. They are taking all measures to ensure that no one notices that the GDR is connected to the film, even though they have to provide financial support. The interview that Prof. Segal will give in October of this year is intended to be the highlight of this initiative. [...] It will be a documentary in the style of English investigative crime films. The arguments will, with one exception, be presented objectively: It will be shown that the Americans are spreading disinformation on the subject of AIDS and that they are abusing technological interventions.”<sup>450</sup>

In 1989, Mutz and Pfeifer further reported that the film had been produced “by a private film company in cooperation with WDR.” The HV A/X had even “subsidized the production of the film with a certain sum.” “The West German side [presumably the WDR] paid 80,000 DM for the production of the film, and the German comrades paid 40,000 DM.” Interestingly, the “Soviet comrades had proposed paying 60,000 DM for the film, but

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<sup>447</sup> Memo from Colonel Wagenbreth, Head of HV A/X, to Willi Damm, Head of Department X of the MfS, August 24, 1989, in: BStU, MfS, Dept. X, No. 1124, p. 65.

<sup>448</sup> Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from September 26 to 29, 1989, October 10, 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 184–196, here 188.

<sup>449</sup> D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First Central Committee of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First Central Committee: Report on our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 86–98, here 93.

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 94.

“The German comrades have refused to participate.” There is now a possibility that the film’s distribution could recoup the production costs. “At present,” according to Mutz and Pfeifer, “the film is being distributed by the producers in West Germany for 10,000 DM per copy and for 5,000 DM per copy in African and Third World countries.” They provided the Bulgarian “comrades” with both a German and an English version of the film.<sup>451</sup> The HV A/X asked the Bulgarian comrades for help in distributing the film in Western and developing countries. The Bulgarians proposed the services of one of their best contacts from the 1980s, the agent “Shiwa,” director of an Indian institute for the Non-Aligned Movement.<sup>452</sup>

According to the description by Mutz and Pfeifer, the film co-financed by HV A/X can only be “AIDS – The African Legend” by West German documentary filmmaker Malte Rauch and journalist Heimo Claßen. The latter, as already mentioned, was listed by HV A/X/1 in the IMA file “Joachim.” After Pfeifer was promoted to head of department, Dams, who was still in charge of “Denver,” took over the IMA file “Joachim”—that is, at the time of Claßen and Rauch’s film project.<sup>453</sup> Rauch was registered by Dams on July 31, 1987, under the “Denver” case file, presumably as a person with whom the Stasi had not yet made contact.<sup>454</sup>

As Mutz and Pfeifer mentioned, the film “AIDS – The African Legend” was shown three times on West German television prior to their visit to Sofia in September 1989: on January 3, 1989, in the “Weltweit” series on West Drei at 8:00 p.m.,<sup>455</sup> on May 22 at 10:30 p.m. on Hessen 3 and Eins Plus<sup>456</sup> and on June 5 at 11:20 p.m. on SWR 3.<sup>457</sup> The film was also shown on

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<sup>451</sup> Report recording of the discussions held with the German comrades from September 26 to 29, 1989, October 10, 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 184–196, here 189.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid. On “Shiwa,” see the record on the implementation of measures on the “China and NPG” line together with Soviet friends [19]89 (Bulgarian), undated. In: Kiryakova; Angelova (eds.): KGB i DS (note 29), pp. 2012–2014.

<sup>453</sup> See BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8237870; BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F22, Reg. No. XV 4735/63.

<sup>454</sup> See BStU, AR 2, RoHo, F16, Reg. No. XV 3429/86.

<sup>455</sup> Frühwein, Marietta: “Vorlauf: Woher kommt AIDS?” In: taz, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 14.

<sup>456</sup> “AIDS – the African Legend.” In: taz, May 22, 1989, p. 14.

public screenings. Jakob Segal had planned to take part in a panel discussion following a public screening in Frankfurt am Main in February 1989. The film would have “generated a huge response”—according to Lilli Segal.<sup>458</sup>

The documentary suggests that the AIDS virus originated in the research laboratory at Fort Detrick, without forcing this theory on the audience. After an opening sequence set in New York that shows how marginalized groups in American society are hardest hit by AIDS, it turns to the theory of African origin with quotes from Gallo<sup>459</sup> and Essex<sup>460</sup>. He repeated the Segals’ argument, equating the theory of African origin with the already-discredited “green monkey” hypothesis—the Segals’ well-known straw man argument.<sup>461</sup> Among others, the film quotes Montagnier rejecting the “green monkey” theory,<sup>462</sup> without mentioning that he had rejected the Segals’ thesis of artificial origin in 1987 as “frivolous” and impossible.<sup>463</sup> Prof. Gerhard Hunsmann of the German Primate Center in Göttingen, one of the leading AIDS researchers in the Federal Republic, was quoted on the question of earlier serum samples from Africa: Among the approximately 7,000 frozen blood samples from Africa at his institute, only 37 to 38 from the years 1982 to 1983 tested positive for HTLV-I.<sup>464</sup> Unmentioned was the fact that this very same Prof. Hunsmann had

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<sup>457</sup> WDR: Vollinformation: AIDS – the African Legend; Database of the WDR Historical Archive, May 13, 2013, pp. 1–3, here p. 1. The authors thank Petra Witting of the WDR Historical Archive for this information.

<sup>458</sup> Letter from Lilli Segal to an acquaintance in Hannoversch Münden, February 24, 1989; BArch, DY 4516, fol. K. 13, n. p.

<sup>459</sup> “AIDS – the African Legend,” min. 7:49–8:00.

<sup>460</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 9:02 ff. In the interview in the film, Essex spoke of an African origin among monkeys or apes, but not about green monkeys.

<sup>461</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 9:02 ff., 15:16–15:28, 19:29–19:43. See also Frühwein: Introduction (note 455), p. 14.

<sup>462</sup> “AIDS – The African Legend,” min. 22:59–23:35. The film did, however, acknowledge that Montagnier also supported the African theory, “albeit somewhat more cautiously” than Gallo and Essex. See *ibid.*, min. 10:52 ff.

<sup>463</sup> U.S. DOS: Soviet Influence Activities (note 46), p. 36.

<sup>464</sup> “AIDS – The African Legend,” min. 27:48 ff.

refused to collaborate with East German colleagues on AIDS research as long as Jakob Segal was allowed to continue spreading his theory.<sup>465</sup>

The film centers on an interview with the “researcher couple” Jakob and Lilli Segal in their East Berlin apartment. In it, they reiterated their rejection of the “Green Monkey Theory”<sup>466</sup> and their own belief in an artificial origin at Fort Detrick for the camera.<sup>467</sup> The narrator in the film explains that the Segals had simply concluded that,

“what seemed obvious,” namely, that the AIDS virus did not originate in nature.<sup>468</sup> Jakob Segal claimed, as always, that the burden of proof lay with the proponents of the theory of African origin,<sup>469</sup> and apparently no concrete evidence was needed to support his chain of circumstantial evidence. In the film, the Segals are portrayed as heroic fighters for the truth against the “greats of science” who reject their theory,<sup>470</sup> or the “leading experts of the scientific community from Washington to Paris to Moscow,” among whom “alternative theories [...] did not gain traction,”<sup>471</sup>. In other words: The film turns out to be a variation on the old thesis, propagated by the KGB, the Segals, and the HV A, regarding the artificial origin of the AIDS pathogen at Fort Detrick.

The film’s content aligns with the materials that both HV A/X and the Segals collected and distributed for their ongoing AIDS-related activities. In addition to the interview with the Segals, there was an interview with Rifkin of the FET, whose petition to Secretary of Defense Carlucci was distributed in German translation by both HV A/X and the Segals.<sup>472</sup> In the film, Rifkin explained that under Reagan, “the U.S. Department of Defense [...] had drastically increased funding for biological weapons research,” that a “large number of research contracts had been awarded to universities,” and that “work was being conducted with the most dangerous pathogens.”<sup>473</sup> The narrator in the film quotes MacArthur’s statement

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<sup>465</sup> Dewitz, Report (note 358), p. 22.

<sup>466</sup> “AIDS – The African Legend,” min. 18:35–20:30.

<sup>467</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 29:46–30:54.

<sup>468</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 29:46 ff.

<sup>469</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 29:46–30:54.

<sup>470</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 31:43–31:53.

<sup>471</sup> *Ibid.*, min. 10:28 ff.

<sup>472</sup> See List of Materials, undated, p. 110; Segal; Segal: AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon (note 388), pp. 125–128.

<sup>473</sup> “AIDS – The African Legend,” min. 36:09–36:29. The quotations are from WDR, Vollinformation, May 13, 2013, p. 2.

before the U.S. Congressional Committee in 1969 regarding the development of a new virus.<sup>474</sup> Rifkin commented on his foundation's request for information regarding the potential consequences of the aforementioned plans, addressed to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Although Rifkin stated in his interview for the film that such research most likely did not take place, the film emphasized that the response to the FET's inquiry remains unresolved.<sup>475</sup>

The film also featured London-based journalists Richard and Rosalind Chirimuuta, who discussed their book *\*AIDS, Africa, and Racism\**.<sup>476</sup> In the book, they criticized the prevalence of racist stereotypes in many Western publications—including those by medical professionals—regarding the African origins of AIDS. Furthermore, they also challenged the established scientific consensus on AIDS by attempting to “expose the fundamentally flawed nature of the evidence and arguments offered in support of the African hypo”<sup>477</sup> Their interview in the film, as well as their book, therefore aligned with the aforementioned goal of the KGB and HV A/X to stir up public opinion in Africa against the allegedly racist and American thesis of the African origin of AIDS.<sup>478</sup> The HV A/X was already familiar with the Chirimuutas' work from earlier contexts. In September 1989, Mutz and Pfeifer reported to their Bulgarian colleagues regarding the film that their unit had “in the meantime [...] published two brochures on AIDS,” and one of them was by Chirimuuta, the “brochure”—presumably “AIDS, ‘ Africa, and Racism”—a book that “had already gone through two printings.”<sup>(479)</sup> They had apparently already mentioned the Chirimuutas' book during their meeting with the Bulgarians in September 1988:

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<sup>474</sup> Ibid., min. 36:29–37:25.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid., min. 37:25–38:45.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid., min. 16:23–17:36.

<sup>477</sup> Chirimuuta, Richard C.; Chirimuuta, Rosalind J.: *AIDS, Africa and Racism*. Stanhope 1987, p. 2.

<sup>478</sup> See, e.g., Information No. 2742 (Russian), undated; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 675, pp. 156–159, here 157; Record (presumably from HV A/X), June 29, 1987; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 676, pp. 46–47, here 47.

<sup>479</sup> Report on the discussions held with the German comrades from September 26 to 29, 1989, October 10, 1989; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 184–196, here 189. Either the HV A/X or their Bulgarian colleagues had mistakenly identified Chirimuuta as a “Senegalese journalist.” He was born in Zimbabwe, where he was actively involved in the struggle for freedom until his deportation

“A book by two journalists from Zimbabwe has been published in London; they essentially share Segal’s views. Government circles in Zimbabwe have received the book very favorably, as evidenced by the letter from the Minister of Health. He states that action must be taken to refute the claim that AIDS originated in Africa.”<sup>480</sup>

It is understandable that HV A/X wanted to support the dissemination of the Chirimuutas’ work as part of its “Detrick” operation, even—or perhaps precisely because—the Chirimuutas knew nothing at all about such support. The original 1987 edition of the book referred to the same statement by MacArthur before the U.S. Congress in 1969, which the film, the Segals, and Rifkin also cited.<sup>481</sup> Even back then, the Chirimuutas viewed the rejection of Soviet allegations of an artificial origin as proof that the U.S. government wanted to shift the blame for AIDS onto Africa.<sup>482</sup>

The HV A/X should have regarded the Chirimuutas’ 1989 revised edition of the book as even more helpful for their work; after all, an addendum now cited Segal’s claim as a counter-hypothesis to the allegedly racist theory of African origin.<sup>483</sup> The addendum also hinted at the concurrent Soviet disinformation campaign claiming that the U.S. intended to conduct criminal experiments with HIV on Africans in order to find a vaccine against the virus.<sup>484</sup> The Chirimuutas

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in 1972. From that point on, he lived in London. See Chi-rimuuta, Richard C.; Chirimuuta, Rosalind J.: *AIDS, Africa and Racism*. 2nd, expanded ed., London 1989, authors’ page.

<sup>480</sup> Rosalind Chirimuuta, however, was from Australia. See *ibid.* D. Stankow, Deputy Head of the First Central Committee of the DS and Head of the 8th Department of the First Central Committee: Record of our discussions with the German comrades on the AM line, November 10, 1988; COMDOS-Arch-R, F. 9, op. 4, a.e. 691, pp. 86–98, here 94.

<sup>481</sup> Chirimuuta; Chirimuuta: *AIDS, Africa and Racism* (note 477), p. 7.

<sup>482</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>483</sup> Chirimuuta; Chirimuuta: *AIDS, Africa and Racism* (note 479), pp. 141, 164.

<sup>484</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 164–165. On Soviet disinformation, see CIA, DOI: Worldwide Active Measures Propaganda Alert, February 1987, p. 2; Annex, AIDS Disinformation Campaign. Attachment to: Director of Central Intelligence, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 70/1-87, Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications of the AIDS Pandemic, June 2, 1987, 22 pp., p. 19. In: CIA Freedom of Information Act Website, [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/89801/DOC\\_0000579295.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000579295.pdf).

thanked Claassen, among others, for “additional information and encouragement” since the first edition.<sup>485</sup>

The English version of the film by Claassen and Rauch, which the HV A/X offered to its Bulgarian colleagues, was broadcast under the title “Monkey Business: AIDS. The Africa Story” on January 22, 1990, at 11:05 p.m. on Britain’s Channel 4. The film had 581,000 viewers, relatively few compared to other television programs airing at the same time (e.g., the BBC News with 6,224,000 viewers or the Independent Television News with 7,093,000 viewers).<sup>486</sup> As part of their research involving several focus groups, two British researchers found that, unlike the majority of study participants, viewers of the film tended not to believe in an African origin of AIDS or at least doubted it. Rather, they believed in an artificial origin of the HIV virus in the United States.<sup>487</sup> Regardless of whether the HV A played a role in the British television broadcast or not, the intended effect on viewers was achieved.

The broadcast of the film mobilized new and unsuspecting multipliers for the HV A/X thesis—including WDR, Channel 4, Jörg Armbruster, the editor in charge of the program on *\*Weltweit\**, and Dietrich Peter Winterberg, the commentator for *\*Weltweit\**.<sup>488</sup> The “*taz*,” which had already done much to disseminate Segal’s thesis, now once again served as a multiplier without realizing it. The newspaper signaled approval of the new film and quoted Rauch without any qualifying commentary on his main thesis: “What we have discovered: The Africa thesis is so important to many people because it is the only alternative to the other hypothesis, namely that AIDS comes from a laboratory—a commercial or military research laboratory, which today can no longer be distinguished at all.” The reviewer explained: “In his documentary with the internal working title ‘The Monkey Theater,’ one thing above all becomes clear: The Africa/monkey theory is not only long since scientifically outdated, but has been refuted over a long period of time—

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<sup>485</sup> See the “Acknowledgments” in: Chirimuuta; Chirimuuta: AIDS, Africa and Racism (note 479).

<sup>486</sup> Kitzinger, Jenny; Miller, David: “African AIDS.” Media and Audience Beliefs. In: Aggleton, Peter; Davies, Peter; Hart, Graham (eds.): AIDS, Rights, Risk and Reason. London 1992, p. 51, n. 11.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid., p. 45 ff.

<sup>488</sup> For Winterberg’s affirmative commentary on the film’s thesis, see AIDS – die Afrikalegende, min. 0:00–1:32. Armbruster was the editor in charge of the program. See WDR, Vollinformation, May 13, 2013, p. 1.

“kept this knowledge alive and continues to disseminate it to this day.”<sup>489</sup>  
The only thing the reviewer got even halfway right: The Africa/monkey thesis was discussed time and again by scientists. For one reason alone: New evidence confirming the thesis kept emerging.

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<sup>489</sup> Frühwein: Introduction (note 455), p. 14.

## 6 Long-term medical and political effects: AIDS misinformation, 1990–2013

Despite scientific advances in understanding the origins, epidemiology, and control of HIV infection and AIDS since the 1980s, the disinformation theories propagated by the KGB and the Segals, along with various conspiracy theories from the United States and other countries, continue to circulate on the internet and persist in the minds of countless people. And this is by no means surprising. As has been shown, misinformation in the form of conspiracy theories in the U.S. and the disinformation theories from the East regarding AIDS during the Cold War fed off one another. The Fort Detrick theory and aspects of Segal's research were integrated into other conspiracy theories about AIDS and the fight against it back then and continue to be integrated today. Various propagators of the Fort Detrick and Segal theories remained actively involved in spreading misinformation about AIDS and its treatment after the fall of the Berlin Wall and continue to do so today.

The names and theories of some active measures by the KGB and the Stasi became intertwined, partly through multipliers, with further misinformation about AIDS and today go beyond the original disinformation theories. The conspiracy at the time to spread disinformation about AIDS, in which the KGB, the MfS, and their “sister organizations”—the CPSU, the SED, and Jakob Segal—participated, did not merely result in the exposure of the United States, which was, of course, the intended outcome. It also had side effects. These consist in part of the rejection of scientifically and medically grounded knowledge about AIDS, primarily among the segments of the population most severely affected by AIDS. Presumably not infrequently with fatal consequences.

### 6.1 The Segals Between Conspiracy Theory and Early Therapy, 1990–1995

Despite the political upheaval, the Segals continued to stand by their Fort Detrick thesis out of personal conviction. Jakob Segal, in particular, went public with several publications. Not only “AIDS—The Trail Leads to the Pentagon” (1990),<sup>490</sup> whose manuscript was presumably written even before

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<sup>490</sup> Segal; Segal: AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon (note 388).

was completed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also a series of other interviews and publications, culminating in the book *\*AIDS Is Defeatable\** ( , 1995),<sup>491</sup> which appeared shortly after Jakob Segal’s death. There were no significant changes to their original lines of thought, except for a greater focus on the person of the leading American AIDS researcher Robert Gallo. The Segals now suggested, in a manner that could hardly be misunderstood, that he had played a role in the alleged artificial creation of the AIDS pathogen, and not merely in its cover-up.<sup>492</sup>

In order to continue promoting their thesis in reunified Germany, they had to downplay or cover up their earlier contacts with GDR officials and Soviet government agencies, especially following Primakov’s revelations and Bohnsack’s allegations in 1992. The Segals devised a new cover story, according to which they had been in the GDR

“AIDS dissidents.” They had fought against opposition from the SED and Moscow to bring to light the truth about the artificial origin of HIV at Fort Detrick. To substantiate this, repeatedly highlighted the publication ban on their thesis in the GDR.<sup>493</sup> Of course, they failed to mention that the publication ban applied to all works on the origin of AIDS, concealed their privileged position compared to other East German scientists regarding publications in the West, and ignored Jakob Segal’s efforts to secure bans against his scientific opponents. They now particularly emphasized the fact that Jakob Segal—allegedly due to his predicament—had given a lecture on his thesis in September 1987 before the opposition group “Church from Below.”<sup>494</sup> Such a lecture did indeed take place, but the Stasi subsequently had only positive things to report about this “objective lecture” on AIDS.<sup>495</sup>

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<sup>491</sup> Segal, Jakob; Segal, Lilli; Klug, Christoph: *AIDS Can Be Defeated: Artificial Production, Early Therapy, and Their Boycott*. Essen 1995.

<sup>492</sup> Geene: *AIDS Policy* (note 317), p. 294; Segal; Segal: *AIDS – The Trail Leads to the Pentagon* (note 388), p. 72; Segal, Jakob: *The Current State of the AIDS Debate*, 1993, [www.monochrom.at/segal/i.htm](http://www.monochrom.at/segal/i.htm).

<sup>493</sup> Segal: *Public Statement* (note 215); Johnson, Ian: *German scientist couple presses theory that AIDS was created at Fort Detrick*. In: *The Baltimore Sun* Feb. 21, 1992, p. 2A; Segal; Segal; Klug: *AIDS Is Defeatable* (note 491), p. 200.

<sup>494</sup> Segal: *Public Statement* (note 215).

<sup>495</sup> Stasi, Berlin Regional Office, report on the holding of an “Open Work Workshop” at the Protestant Sophiengemeinde in Berlin-Mitte on September 11 and 12, 1987, September 15, 1987; BStU, Stasi, Berlin Regional Office, AKG, No. 199, pp. 1–4, here p. 2.

Nor were there any signs afterward of repressive measures against the Segals. Quite the contrary: Behind the scenes, the MfS supported the establishment of the new research center for the Segals at the MfG. Nevertheless, as part of their post-Reunification narrative, the Segals claimed to have received no money or assistance from the GDR government for researching or disseminating their thesis.<sup>496</sup>

For many listeners on the left wing of unified Germany and for quite a few AIDS activists, the Segals' defense was entirely credible and, in fact, unnecessary. They wanted to hear about alternative explanations and therapies for HIV infection and AIDS.<sup>497</sup> This openness stemmed from the state of AIDS research at the time. A deep sense of pessimism set in among homosexuals and those infected with AIDS in the late 1980s, when health authorities revised their earlier estimates that only 5 to 10 percent of those infected with HIV would develop AIDS. They now suspected that 70 to 100 percent would become ill and likely die of AIDS. The long-promised vaccine had not (and still has not) been invented. The introduction of the first antiretroviral (ARV) drug against HIV, zidovudine or azidothymidine (AZT), in 1987, contributed little to the fight against AIDS. At first, the drug was administered only to AIDS patients, and only starting in 1990 was it also given to HIV-infected individuals without symptoms, whom it could presumably help more. AZT was very expensive, a fact that led to accusations against the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, it had severe, harmful side effects, only occasionally helped prolong the lives of AIDS patients, and lost its effectiveness because the virus developed resistance to it. Because mainstream science still seemed powerless against AIDS, many people placed all their hope in other explanations for AIDS and alternative therapies.<sup>498</sup> Under these circumstances, for example, the theories of the American molecular biologist Peter Duesberg, a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a former researcher on retroviruses and cancer, became increasingly popular. Beginning in 1987, he denied that HIV alone caused AIDS. The virus itself was not particularly dangerous, according to Duesberg. There must always be co-factors

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<sup>496</sup> Johnson: German scientist couple (note 493), p. 2A.

<sup>497</sup> Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS Is Defeatable (note 491), p. 162; Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), pp. 295 ff.

<sup>498</sup> Epstein, Steve: *Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge*. Berkeley 1996, p. 117.  
Available online: <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft1s20045x>.

that cause AIDS. If these co-factors were identified and avoided, HIV-infected individuals could supposedly escape AIDS. Starting in 1991, he developed a theory regarding the toxicological origins of AIDS, a “drug-AIDS hypothesis,” according to which drug use causes AIDS. In 1992, he went so far as to claim that the use of AZT could cause AIDS—“AIDS by prescription.” He made this claim at a time when many HIV-infected individuals and AIDS patients were refusing to take AZT due to its side effects and were complaining about the expensive, not always effective drug and the pharmaceutical industry.<sup>499</sup>

May 1992 marked a high point for “AIDS dissidents” or deniers in Europe with the first alternative “International Symposium on AIDS – A Different View” in the Netherlands. Even Montagnier, one of the co-discoverers of HIV, had by then become convinced of the importance of co-factors and took part in the event. In the weeks leading up to the conference, Rupert Murdoch’s media empire in the UK—which had long been reporting on AIDS in a “headline-grabbing” manner—had written about the “astonishing challenge to AIDS orthodoxy” posed by Duesberg and Montagnier.<sup>500</sup> During the symposium, unrest arose when Duesberg blamed AIDS victims themselves for their illness due to their promiscuous lifestyles. The meeting ended in a scandal, as Duesberg declared all safer-sex campaigns nonsensical, “because AIDS is by no means a communicable disease” and “drugs are to blame for everything.” In response, many prominent conference participants protested in a press statement, describing safe sex as “our most important weapon in the fight against AIDS.”<sup>501</sup>

During the conference, the work of the Segals was also discussed, thanks to the Swede “Kwame”<sup>502</sup> Ingemar Ljungqvist. Ljungqvist, who the Segals

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<sup>499</sup> Ibid., pp. 107, 115 ff., 118, 146 ff., and 149.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>501</sup> Silberstein, Cronette: “It’s all the drugs’ fault.” In: taz, May 22, 1992, p. 19.

<sup>502</sup> Ljungqvist had been given the nickname “Kwame” (Saturday) during his time as a teacher in Ghana and West Africa. See Hellertz, Pia: Jag har läst AIDS TABU Ursprung – Utveckling – Behandling by Kwame Ingemar Ljungqvist [“My Reading”: AIDS Taboo: Origins – Development – Treatment by Kwame Ingemar Ljungqvist]. February 2013, [http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/recensioner/aids\\_tabu.pdf](http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/recensioner/aids_tabu.pdf).

, whom he knew personally and to whom he attributed his knowledge of AIDS,<sup>503</sup> reported on a “new approach to AIDS therapy” by Jakob Segal.<sup>504</sup> In 1990, Ljungqvist had co-founded a “Swedish AIDS Group against Racism” (Svenska aidsgruppen mot rasism, SARA) in Uppsala, which rejected the African theory of the origins of AIDS as racist and therefore promoted Segal’s thesis.<sup>505</sup> In 1991, SARA served as co-publisher of an English-language brochure on alternative AIDS therapies by Jakob Segal, published by his new self-publishing house “Neuer Weg.”<sup>506</sup>

Segal claimed a say in the public discourse on AIDS therapies based on his theory of the artificial origin of AIDS. As always, he knew better than mainstream scientists. He stated: “Over 120,000 scientists have been working on AIDS for ten years. They have spent over 300 billion dollars on it without having developed an effective therapy. My theory regarding the artificial creation of the AIDS virus has allowed me to develop the correct understanding of the AIDS disease and to make new proposals for therapy.”<sup>507</sup>

Segal even put forward several proposals for alternative therapies. In an article co-authored with his former research colleague Dehmlow in 1990, he had cautiously suggested that ultraviolet radiation (UVB) might “delay or prevent the infection of new cells and the progression of the disease,” even in the case of HIV infection.<sup>508</sup> Segal reiterated this “therapeutic approach” in 1992 in his own book “AIDS: Cell Physiology, Pathology, and Therapy .”<sup>509</sup> Dehmlow had such

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<sup>503</sup> Andersson, Christoph: Operation Norrskén: Om Stasi och Sverige under kalla kriget [Operation Northern Lights: On the Stasi and Sweden during the Cold War]. Stockholm 2013, pp. 182 and 187.

<sup>504</sup> Silberstein: “It’s All the Drugs’ Fault” (note 501), p. 19.

<sup>505</sup> See SARA’s self-description: Om föreningen SARA [About the SARA Association], 2000 Talets-Vetenskap, [http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/om\\_sara.php](http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/om_sara.php). SARA accuses the “research establishment” of uncritically accepting the “Green Monkey Myth” of Gallo and Essex.

<sup>506</sup> Segal, Jakob; Swedish AIDS Group Against Racism: New Directions in AIDS Therapy. Essen 1991.

<sup>507</sup> Schwahlen, Katrin: Genes, Viruses, and the CIA. In: Freitag, May 17, 1991, p. 15.

<sup>508</sup> Segal, Jakob; Dehmlow, Ronald: Cell Physiological Basis of the Effects of UV-Irradiated Blood. In: Segal, Jakob; Seng, Gunther (eds.): Methods of UV Irradiation of Blood – HOT and UVB. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 38–52, here 48.

<sup>509</sup> Segal, Jakob: AIDS: Cell Physiology, Pathology, and Therapy. Essen 1992, pp. 265 ff. and 280 ff.

mentioned a possibility as early as 1987—as IMS “Nils” in an expert opinion for the Stasi on UVB and oxygen therapy. He had also pointed out the economic benefits of the potential, successful treatment of AIDS and other diseases with UVB therapy. The GDR could have carried out such a therapy without expensive imports from Western countries.<sup>510</sup> Segal had already wanted to treat HIV-infected patients with UVB during the GDR era, but this had been rejected by Seidel.<sup>511</sup>

After the fall of the GDR, Dehmlow increasingly specialized in such alternative therapies and even became president of the Society for Ozone and Oxygen Applications (Gesellschaft für Ozon- und Sauerstoffanwendungen e. V.) in Berlin.<sup>512</sup> However, UVB and HOT found no support in the Joint Federal Committee of Physicians and Health Insurance Funds, which generally recognized “no reliable evidence of the benefits and medical necessity” of their use, without even mentioning AIDS.<sup>513</sup>

Segal saw other possibilities for early treatment of AIDS in traditional and natural remedies from Africa and Asia. Regarding the negative results of tests conducted in the U.S. on African medicinal plants against HIV infections, he wrote—in a completely illogical and unscientific manner: “If all patients in America died in the late stages [of AIDS], it was reasonable to assume that in Africa, patients in earlier stages survived to a high degree when treated with indigenous medicinal plants.” Good news had also come from China: “And when, in May 1995, Chinese physicians reported cures for AIDS with

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<sup>510</sup> IM of HA VII/7, Development, Status, and Possibilities of UVB: A Brief Assessment, Jan. 28, 1988; BStU, MfS, AIM 4835/88, Vol. 2, pp. 31–33, here 33. Theisinger had commissioned IMS “Nils” to prepare such an expert opinion at the request of the Schwerin District Administration of the MfS and its District Office (KD) in Sternberg. See Lt. Theisinger, HA VII/7, meeting report, IMS “Nils,” Jan. 28, 1988; *ibid.*, pp. 28 ff.; letter from the KD Sternberg to HA VII/7, Jan. 4, 1988; *ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>511</sup> Segal had complained to Axen about Seidel’s decision. Geißler; Sprinkle: Disinformation squared (note 9), p. 72.

<sup>512</sup> See the website, Airnergy: Energy from Within, <http://www.airnergy.com/aktuell/news-uebersicht/newsansicht/article/veroeffentlichung-von-dr-ronald-dehmlow-zu-sauerstoff-therapien/index.html>.

<sup>513</sup> Ultraviolet B (UVB) irradiation of blood. Summary report of the “Medical Treatment” Working Committee of the Federal Committee of Physicians and Health Insurance Funds on the deliberations pursuant to Section 135(1) of the German Social Code, Book V (SGB V), March 30, 2001, p. 4. Available online:

[http://www.kbv.de/media/sp/2001\\_03\\_30\\_RMvV\\_32\\_nicht\\_anerkannt\\_UVB\\_Bericht\\_AA\\_AeB.pdf](http://www.kbv.de/media/sp/2001_03_30_RMvV_32_nicht_anerkannt_UVB_Bericht_AA_AeB.pdf).

“If patients reported using a natural remedy, this is entirely in line with our expectations.”<sup>514</sup>

But the “new approach” to AIDS treatment on which Segal focused particularly looked quite different: regular administration of low-dose aspirin in the early stages of HIV infection.<sup>515</sup> He explained in 1992: “The aspirin should [...] effectively curb HIV proliferation.”<sup>516</sup> He asked hypothetically, why then do doctors not use aspirin against AIDS? His answer was: “Imagine: If the patient can now be cured without going to the hospital by taking two aspirin tablets a day—that is, for pennies—then it’s obvious that the doctors don’t like me, and the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. don’t like me either.” In this context, he pointed to the high price of AZT, the then-monopoly held by the Anglo-American company Burroughs-Wellcome over the drug, and its alleged ineffectiveness.<sup>517</sup> According to Segal’s account, most doctors had no interest in his proposals for early therapy because they had been bribed by the pharmaceutical industry in the form of paid conference trips, honoraria, and gifts.<sup>518</sup> Segal saw yet another conspiracy, and this time a particularly malicious one: most doctors simply let HIV-infected patients die because they and their sponsors in the pharmaceutical industry could not profit from early therapy with aspirin. The rejection by most doctors, however, can be easily explained. The efficacy of aspirin against HIV remained unproven, and a 1995 U.S. study on the treatment of HIV-infected individuals with aspirin, which the Segals and Klug cited in their book, had to be discontinued due to the toxic side effects of aspirin at higher doses. Contrary to the study’s principal investigator and the responsible medical review board in the U.S., Klug and the Segals claimed that the study should not have been discontinued, despite the critical liver values of some patients. While the American researchers planned new trials with other drugs related to aspirin,<sup>519</sup> the Segals and Klug conducted their

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<sup>514</sup> Segal; Segal; Klug: *AIDS Can Be Defeated* (note 491), pp. 135 and 137.

<sup>515</sup> Geene: *AIDS Policy* (note 317), p. 294.

<sup>516</sup> Segal: *AIDS: Cell Physiology* (note 509), p. 265.

<sup>517</sup> Klaus Hartmann spoke with Prof. Dr. Jakob Segal, pp. 15 ff.

<sup>518</sup> Segal; Segal; Klug: *AIDS Is Defeatable* (note 491), p. 166.

<sup>519</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116–121. Regarding the termination of the American study, see the statement by Joseph A. Sonnabend, MD, Medical Director, Community Research Initiati-

their own study on aspirin. They asked readers who were following their recommended early aspirin therapy to send progress reports to the World Health Organization (WHO) and to them directly via the publisher “Neuer Weg.”<sup>520</sup> Raimund Geene, who interviewed the Segals, wrote about their approach: “On such a basis, not even hypotheses can be generated. However, the Segals are apparently unaware of the questionable nature of such self-organized therapeutic trials.”<sup>521</sup>

In his 1992 book, Segal proposed yet another option for early-stage therapy, though one that would require time for research and development: passive immunization using a component of the HIV virus, the p24 capsid protein.<sup>522</sup> In his publications, however, he failed to mention that the inventor of the polio vaccine, Jonas Salk, had already proposed something similar in 1987.<sup>523</sup> In the same year that Segal’s book was published, Salk filed a patent application in the U.S. for an experimental vaccine made from HI virus capsid proteins, including p24.<sup>524</sup> Neither of the Segals lived to see the start of clinical trials for the experimental vaccine Remune in 2000.<sup>525</sup>

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ve on AIDS, Jan. 21, 1995; University of Michigan, Jon Cohen AIDS Research Collection. Available online:

<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/cohenaid/5571095.0298.021/1?rgn=main;view=image>.

<sup>520</sup> Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS Is Defeatable (note 491), p. 125 ff.

<sup>521</sup> Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), p. 296.

<sup>522</sup> Segal: AIDS: Cell Physiology (note 509), p. 279 ff.; Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS Is Defeatable (note 491), p. 110 ff.

<sup>523</sup> Salk, Jonas: Prospects for the Control of AIDS by Immunizing Seropositive Individuals. In: *Nature* 327 (1987), pp. 473–476.

<sup>524</sup> Salk, Jonas; Carlo, Dennis J.: Patent Application 5256767, Retroviral Antigens, Oct. 26, 1993. Available online: <http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect2=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnethtml%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&d=PALL&RefSrch=yes&Query=PN%2F5256767>. The application was filed on November 10, 1992.

<sup>525</sup> Churdboonchart, V. et al.: A double-blind, adjuvant-controlled trial of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) immunogen (Remune) monotherapy in asymptomatic, HIV-1-infected Thai subjects with CD4-cell counts of >300. In: *Clinical and Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology* 7 (2000) 5, pp. 728–733.

## 6.2 Segal's Legacy in Literature and Film

Although Jakob Segal died in 1995 and Lilli Segal in 1999, their interpretation of the Fort Detrick theory lives on not only among alternative AIDS activists but also in literature, film, and music. Influential figures from the 1980s played a role in this. More decisive, however, were the activities of the Segals and their followers throughout the 1990s.

Particularly traumatic for proponents of the Segal thesis—and indicative of its classification as a conspiracy theory—was the fact that the Segals were unable to present any empirical evidence to substantiate their famous “chain of evidence.” For example, none of the American prisoners who were allegedly used as guinea pigs for the virus from Fort Detrick could ever be identified. However, after 1989, there were two attempts in the field of fine arts to at least artistically fill this gap in the evidence. The first attempt came out in 1996 in the form of a novel titled “The Vaccination,” for which Rauch and Claßen wrote a foreword. The novel, whose author remained anonymous, told of the alleged experiment at Fort Detrick and of the fate of the prisoner-guinea pigs after their release. The anonymous author dedicated the novel to the so-called “pioneers”: Claßen, Rauch, the Chirimuutas, and the Segals.<sup>526</sup> Rauch and Claßen, for their part, wrote in the foreword: “The Segals, the Chirimuutas, and we in our film could only present interim results of this research [on AIDS] [...]—the full picture is still far from clear.” The novel is “a welcome and inspiring next step toward understanding, further reflection, and hopefully, someday, even action.”<sup>527</sup> In 1997, WDR used the release of the new novel as an opportunity to rebroadcast excerpts from the film “AIDS – The African Legend” along with interviews with the authors.<sup>528</sup>

The second attempt took place in 2000 with the film by Jochen Hick “No One Sleeps,” whose plot is based on Segal’s theory. In the film, the heroine finds a list of prisoners who are said to have participated in the experiments at Fort Detrick. In the film, these prisoners were then, one by one, arrested by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

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<sup>526</sup> Schulz, Johann (pseud.); Sherry, Juan (pseud.): *The Vaccination*. Stuttgart 1996.

<sup>527</sup> Rauch, Malte; Claßen, Heimo: Foreword. In: *ibid.*, n. p.

<sup>528</sup> Geißler; Sprinkle: *Disinformation squared* (note 9), p. 74.

(FBI) to cover up the experiment.<sup>529</sup> WDR, which at the time had broadcast “AIDS – The African Legend,” acted as a co-producer alongside arte for the Hicks film, which was shown at the 2000 Berlinale.<sup>530</sup> It was not only the WDR that once again served as an unwitting disseminator of communist disinformation. The “taz” also reviewed the film rather positively, without mentioning its earlier role in spreading Segal’s thesis or the questionable nature of the same.<sup>531</sup> The review in the “taz” appeared at a time when the newspaper had already distanced itself from its earlier role and Segal’s thesis as a result of Primakov’s revelations, Bohnsack’s publications, and its own access to the Stasi files.<sup>532</sup>

If the Stasi were still in existence, HV A/X would likely have recorded not only the novel but also the film and its screening during the Berlinale as a major success in its “Denver” case file. Department “A” of the First Main Directorate of the KGB would probably have concurred with this assessment. It is possible that its successor in the field of active measures, the Department of Auxiliary Measures of the “Slushba Vneshney Razvedki” (SWR) of the Russian Federation, noted these publications with a certain degree of satisfaction.<sup>533</sup>

The same applies to the short film by Swedish director Roy Andersson, “Nothing Happens” (Swedish: Någonting har hänt), which continues to this day to contribute to the popularization of Segal’s thesis in Sweden.<sup>534</sup> Andersson was commissioned by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare to shoot an educational film on AIDS prevention for the military and for schools. During production, he learned of Segal’s thesis and Seale’s claims, and they convinced him. Ultimately, the film dealt more with the alleged artificial origin of the virus than with AIDS prevention. The film mocked the theory

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<sup>529</sup> Political Film Society: Film Reviews. No One Sleeps. <http://www.geocities.com/polfilms/noonesleeps.html>.

<sup>530</sup> Panorama/IFB 2000: No One Sleeps. n.d. Available online: [http://www.berlinale.de/external/de/filmarchiv/doku\\_pdf/20000279.pdf](http://www.berlinale.de/external/de/filmarchiv/doku_pdf/20000279.pdf); Berlinale: 2000 Program. Available online: [http://www.berlinale.de/de/archiv/jahresarchive/2000/02\\_programm\\_2000/02\\_Programm\\_2000.html](http://www.berlinale.de/de/archiv/jahresarchive/2000/02_programm_2000/02_Programm_2000.html)

<sup>531</sup> Diehl, Alexander: Gay Film? In: taz, Oct. 9, 2000, p. 23.

<sup>532</sup> Gast: Barschel Letters (note 254), p. 5.

<sup>533</sup> On the Department for Auxiliary Measures, see Soldatov, Andrei; Borogan, Irina: *The New Nobility. The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB*. New York 2010, p. 108 ff.

<sup>534</sup> Andersson: Operation Norrskén (note 503), pp. 181–185.

of African origin as funny and dismissed them as racist. Alleged experiments in the U.S. involving HIV on the mentally disabled and prisoners were equated in the film with the criminal experiments on prisoners at Auschwitz.<sup>535</sup> Because the film did not fulfill the mandate of the Office of Health and Social Affairs, it was rejected there and kept under lock and key until 1993. That year, however, it was broadcast on Swedish television as a “revelation” from secret government files. It has since received various awards at international film festivals<sup>536</sup> and is still offered by Andersson on the internet for use in schools.<sup>537</sup>

Andersson’s film helped bring further public attention to the work of Ljungqvist, a former student of the Segals in Sweden, who reiterated the Segal thesis in his book *\*AIDS Taboo\** (1992).<sup>538</sup> Although Ljungqvist and his “Swedish AIDS Group Against Racism” (SARA) now devote themselves to alternative medicine in general through their online journal “2000-Talets Vetenskap,”<sup>(539)</sup> they continue to spread the Segal thesis as well as the AIDS conspiracy theory of the American physician Alan Cantwell.<sup>540</sup> The latter adopted most elements of Robert Strecker’s conspiracy theory regarding the origin and spread of AIDS through vaccines, although, unlike the conservative Strecker, he represents a more left-leaning and pro-LGBT perspective.<sup>541</sup> Ljungqvist continues to promote alternative therapies for AIDS on his website, such as the use of colloidal silver,<sup>542</sup> a treatment that under

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<sup>535</sup> Ibid., pp. 171–175.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid., pp. 181–185.

<sup>537</sup> Ibid., pp. 187 ff.

<sup>538</sup> Ibid., pp. 181–185.

<sup>539</sup> SARA: About the SARA Association (note 505).

<sup>540</sup> Ljungqvist, Ingemar: Origin of AIDS, undated. Available online:

<http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/Origin.htm>; Cantwell, Alan R.; Ljungqvist, Ingemar: Is HIV a Man-Made Virus Designed to Kill Blacks and Gays? In: Konformist, August 1999, available online: <http://www.konformist.com/1999/aids/cantwell1.htm>. The authors naturally answer their own question in the affirmative.

<sup>541</sup> See Cantwell, Alan: “Reverend Jeremiah Wright Is Right About Man-Made AIDS,” April 20, 2008. Available online: <http://www.rense.com/general81/sdf.htm>; Cantwell, Alan, Jr.: *AIDS and the Doctors of Death: An Inquiry into the Origin of the AIDS Epidemic*. Los Angeles 1995, pp. 17–30; Knight, Peter (ed.): *Conspiracy Theories in American History: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara 2003, pp. 43 ff.

<sup>542</sup> AIDS, the pathogenesis and ten good treatments, available online:

considered by medical professionals to be ineffective, questionable, and even dangerous at higher dosages.<sup>543</sup>

### 6.3 Dubious Therapies: Christoph Klug and the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany as Segal's Heirs

Ljungqvist was not the only one to continue promoting the Segal thesis alongside alternative therapies for AIDS in the 2000s. The same was true of the intellectual heir to the Segal thesis and its early-stage therapy: its co-author Christoph Klug, a member of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) and director of the MLPD-affiliated publishing house “Neuer Weg” in Essen,<sup>544</sup> which published the Segals’ last books in the 1990s. The far-left<sup>545</sup> MLPD used the Segals’ conspiracy theory to promote, among other things, their goal of “an international socialist revolution.”<sup>546</sup> Klug and the MLPD-affiliated support association “New Approaches in HIV Therapy” (FNW), which is close to the MLPD, propagated the Segals’ thesis

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<http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/Tengood.htm>;  
Ljungqvist, Ingemar: HIV/AIDS. Efficient Treatment with Simple Methods, available online:  
[http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/aidstreatments\\_selenium\\_silver.htm](http://www.2000taletsvetenskap.nu/gammalt/aids/aidstreatments_selenium_silver.htm).

<sup>543</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Colloidal Silver, as of March 2013. Available online: <http://nccam.nih.gov/health/silver>.

<sup>544</sup> Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS Is Defeatable (note 491); Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), p. 295.

<sup>545</sup> Federal Ministry of the Interior: 2012 Report on the Protection of the Constitution. Berlin 2013,

pp. 203–205. Available online: <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2012.pdf>. For a definition of “left-wing extremism,” see the online glossary of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV): [http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/\\_IL#linksextremismus](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/_IL#linksextremismus).

<sup>546</sup> Klug and Dr. Willi Mast (MLPD) stated in 2002: “The global AIDS epidemic is an expression of the crisis [of capitalism] and a profound questioning of the entire social order by imperialism. [...] many wish [...], that people—not profit—be at the center of production and research [...], when the rule of capitalism is overthrown in an international socialist revolution.” Klug, Christoph; Mast, Willi: Dramatic Spread of AIDS in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe—A New Program to Combat AIDS Worldwide! In: Rote Fahne (RF) dated July 11, 2002,

<http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0228/rfart2.htm>.

and their proposals for early intervention as an “emergency program” can be found at .<sup>547</sup> The activities of Klug and the MLPD demonstrate how political extremists exploit conspiracy theories for their own anti-democratic<sup>548</sup> political goals and how conspiracy theories in the medical field can lead to health-threatening side effects and complications.<sup>549</sup>

It is not surprising that the CPSU, the SED, and later the MLPD all made use of conspiracy theories. When it comes to conspiracies, right-wing and left-wing extremists are particularly active in propagating them. Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse write: “Conspiracy theories accompany the history of extremist groups.”<sup>550</sup> The belief in a Jewish global conspiracy lies For example, it underlies the ideology of many far-right groups, while far-left extremists see a global conspiracy by “monopoly capitalists” at work behind most of the problems of modern society.<sup>551</sup> Such conspiracy theories are intended to underscore the particularly insidious and sinister character of the depicted adversary and to contribute to the construction of enemy images .<sup>552</sup> Enemy images and the associated conspiracy theories are used to recruit followers, mobilize them, and to come to power or remain in power.<sup>553</sup>

In the case of the AIDS conspiracy theory, Klug and the MLPD proceeded in a manner similar to that of the CPSU and the SED in the past: They exploited the Fort Detrick theory and the Segals’ early therapy to denounce American “imperialism” and promote their own communist goals

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<sup>547</sup> Mast, Willi: Chemical workers discuss AIDS emergency program, RF, Sept. 27, 2001, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0139/rfart8.htm>. An important step in the fight against AIDS, RF, Dec. 20, 2001, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0151/rfart14.htm>.

<sup>548</sup> For the terms “extremists,” “extremist,” and “extremism” as defined by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), see BfV, Online Glossary, [http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/\\_1E](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/service/glossar/_1E).

<sup>549</sup> See, for example, Goertzel, Ted: “Conspiracy theories in science.” In: European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO) Reports 11 (2010) 7, pp. 493–499, here 494–496.

<sup>550</sup> Backes, Uwe; Jesse, Eckhard: Political Extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany. 4th ed., Bonn 1996, p. 257.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid., pp. 257 ff.

<sup>552</sup> Jesse, Eckhard: Enemy Images in Extremism. In: Backes, Uwe; Gallus, Alexander; Jesse, Eckhard (eds.): Yearbook on Extremism and Democracy 23 (2011), pp. 13–36, here 18.

<sup>553</sup> Ibid., pp. 17–23.

<sup>554</sup> According to the MLPD's self-image, however, the party—in contrast to the former SED and CPSU—is a true representative of communism because it has always remained faithful to the teachings of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.<sup>555</sup> In order to use Segal's thesis for its own purposes, the MLPD seized upon the legend of the Segals' "AIDS dissent" in its party organ "Rote Fahne" (RF) and further developed it. According to the distorted timeline presented by "Rote Fahne," the foreign ministers of the U.S. and the USSR had agreed at a meeting "on closer economic cooperation" in the fall of 1986 "to settle the public debate over the origin of HIV from a U.S. laboratory so as not to jeopardize the 'policy of détente.'" For this reason, Segal was reportedly given a "publication ban" by the SED and took the roundabout route via Heym and the "taz" to publish his thesis. Following the publication, in March 1987, the "Rote Fahne" reportedly offered Segal its "support [...] in breaking through the press censorship" of the GDR and the USSR. A series of articles by Jakob Segal, "AIDS – The Pentagon Was Behind It," appeared in the RF and was subsequently published as a brochure.<sup>556</sup>

However, there was and is no evidence of any complaints from the SED or the Stasi regarding this series of articles. Moscow continued to support Jakob Segal and his thesis until the spring of 1987, as evidenced by the publication of a summary of his thesis in the "Moscow News."<sup>557</sup> Nevertheless, the legend of a conspiracy between the "monopoly capitalists" of the West and the "bureaucratic capitalists"

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<sup>554</sup> See, e.g., Klug; Mast: Dramatic Spread of AIDS (note 546).

(<sup>555</sup>) See the MLPD Statutes. In: Organizational Principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party, Essen 2009, pp. 1–20, here pp. 4–5. Available online: [http://www.mlpd.de/partei/grundsatz/organisationspolitische-grundsatz/der-mlpd/at\\_download/file](http://www.mlpd.de/partei/grundsatz/organisationspolitische-grundsatz/der-mlpd/at_download/file); MLPD Party Program, Chapter A, Social Development in Germany, undated. Available online:

<http://www.mlpd.de/partei/parteiprogramm/gesellschaftliche-entwicklung->

in Germany. See also Müller-Enbergs, Helmut: "A Stalinist Sect Turns 40—For the Past 25 Years It Has Been Called the MLPD." In: Backes, Uwe; Jesse, Eckhard (eds.): Yearbook on Extremism and Democracy 2008. Baden-Baden 2009, pp. 167–184.

<sup>556</sup> See Geene: AIDS Policy (note 317), p. 295; 15 Years of Criticism of Bourgeois AIDS Policy – A Brief Chronicle. In: RF, July 11, 2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0529/rfart12.htm>; Marxist-Leninist Union of Intellectuals (Essen): AIDS: The Pentagon Was Behind It: Documentation. Essen 1989 (15 pp.).

<sup>557</sup> Prof. Jakob Segal, GDR: Where Does AIDS Come from? In: Moscow News

, April 20, 1987, p. 10.

“elites” of the East to cover up the origins of AIDS as a justification for the MLPD’s adoption of Segal’s thesis. In this way, it was also able to claim that it had always been the sole true proponent of the thesis. The alleged blocking of Segal’s proposals for the successful treatment of AIDS by the pharmaceutical corporations served the MLPD, despite the growing death toll, as a lesson in the necessity of a communist world revolution according to its own principles.<sup>558</sup>

At the local level, Klug sought support for Segal’s thesis and his proposals for early intervention. He found it among members of AIDS-Hilfe Stuttgart (AHS) e.V. Under editor Ralf Bogen, their magazine \*Rainbow\* served on several occasions as a platform for publishing the ideas of Jakob Segal and his old and new supporters. In June 1996, the AHS, in collaboration with ACT UP Stuttgart, organized an evening on “current treatment standards and alternatives for HIV and AIDS.”<sup>559</sup> At the event, Klug presented the main points of his earlier book, written in collaboration with the Segals,<sup>560</sup> and at the conclusion, a majority of those present adopted a resolution addressed to the Federal Ministry of Health demanding an immediate review of early-stage therapy with aspirin and passive immunization with the p24 protein of the HIV virus.<sup>561</sup> When the MLPD called for a protest demonstration in Frankfurt in 1999 against the awarding of the highest prize in German medicine, the Paul Ehrlich Prize, to Gallo, Bogen organized an informational evening in Stuttgart in the run-up to the event. He and his co-organizers, in line with Segal’s thesis, accused Gallo of playing a decisive role in the alleged artificial creation of the HIV virus. To inform the event participants, excerpts from the film “AIDS—The African Legend” were shown.<sup>562</sup>

Thanks to Klug’s preliminary work and the support of the AHS and other organizations, the support association “Neue Wege in der HIV-

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<sup>558</sup> Klug; Mast: Dramatic Spread of AIDS (note 546).

<sup>559</sup> Förderverein Neue Wege in der HIV-Therapie, e. V.: Chronicle of Activities 1990–2005, [http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/archiv\\_1990-2005.html](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/archiv_1990-2005.html).

<sup>560</sup> Bogen, Ralf: Getting Involved – ACT UP; Rainbow Medical Info, supplement to Rainbow (1996) 25, 5 pp., here 3. Available online: [http://www.hiv-therapie.org/1996\\_RAINBOW\\_NR\\_25.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/1996_RAINBOW_NR_25.pdf).

<sup>561</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>562</sup> Marquart, Elisabeth; Bogen, Ralf: No Award Ceremony for Robert Gallo! Gallo Belongs in Court, Not in St. Paul’s Church! Rainbow (1999) 33, pp. 19–23.

Therapy” (FNW) was founded in Gelsenkirchen.<sup>563</sup> The “Rote Fahne” noted: “From the very beginning, the MLPD has done everything in its power to support the establishment of this association”<sup>(564)</sup> A leading role in the new association was played by acquaintances of Klug from the MLPD and the AHS—for example, Bogen (AHS), Dr. Günther Bittel (MLPD), and Dr. Willi Mast (MLPD).<sup>565</sup> After consulting with association members, Klug put together an “emergency program” to combat AIDS based on Segal’s research and therapeutic approaches. Among other things, it provided for: the “development of a vaccine based on Jakob Segal’s proposal,” “immediate administration of ASS (aspirin) and minerals to prolong the time from infection to the onset of the disease,” “free access to modern antiviral therapy,” and “financing of the program by those responsible for and spreading HIV.” The last point drew on Segal’s thesis. Because the U.S. was responsible for the artificial creation of the AIDS pathogen, it should pay for the entire cost.<sup>566</sup> The program took into account the fact that highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) against HIV/AIDS was introduced in 1996 only to the extent that it demanded the United States cover the costs of said therapy. Although the FNW learned of Salk’s patent by 2000 at the latest<sup>567</sup> and presumably also of the start of clinical trials for it,<sup>568</sup> the association repeatedly called on the federal government to provide public funds for trials with p24

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<sup>563</sup> FNW: Chronicle of Activities 1990–2005 (Note 559).

<sup>564</sup> 15 Years of Criticism of Bourgeois AIDS Policy.

<sup>565</sup> FNW: Contact, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/kontakt.html>. On Bittel, see also Initiators for an Environmental Union, <http://www.umweltgewerkschaft.org/index.php/de/ueber-uns/initiatoren-auswahl>. Mast became the MLPD’s Bundestag candidate in Gelsenkirchen in 2009. See Dr. Willi Mast. MLPD Bundestag candidate and Monday demonstrator in Gelsenkirchen reports, 2009. Available online: <http://www.mlpd.de/themen/flugblatter/montagsdemo-aktuell/montagsdemo-aktuell-38-vom-20.7.2009/view>.

<sup>566</sup> Mast: Emergency AIDS Program. An important step in the fight against AIDS (note 547).

<sup>567</sup> See the FNW flyer: World AIDS Day 2000: For a Change in AIDS Research & AIDS Policy! Available online: [http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2000\\_Welt\\_AIDS\\_Tag.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2000_Welt_AIDS_Tag.pdf).

<sup>568</sup> See Churdboonchart et al.: A double-blind, adjuvant-controlled trial (note 525), pp. 728–733; Glidden, David; Kim, Soyeon; Lagakos, Stephen: Effectiveness of Remune. *Clinical and Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology* 8 (2001) 2, pp. 468 ff.

<sup>569</sup> By 2004, however, it had been established that Salk's vaccine "Remune" offered no therapeutic benefit as a monotherapy.<sup>570</sup> The FNW attributed the difficulties and errors in developing a vaccine against HIV to the use of the wrong animal model in the studies. Because, according to Segal's theory, half of HIV originated from the Visna virus in sheep, sheep should have been used for trials with potential vaccines instead of chimpanzees or monkeys.<sup>571</sup>

Klug, the "Rote Fahne," and the support association continued to call for a government-funded study on aspirin as an early-stage therapy against HIV infection, despite the termination of the American study in 1995 due to adverse side effects. In 2002, Mast interviewed for the "Rote Fahne," he interviewed a like-minded individual on this issue, the American AIDS activist and businessman Howard S. Armistead. In 2001, Armistead had conducted his own study in Zimbabwe and allegedly found that "patients who took aspirin, selenium, and a multivitamin" experienced "an improvement of more than 50 percent in six

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<sup>569</sup> See, for example, the email exchange between FNW and Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe Berlin from 2001. In: *Rainbow* (2001)40, p. 12 ff., available online: [http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001\\_Email-Austausch\\_mit\\_der\\_DAH.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001_Email-Austausch_mit_der_DAH.pdf); the FNW's open letter to the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Federal Ministry of Health, November 27, 2001; [http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001\\_Dezember\\_Offener\\_Brief\\_des\\_Foerddervereins.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001_Dezember_Offener_Brief_des_Foerddervereins.pdf); the FNW leaflet for World AIDS Day, December 2002; [http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2002\\_Faltblatt\\_Foerdderverein.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2002_Faltblatt_Foerdderverein.pdf).

<sup>570</sup> Lundgren, J. D.: Is the Salk principle still viable for the design of an effective HIV vaccine? *HIV Medicine* 2004:5, p. 315 et seq. By 2006 at the latest, all clinical trials for the potential use of Remune or its successor drug, IR 103, had been discontinued. See Remune (HIV-1 Immunogen, Salk vaccine). In: *AIDS-Meds*, [http://www.aidsmeds.com/archive/Remune\\_1644.shtml](http://www.aidsmeds.com/archive/Remune_1644.shtml); IR103. In: *ibid.*, [http://www.aidsmeds.com/archive/IR103\\_1645.shtml](http://www.aidsmeds.com/archive/IR103_1645.shtml).

<sup>571</sup> This is how Dr. Willi Mast described the situation at a vaccine symposium organized by AIDS-Hilfe Stuttgart in November 2003. According to his own account, Mast

"collaborated scientifically with Prof. Segal from 1988 until his death on issues of immunology and AIDS." See Mast, Willi: What Are the Obstacles in Research for an AIDS Vaccine? In: Bogen, Ralf: *Reader for the Vaccine Symposium on November 22, 2003, in Stuttgart*, p. 5 ff. Available online: <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2003-impfstoff-Reader.pdf>. See also the FNW's flyer for World AIDS Day 2001, which once again brought up Segal's hypothesis:

[http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001\\_Julli\\_8\\_Dtsch\\_AIDS\\_Kongress\\_Berlin.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2001_Julli_8_Dtsch_AIDS_Kongress_Berlin.pdf).

months.” For the *\*Rote Fahne\**, Armistead’s study was seen as further proof of aspirin’s effectiveness, contrary to the claims of the pharmaceutical industry, the Federal Health Office, and Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe.<sup>572</sup> The newspaper overlooked the fact that only ten people in the study received Armistead’s mixture of selenium, aspirin, and multivitamins (SAM). Due to the limited number of participants, the study lacked scientific validity. Nevertheless, in 2002, Armistead, as president of SAM Medical Products, launched his “SAM Combination Antiretroviral Therapy” on the Zambian market.<sup>573</sup> After a week and a half, however, the Zambian Ministry of Health ordered the suspension of SAM sales and confiscated the product’s inventory. It stated that there was no evidence of SAM’s efficacy against HIV, and that its selenium content exceeded the recommended daily intake.<sup>574</sup> Nevertheless, the funding association “New Paths in HIV Therapy” decided in 2004 to co-fund a comparable study in Zimbabwe on the efficacy of aspirin and selenium in HIV therapy.<sup>575</sup> The FNW ignored the warnings of Hannelore Knittel, executive director of Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe e. V. (DAH), that the planned study, as presented, was “ethically unjustifiable.”<sup>576</sup> Interestingly three of the four principal investigators in Zimbabwe were the same as those in Armistead’s 2001 study: Dr. Marianne Thomsen from the nongovernmental organization Humana People-to-People International (HPtP) and Prof. E.N. Sibanda and Dr. Grażyna Stanczuk from the medical

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<sup>572</sup> Mast, Dr. Willi: Does Aspirin Work for AIDS? RF, April 11, 2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0215/rfart17.htm>. Armistead’s name was consistently misspelled as “Armistaed” throughout the article.

<sup>573</sup> Researcher Proposes Low-Cost ARV. In: *The Standard* (Zimbabwe), Sept. 5, 2004. Available online: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200409070522.html>.

<sup>574</sup> Zambia orders withdrawal of untested AIDS drug. Panapress, Nov. 25, 2002. Available online: <http://www.panapress.com/Zambia-orders-withdrawal-of-unttested-AiDS-drug--13-468995-17-lang1-index.html>. See also Sam’s AIDS Drug in New Twist. In: *Times of Zambia*, Sept. 3, 2004. Available online: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200409030326.html>.

<sup>575</sup> FNW: Chronicle of Activities 1990–2005 (note 559).

<sup>576</sup> Letter from Hannelore Knittel, Executive Director, DAH, to Bittel, September 7, 2004, 3 pp., here p. 3. Available online: <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-02-09-2004-Seite-1>, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-02-09-2004-Seite-2>, and <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-02-09-2004-Seite-3>. For the reply letter from Dr. Detlef Rohm, FNW, to Knittel, October 20, 2004, see [www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-Ethik-20-10-2004.doc](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/DAH-Ethik-20-10-2004.doc).

Faculty of Medicine at the University of Zimbabwe. Both studies were considered by HPtP as part of its own project to combat AIDS in Africa, “Total Control of Epidemic” t.<sup>577</sup> The roots of HPtP in the Danish revolutionary school reform movement “Tvind,” led by the Maoist Arndt Petersen<sup>578</sup>, may have played a role in the FNW’s decision to co-fund the study. In the end, Thomsen declared the one-year “pilot study” with 31 participants a success in an FNW publication.<sup>579</sup> For his part, Klug spoke after the study of a “palliative and life-prolonging effect” of aspirin among HIV-infected individuals<sup>580</sup> – including in a lecture series in Saxony in 2006, which was co-organized by the German Freethinkers’ Association e.V., the PDS-affiliated Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, and the Left Party/PDS. With his lecture “AIDS – A Botched Biological Weapon and a Booming Business,” he also sought to win over a new generation to Segal’s thesis—including at the Technical University of Chemnitz.<sup>581</sup> Thomsen, Sibanda, and Stanczuk reported

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<sup>577</sup> See Humana People-to-People (HPtP): Total Control of the Epidemic (TCE), n.d. Available online: <http://www.fonden.org/trial/content.htm>. HUMANA in Germany: TCE – Total Control of the Epidemic – Our Program Against HIV/AIDS, n.d. Available online: [http://www.humana-de.org/21\\_tce/](http://www.humana-de.org/21_tce/), and in particular the links to “TCE – Clinical Study,” 2001, [http://www.humana-de.org/21\\_tce/tce\\_klin.html](http://www.humana-de.org/21_tce/tce_klin.html), and to the FNW’s appeal for donations, July 2004, [http://www.humana-de.org/21\\_tce/](http://www.humana-de.org/21_tce/). See also Sibanda, Elope Nimele; Stanczuk, Grażyna A.; Thomsen, Marianne: Acetylsalicylic acid (ASPIRIN) increases CD4+ T lymphocytes and suppresses TNF- $\alpha$  in HIV-1-infected patients. Results of a 12-month, three-arm, placebo-controlled pilot study, *AIDS Vaccines and Related Topics*, 2004, pp. 179–190; abstract available online: <http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=16464616>.

<sup>578</sup> See Nordhausen, Frank: Aid to Africa for nothing. In: *Berliner Zeitung*, Jan. 3, 2014. Available online: <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/ehemalige-mitarbeiter-werfen-der-firma-humana-ausbeutung-vor--die-bundesregierung-hat-jetzt-reagiert-afrika-hilfe-umsonst,10810590,10627452.html>.

<sup>579</sup> Thomsen, Maria: Significant Successes in HIV/AIDS Therapy with Aspirin (ASA), undated. In: FNW website, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/ThomsenAspirin.pdf>.

<sup>580</sup> Klug, Christoph: “Correcting Some Fundamental Misconceptions About HIV and AIDS: An Introduction,” pp. 153–162, here 159. It is unclear from which publication Klug’s article is taken.

<sup>581</sup> See Fischer, Wolfram: Lecture series in Plauen, Zwickau, Chemnitz, Greiz, and Jena. In: *Info des Fördervereins Neue Wege in der HIV-Therapie e. V.*, 1 (July 2006),

p. 12, available online:

In contrast, a medical journal<sup>582</sup> was much more cautious about the study's results, and even the FNW admitted in its 2012 newsletter that there had been "gaps in the data" that "may have contributed to the inability to determine clear study results." This was attributed to "the catastrophic political conditions in Zimbabwe."<sup>583</sup>

#### 6.4 Gerappter Segal: The "spectrum" between left-wing and right-wing extremism

Ironically, the support group "New Paths in HIV Therapy" only received significant publicity outside of the "Rote Fahne" and "Rainbow" after its self-dissolution in April 2012.<sup>584</sup> The occasion for this renewed public attention was a new controversy surrounding Segal's thesis. The Duisburg hip-hop duo "Die Bandbreite" was disinvited from Christopher Street Day (CSD) in Duisburg because they wanted to rap their new song on the topic of AIDS. The lyrics echoed Segal's thesis:

"... Do you believe that nonsense about monkeys, those nasty little green sea cats? The animals that supposedly first infected their Zairean hunters, SIV mutates, and the Black people bring it across the pond, so that HIV 81 then reaches the US via Haiti. But it can't be that simple; there must be a mistake here, because SIV and HIV bear virtually no resemblance to one another. [...]"

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[http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2006\\_Juli\\_Interview\\_mit\\_Rainer\\_Seybold.pdf](http://www.hiv-therapie.org/2006_Juli_Interview_mit_Rainer_Seybold.pdf); and Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Sachsen e.V., Events 2006, undated, [http://www.sachsen.rosalux.de/fileadmin/ls\\_sachsen/dokumente/archiv/chronik2006.pdf](http://www.sachsen.rosalux.de/fileadmin/ls_sachsen/dokumente/archiv/chronik2006.pdf).

<sup>582</sup> Sibanda; Stanzuk; Thomsen: Acetylsalicylic acid (Note 577), pp. 179–190; abstract available online: <http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=16464616>. They wrote in their abstract: "The data presented in this pilot study show that the administration of aspirin to HIV-1-infected individuals resulted in a significant increase in T lymphocyte numbers and decreases in p24 and TNF- $\alpha$ . We are convinced that there is merit in further investigating the mechanisms through which this combination increased the CD4+ cell count and determining whether this agent has any role in HIV management algorithms."

<sup>583</sup> FNW, Newsletter, June 2012, 8 pp., here 8; [http://solidaritaet-international.de/uploads/media/Newsletter\\_2\\_2012\\_online-2\\_02.pdf](http://solidaritaet-international.de/uploads/media/Newsletter_2_2012_online-2_02.pdf).

<sup>584</sup> Ibid.

Dr. MacArthur [sic] in 1969 asked the House of Representatives for money, because the country needed a biological weapon for its military. And that's exactly what happened: the money was allocated, and then Robert Gallo appeared on the scene. People say he discovered AIDS. Wrong! The man created AIDS. [...]

AIDS has the same morphology as the Visna virus, which affects sheep; the same molecular weight; and a 60 percent genomic identity. Ultimately, the fusion succeeds; AIDS is born in the laboratory. Now research is shifting to testing the general population. [...]«<sup>585</sup>

Because the duo insisted on performing the song, they were disinvented and the performance canceled. Dietmar Heyde from Duisburg AIDS-Hilfe had explained the reasons in an email to the duo's singer and songwriter, Marcel Wojnarowicz, prior to the disinvention:

“We at AIDS-Hilfe very clearly distance ourselves from the origin story of HIV propagated in the song, which adheres to a conspiracy theory that, while it has a certain charm, has long since been scientifically and epidemiologically disproved and is highly ideological (and dates back to the height of the Cold War, which certainly lends it a certain charm, but must be viewed in the context of historical events). In my opinion, this interpretation is not only false and refuted, but also extremely counterproductive to our prevention efforts.”<sup>586</sup>

During his research, journalist Philipp Wahl learned that “the pseudo-scientific song” had been commissioned by the FNW.<sup>587</sup> The FNW's chairman, Detlef Rohm, had awarded the paid commission to the duo and presented the song, along with the accompanying video on YouTube, at the association's very last general meeting in April 2012.<sup>588</sup> The last verse of the song makes the sponsorship clear: In it

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<sup>585</sup> Die Bandbreite: AIDS: Transcript. In: YouTube: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6\\_yw&feature=youtu.be](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6_yw&feature=youtu.be).

<sup>586</sup> Wojna: Statement by Dietmar Heyde of AIDS-Hilfe, July 31, 2012. In: Die Bandbreite website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/stellungnahme-von-dietmar-heyde-von-der-aids-hilfe/>.

<sup>587</sup> Wahl, Phillip: AIDS and Nazi songs by Bandbreite divide the gay community ahead of the CSD. In: Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27, 2012; <http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/duisburg/aids-und-nazi-songs-der-bandbreite-spalten-homosexuelle-vor-dem-csd-id6817083.html?from=mobile>.

<sup>588</sup> FNW: Newsletter, June 2012, p. 2. As of January 4, 2014, the video is still available

at the same location on YouTube:

Wojnarowicz calls for the implementation of the association's "emergency program," including early treatment with aspirin.<sup>589</sup>

The controversy surrounding the song escalated when Marcus Meier of "Neues Deutschland" picked up the story and positioned the song on the right side of the political spectrum. Meier pointed out that Wojnarowicz cited a book by Wolfgang Eggert, "Die geplanten Seuchen: AIDS – SARS und die militärische Genforschung" (2003), as a key source for the song alongside a brochure by Klug. According to Meier, the book is considered "crude anti-Semitic propaganda." According to Eggert's account, HIV was developed at Fort Detrick by the U.S. government and passed on to the Mossad by the CIA. The Israeli intelligence agency then spread the virus in Africa through intentionally contaminated blood supplies. Behind it all, he claims, lies a Jewish end-times cult sect.<sup>590</sup> Eggert wrote of a "biblical-apocalyptic project that extended into the present: It is the possible creation of an artificial pathogen that would destroy all the races of the world—except for the genetically 'purest' core of the Jewish people." «<sup>591</sup> In the book, Eggert cites the writings of American conspiracy theorists regarding the alleged spread of the virus in Africa by the WHO and, like them, named the Polish-Jewish scientist Wolf Szmunn as a key figure. While Szmunn, who emigrated from Poland to the U.S. in the early 1970s, served as alleged evidence for the Strecker brothers of a communist conspiracy to spread AIDS, he served Eggert as proof of a Zionist global conspiracy.<sup>592</sup> Regarding Eggert's conspiracy theory, Meier wrote in "Neues Deutschland": "Compared to this apocalyptic 'project,' the Holocaust must seem like child's play [sic]."<sup>593</sup> Eggert had relativized the alleged Holocaust project in his book as "the greatest Shoah of all time."<sup>594</sup> Due to the reference to Eggert, a link from the "Bandbreite" website to the sales page for Eggert's book at his publisher "Chronos-Medien"—which also offers other books on his conspiracy theories about Jews—and

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[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6\\_yw&feature=youtu.be](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6_yw&feature=youtu.be).

<sup>589</sup> Wahl: AIDS and Nazi Songs (note 587).

<sup>590</sup> Meier, Marcus: How Left-Wing Is Paranoia? In: ND, June 2, 2012, online edition: <http://www.neuesdeutschland.de/artikel/228439.wie-links-ist-paranoia.html>.

<sup>591</sup> Eggert, Wolfgang (ed.): The Planned Epidemics: AIDS – SARS and Military Genetic Research. Munich 2003, p. 72.

<sup>592</sup> Ibid., pp. 54 and 71.

<sup>593</sup> Meier: How Left-Wing Is Paranoia? (Note 590).

<sup>594</sup> Eggert: The Planned Epidemics (note 591), p. 83.

Because of “Bandbreite’s” appearances at right-wing and right-conservative events, Meier classified them as closer to the “right-wing comrades” than to the “left-wing comrades.” According to Meier, their reference to Eggert’s book and the promotion of it on their website served as a “taster for anti-Semitism.” He accused them of taking up “conspiracy theories” and mixing them “with slogans that appear left-wing.” In this context, he cited a second song by “Bandbreite” about September 11 titled “Self-Made,” which claims that the U.S. government allegedly blew up the World Trade Center itself.<sup>595</sup>

Despite their promotion of Eggert and despite appearances at events linked to the far-right scene, “Die Bandbreite” rejected accusations of proximity to the far-right spectrum. They were aided by the (somehow still active) FNW and the MLPD, which emphasized the proximity of the “Bandbreite” confirmed their support for them. Bittel (MLPD), who remains the managing director of the FNW, participated “as a spokesperson for Bandbreite” in a public event on November 12, 2012, regarding the cancellation.<sup>596</sup> When renewed accusations were leveled against the band regarding “sexist, right-wing populist, and anti-American lyrics” in the run-up to their performance at the Gelsenkirchen Whitsun Festival,<sup>597</sup> the MLPD, as a co-organizer of the event, spoke out in their defense: “We have not seen a single one of these accusations confirmed. Otherwise, as co-organizers, we would of course have spoken out against a performance.”<sup>598</sup> Wojnarowicz, for his part, stated: “Just as the alleged right-wing bias of

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<sup>595</sup> Meier: How Left-Wing Is Paranoia? (Note 590).

<sup>596</sup> Following the discussion on the allegations at the CSD, Nov. 16, 2012. In: Die Bandbreite Website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/nach-der-diskussion-zu-den-vorwurfen-beim-csd/>.

<sup>597</sup> Sepultura at the Rock Hard Festival; Die Bandbreite at the MLPD event in Gelsenkirchen. In: WAZ from May 16, 2013. Available online: <http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/gelsenkirchen/sepultura-beim-rock-hard-festival-die-bandbreite-bei-der-mlpd-in-gelsenkirchen-id7956913.html#plx1921309348>.

<sup>598</sup> Controversy surrounding the Pentecost Youth Gathering and the performance by “Bandbreite.” In: RF dated May 16, 2013. Available online: <http://www.rf-news.de/2013/kw20/wirbelum-das-pfingstjugendtreffen-und-den-auftritt-der-bandbreite>.

“How our band is supposed to be compatible with the left-wing communist stance of the MLPD remains [...] unanswered.”<sup>599</sup>

Wojnarowicz recalled that the brochure by Klug (MLPD) titled “AIDS in Africa” had also served as a source for the song lyrics. He explained on his website: “Two completely independent sources provided us with virtually identical information about the origin of the HIV virus. We also found support for the theses presented in the music video from the advocacy group ‘New Paths in HIV Therapy.’”<sup>600</sup> Contrary to appearances, however, the two sources were not entirely independent of one another, because both Eggert<sup>601</sup> and Klug<sup>602</sup> took Segal’s thesis as their starting point. The “Bandbreite” song “AIDS” was not just “Eggert rapped,” as Meier claimed,<sup>603</sup> but also Klug rapped—and even more so, Segal rapped.

By quoting Eggert, Wojnarowicz cited the FNW and the MLPD as examples. They had not hesitated to adopt others’ conspiracy theories regardless of their political background, as long as they somehow confirmed Segal’s thesis. For example, “Rainbow” reprinted an interview with Eggert about his book as early as 2004.<sup>604</sup> In the introduction to the interview, FNW members Ralf Bogen and Reiner Seybold—who was also the executive director of the Action Alliance Against AIDS e.V. at the time—justified the reprint as follows:

“Eggert critically dismantles Prof. Gallo’s widely accepted dogma that HIV was originally a natural monkey virus from Africa. [...] A clear resolution of the question of HIV’s origin is crucial for the rapid development of an effective AIDS vaccine. For the

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<sup>599</sup> Wojna: Subtle smear campaign by derwesten.de against “Die Bandbreite” and the MLPD, May 16, 2013; Bandbreite website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/subtile-hetze-von-derwesten-de-gegen-die-bandbreite-und-die-mlpd/>.

<sup>600</sup> Wojna: Video clip AIDS, May 29, 2012; Die Bandbreite website, <http://www.diebandbreite.de/videoclip-aids/>.

<sup>601</sup> Eggert: *The Planned Epidemics* (note 591), pp. 23 ff., 47, 49–52, and 77–82.

<sup>602</sup> Klug, Christoph: *AIDS in Africa*. Essen 2001, pp. 2 ff.

<sup>603</sup> Meier: *How Left-Wing Is Paranoia?* (note 590).

<sup>604</sup> *AIDS – The Weapon from the Genetic Laboratory*. Interview with W. Eggert, Part 1, by Alain Rappsilber from BOX 128, p. 18 ff. In: *Rainbow* (2004) 48, p. 18 ff. The second part of the interview appeared in the next issue. See Box interview with W. Eggert, Part 2, by Alain Rappsilber from BOX 128, pp. 18–19. In: *Rainbow* (2004) 49, S. 16.

“For the necessary vaccination research, the correct selection of suitable animal models [i.e., sheep!] is important.”<sup>605</sup>

In the introduction to the second part of the interview, they repeated the myth that “in the 1960s, the Pentagon had launched a research project to artificially create a virus designed to destroy the human immune system.”<sup>606</sup> Although ordering information for Eggert’s book appeared in “Rainbow,”<sup>(607)</sup> his accusation against a Jewish end-times cult went unmentioned. The AIDS song by “Bandbreite” also omitted this. Although, unlike “Rainbow,” it refers to Szmunes’s alleged role in the spread of HIV in Africa through U.S. vaccines.<sup>608</sup>

In the case of the MLPD, Mast reported favorably in the *\*Rote Fahne\** in 2002 on the writings of the American conspiracy theorist Boyd E. Graves. Graves, as Mast emphasized, had once again “confirmed” the Fort Detrick theory.<sup>609</sup> But according to Graves’ account, the creation and spread of AIDS around the world had been a joint program of the U.S. and the USSR aimed at the extermination of Black people and homosexuals. He himself allegedly cured himself of AIDS with colloidal silver—a remedy whose effectiveness an Israeli pharmaceutical company and an Israeli research institute allegedly sought to cover up.<sup>610</sup> Mast does not report on these aspects of Graves’ writings. The “Rote Fahne” had also linked to a rewritten version of MacArthur’s 1969 testimony before the U.S. Congress on Graves’ website. In Graves’ revised version, it was, among other things, anachronistically suggested that First Lady Hillary Clinton, with her plans for national health insurance, would cause further deaths through imp-

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<sup>605</sup> Bogen, Ralf; Seybold, Rainer: HIV – a failed outcome of research into virus-based biological weapons? In: *Rainbow* (2004) 48, p. 18. On Seybold, see *Action Alliance Against AIDS* (ed.): *10 Years of the Action Alliance Against AIDS. We’re staying on it! No place specified* 2012, p. 18; Bogen’s interview with Seybold: *Pills Instead of Profits – LIFE for 6 Million People – Treatment for All*. In: *FNW Info: HIV Therapy* (note 581), pp. 10–13, here 10.

<sup>606</sup> Bogen; Seybold: HIV – A Failed Outcome? (note 605), p. 15.

<sup>607</sup> See *Rainbow* (2004) 48, p. 19.

<sup>608</sup> *Die Bandbreite: AIDS*, YouTube transcript:  
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6\\_yw&feature=youtu.be](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4uMEs6_yw&feature=youtu.be)

<sup>609</sup> Mast, Willi: *New Evidence: AIDS Virus Is a Product of Biological Weapons Research*. In: *RF*, Jan. 17, 2002, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0203/rfart10.htm>.

<sup>610</sup> MacConnachie, James; Tudge, Robin: *Rough Guide to Conspiracy Theories*, 3rd edition. London 2013, Kindle e-book, location 8173.

wanted to infect people through these experiments.<sup>611</sup> Despite everything, the document served as further evidence for Segal's thesis in the RF.

It should be noted here that it was not only members of the MLPD and its allied circles who made use of conspiracy theories from the other end of the political spectrum. Eggert, for his part, had not shied away from drawing on conspiracy theories from the left, such as Segal's thesis.<sup>612</sup> In general, as was already the case before 1989 and as demonstrated by the examples of the KGB, the Segals, Streckers, and others, there remains to this day a lively exchange of conspiracy theories between the left and the right regarding AIDS. The unifying factor behind this lies in the alleged "culprit" of the conspiracy: the U.S. government. In the U.S. and Europe, the American government serves as a bogeyman for both right-wing and left-wing extremists, and on both sides, corresponding conspiracy theories—not only about the origin of AIDS, but also, for example, regarding the "self-inflicted" attacks of September 11—are invented and disseminated. This shared anti-Americanism<sup>613</sup> also explains why the songs of the "Bandbreite," with its conspiracy-driven political views, has found an audience among both left-wing and right-wing extremists in German-speaking countries, and as a result, the band receives invitations to perform from both political camps.

## 6.5 Disinformation, misinformation, and fatal consequences?

In connection with the controversy surrounding "Die Bandbreite," Dietmar Heyde, executive director of AIDS-Hilfe Duisburg/Kreis Wesel, expressed his concern that the "promotion of cheap therapies" by FNW plays "into the hands" of AIDS deniers in developing countries. Dr. Ingulf Becker-Boost, an infectious disease specialist at the Sittardsberg Health Center and caregiver to more than 200 HIV-positive patients, referred in this context to the "disastrous actions" of former South African President Thabo Mbeki.<sup>614</sup>

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<sup>611</sup> From Official U.S. Govt. Documents House of Rep[resentatives] American Masses Hoodwinked AIDS Visus [sic] a Political Disease, undated. American Patriot Friends Network, <http://www.apFn.org/apfn/aids2.pdf>.

<sup>612</sup> Eggert: *The Planned Epidemics* (note 591), pp. 23 ff., 47, 49–52, and 77–82.

<sup>613</sup> Jesse: *Enemy Image* (note 552), pp. 13–36, here 14, 27 ff. and 31.

<sup>614</sup> Wahl: *AIDS and Nazi Songs* (note 587).

This referred to Mbeki's policies on AIDS during his term in office (1999–2008). When he was elected, approximately one-fifth of adults in South Africa were infected with HIV. About 300,000 South Africans had already died from the disease, and during his tenure, the death toll rose to 2.7 million people. Nevertheless, Mbeki believed in the theories of Duesberg and other AIDS deniers and ignored the findings of mainstream scientists on AIDS. Consequently, he blocked the introduction of ARVs in state clinics at a time when the effectiveness of HAART therapy and the benefits of AZT in preventing the transmission of HIV from mothers to their unborn children had already been proven. His Minister of Health, Dr. Mantombazana Edmie Tshabalala-Msimang, even declared ARVs to be “poison” and instead promoted unproven and ineffective alternative therapies such as garlic and beetroot or the vitamin supplements of the German alternative medicine practitioner Matthias Rath.<sup>615</sup> Estimates suggest that, as a result of the Mbeki government's delayed introduction of ARVs during his tenure, approximately 333,000 additional South Africans died of AIDS.<sup>616</sup>

At first glance, the writings of the Segals, Klug, the FNW, and the MLPD—including their conspiracy theories and proposals for early-stage AIDS therapy—do not appear to have had the same destructive consequences as the activities of Duesberg and other AIDS deniers. The latter had a significant influence on Mbeki's policies. Unlike Duesberg, the Segals were always aware of the danger of HIV and had therefore supported “safer sex.”<sup>617</sup> During a lecture tour through South Africa, Klug, as a member of the MLPD, took a stand against Mbeki's AIDS policy together with the party's sister organization, the Communist Party of South Africa—Marxist-Leninist (CPSA-ML). As part of their “militant alliance” to introduce Klug's emergency program against AIDS in South Africa, they demanded, in addition to early therapy with aspirin and the development of a vaccine based on p24, the immediate introduction of ARVs without profit for the pharmaceutical industry.<sup>618</sup> Klug and the FNW, however,

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<sup>615</sup> Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12), pp. 5 ff., 96.

<sup>616</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>617</sup> Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS Can Be Defeated (note 491), pp. 224 ff. and 230.

<sup>618</sup> “The Fight Against AIDS Needs Strong Organizations” (Part 1). Die Rote Fahne spoke with Shobane F. Mpeake and Christoph Klug. In: RF, July 21, 2005, <http://interaktiv.mlpd.de/rf0529/rfart12.htm>.

They reject Duesberg's AIDS denial as unscientific and false.<sup>619</sup>

Despite these significant differences between Segal's and Duesberg's followers, Nicoli Natrass believes that the belief in the virus as a failed biological weapon can be just as dangerous to public health as the belief in the theories of AIDS deniers. She writes:

"A growing body of research shows that conspiracy-based beliefs about AIDS in the U.S. and South Africa are associated with unprotected sex, non-adherence to antiret , and failure to get tested for HIV."<sup>620</sup> All three behavioral patterns can have fatal consequences.

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<sup>619</sup> Mast, Dr. W.: Prof. Duesberg's denial of the danger posed by HIV is intended to undermine the fight for global access to AIDS medications and the development of an effective vaccine. In: FNW website, undated, <http://www.hiv-therapie.org/html/duesberg.html>; Segal; Segal; Klug: AIDS is Defeatable (note 491), pp. 227–231.

<sup>620</sup> "A growing body of research shows that beliefs in AIDS conspiracies in the U.S. and South Africa are associated with risky sexual behavior, non-adherence to antiretroviral treatment, and failure to get tested for HIV." Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12),

S.1. For the link between belief in conspiracy theories and unprotected sex, see also, for example, for the U.S.: Bogart, L. M.; Bird, S. Thorburn: "Exploring the Relationship of Conspiracy Beliefs about HIV/AIDS to Sexual Behaviors and Attitudes among African-American Adults." In: *Journal of the National Medical Association* 95 (2003) 11, pp. 1057–1065. Available online: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2594665/>; Bogart, L. M.; Thorburn, S.: Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention among African Americans? In: *JAIDS* 38 (2005) 2, pp. 213–218; Ross, M.; Essien, J.; Torres, I.: Conspiracy Beliefs about the Origin of HIV/AIDS in Four Racial Groups. In: *JAIDS* 41 (2006) 3, pp. 342–344. For South Africa, see Grebe, E.; Natrass, N.: AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs and Unsafe Sex in Cape Town. In: *AIDS and Behavior* 16 (2012) 3, pp. 761–763. On the link to nonadherence to ARV treatment, see Bogart, L. et al.: Conspiracy beliefs about HIV are related to antiretroviral treatment nonadherence among African-American men with HIV. In: *JAIDS* 53 (2010) 5, pp. 648–655. On the link to HIV testing, see for the U.S.: Bohnert, A. S.; Latkin, C. A.: HIV Testing and Conspiracy Beliefs Regarding the Origins of HIV among African Americans. In: *AIDS Patient Care and STDs* 23 (2009) 9, pp. 759–763; and for South Africa: Bogart et al.: Conspiracy Beliefs, passim, and W. S. Tun, S. Kellerman, and S. Maime,

Z. Fipaza, M. Sheehy, L. Vu1, and D. Nel, "Conspiracy beliefs about HIV, attitudes toward condoms and treatment, and HIV-related preventive behaviors among men who have sex with men in Tschwane (Pretoria), South Africa,"

<sup>18th</sup>International—

Why can belief in the theory that HIV is a biological weapon lead to such destructive behavior? Natrass attributes this to the implication of the theory that scientists and clinicians have either been duped by a conspiracy or are themselves participating in it. This, in turn, “undermines confidence in the scientific consensus regarding the possibilities for the prevention and treatment of AIDS.”<sup>621</sup> If AIDS scientists are lying or so easily deceived, their pleas for “safer sex” might also be superfluous. The South African AIDS activist Edwin Cameron, for example, told the “taz” in 2010: “Theories like Segal’s have hindered prevention efforts in Africa for many years—people continue to believe that AIDS comes from the U.S., from tourists, from gay men.”<sup>622</sup> When it comes to ARV therapy, a belief in the theory of HIV as a biological weapon often leads to a search for scientifically untenable alternative therapies. This assumption prompted Jakob Segal to seek out effective alternative therapies outside of mainstream science. The same belief influenced Tshabalala-Msimanga in her promotion of alternative approaches in South Africa. A belief in Segal’s thesis or in other conspiracy theories can lead people living with HIV to the same search for—and perhaps rejection of—ARVs in favor of AIDS therapies whose effectiveness has not been proven,<sup>623</sup> – perhaps UVB, traditional African and Chinese remedies, or aspirin.

It stands to reason that the spread of the theory that HIV is a biological weapon—whether in its original Fort Detrick version promoted by the KGB or in the more scientific-sounding version put forward by the Segals—had unintended and unplanned side effects. The Fort Detrick disinformation campaign by the KGB and HV A, the CPSU and the SED—whose core message was disseminated by conscious or unconscious supporters such as the Segals—has outlived its originators, taken on a life of its own, and is now having an adverse effect on efforts to combat the HIV epidemic.

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tional AIDS Conference, Vienna, 2010, Abstract available online: <http://pag.aids2010.org/Abstracts.aspx?AID=14825>.

<sup>621</sup> Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12), p. 1 ff.

<sup>622</sup> Feddersen, Jan; Gast, Wolfgang: Propaganda and the “taz.” When the Stasi Used Us. In: taz, Jan. 9, 2010, p. 16 ff.

<sup>623</sup> Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12), p. 1 ff.; Bogart et al.: Conspiracy beliefs about HIV (note 620), pp. 648–655.

## 7 Summary

Based on newly accessible sources in the COM-DOS archive in Sofia and new discoveries and analyses of documents in the BStU archive, previously unknown details have been uncovered regarding the involvement of the HV A and the researcher couple Jakob and Lilli Segal in the KGB's AIDS disinformation campaign. There was a conspiracy between the KGB and the HV A to spread AIDS disinformation in the form of the Fort Detrick theory regarding the origin of HIV. Individuals such as the Segals served at least as unwitting disseminators in this campaign. A closer examination of the Segal thesis and the cycle of disinformation and misinformation regarding AIDS reveals the negative political and public health consequences of the thesis that HIV is a biological weapon.

In 1985, the KGB launched its campaign with the theory that the AIDS virus had been artificially created at Fort Detrick. It enlisted Eastern European “brother agencies”—other state security services of the Warsaw Pact—in the dissemination of its disinformation. The HV A's contribution consisted of preparing a “scientific study” on the origin of AIDS at Fort Detrick. The HV A/X/1 managed and carried out this task as part of a new project code-named “Denver.”

According to the current body of evidence, the Segals decided in 1985 to begin their research into the origins of AIDS independently of any direct influence from intelligence agencies. Jakob Segal was indirectly influenced by the KGB through articles in *\*Patriot\** and *\*Literaturnaya Gazeta\**, which attributed the alleged artificial origin of the HIV virus to Fort Detrick. Given his previous connections to Soviet agencies and the conceptual proximity of his research to the KGB's Fort Detrick thesis as presented in the aforementioned publications, direct influence by the KGB cannot be ruled out. However, there is no evidence to support this.

As early as the spring of 1986, Jakob Segal spoke of his research being used for propaganda purposes and named Hermann Axen, the Secretary for International Relations of the SED Central Committee, as the person who commissioned it. In June 1986, Axel Theisinger of HA VII of the Stasi wrote that Segal had forwarded his study on AIDS not only to Axen but also to HV A. This means that Jakob Segal, and perhaps his wife as well, participated in a broader collaboration between the CPSU, the SED, the KGB, and the Stasi to disseminate the Fort Detrick theory. The department for which Segal was “positively registered” was not the disinformation department HV A/X, but

The HV A/SWT/XIII/5 unit, responsible for espionage in the field of genetic and biotechnology. Based on the information provided to the HV A, Jakob or Lilli or both Segals were apparently registered by the HV A/SWT/XIII/5 unit as the contact person “Diagnosis.” There was a division of labor between HV A/SWT/XIII/5, which was responsible for research on genetic and biotechnology and AIDS—and, not coincidentally, also for the Segals—and HV A/X/1, which was responsible for active measures regarding AIDS (“Denver”).

An English version of the Segal study “AIDS: Its Nature and Origin” was distributed, along with a short introduction by an unknown author, in a mimeographed pamphlet titled “AIDS: USA-home made evil, NOT imported from AFRICA” in the run-up to and during the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare in early September 1986. It stands to reason that HV A played a role in the compilation and distribution of the brochure. The Segals’ study was regarded by HV A/X as part of its OVO “Denver”; Jakob Segal was aware of the Stasi’s interest in his study, and HV A was, at least from the Stasi’s perspective at that time, one of the commissioning parties for the Segals’ work. However the brochure was prepared and distributed, the KGB was satisfied with the Segals’ study and, in particular, with the rejection of the short-lived “green monkeys” theory. The work served to stir up anti-American sentiment in Africa. The Soviet secret service regarded the study and its dissemination as part of its broader AIDS disinformation campaign in collaboration with its “brother agencies.”

The Segals received assistance from the MfS, and in particular from HV A, in disseminating and defending their thesis and for their research. The MfS, in collaboration with the Central Committee of the SED, enforced a publication ban against East German scientists who questioned the Segals’ thesis, both in the West and in the East. There are several indications that the HV A/X attempted, after Harare, to pave the way for further publications by the Segals in Western countries. Kunhanandan Nair, who apparently published a manuscript previously prepared by the HV A/X as “The Devil and his Dart” in 1986, interviewed the Segals in the fall of 1986. Corresponding articles appeared in the “Nairobi Sunday Times,” the Senegalese “Le Devoir,” and the Indian “Blitz.” In India, an English version of the Segals’ study was published in book form in 1989, together with Nair’s interview. Heimo Claßen, a West German journalist based in Brussels, suggested to Jakob Segal that an anthology containing his study be published in the West, attempted to organize this, and submitted the Segals’ study to the journal “Wechselwirkung” for publication.

continued. At that time, Claußen was being monitored by HV A/X/1—the unit responsible for “Denver”—as part of the IMA operation “Joachim.” Before Claußen’s efforts could bear fruit, Stefan Heym’s interview with Jakob Segal was published in the “taz.” HV A/X played a role in this insofar as one of its OibEs alerted “taz” journalist Arno Widmann to the existence of the interview. HV A also informed other MfS units that it was interested in the publication of the interview in order to prevent them from taking any action against Heym.

The decision by Kuno Kruse of the “taz” to publish an anthology featuring Segal’s thesis and other contributions, however, was not a direct result of HV A’s activities. Nevertheless, HV A/X, under the case file “Denver,” forwarded a copy to its Bulgarian colleagues and presumably also to other “brother agencies” for their active measures and for AIDS disinformation. HV A/SWT/XIII/5 commissioned the co-author of Segal’s study, Ronald Dehmlow, as an IMS

“Nils” directly offered to assist the Segals with their research in August 1987. A second informant of HV A/SWT/XIII/5, “Jörg,” also assisted them at that time with research and trips to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. In April 1988, with the involvement of HV A/SWT/XIII/5, Dehmlow became head of a research center for medical biophysical chemistry at the Ministry of Health. Under Dehmlow, Jakob Segal was hired as scientific director and his wife Lilli as a documentation consultant. According to entries in the HV A database, there was a regular exchange of information between the research center’s staff and van de Sand, HV A/SWT/XIII/5.

In the second half of 1987, the KGB was forced to end its AIDS disinformation campaign or, at the very least, limit it to measures targeting the presence of U.S. military bases. Despite Falin’s resistance, even the “white propaganda” organs subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had to halt the campaign. This was prompted by Gorbachev’s efforts to conclude arms control and disarmament agreements with the United States. The Americans had demanded the cessation of the AIDS disinformation campaign as a precondition for summit meetings between Gorbachev and Reagan.

Despite similar protests from the State Department to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and against the advice of the KGB, HV A/X continued its active measures in the “Denver.” They received new impetus from the revelations of the U.S. NGO “Foundation for Economic Trends” (FET) under the leadership of Jeremy Rifkin. The FET had obtained a statement from a U.S.

Donald MacArthur, a scientist working for the U.S. Department of Defense, made this statement before a congressional committee in 1969. MacArthur spoke of the possibility of developing a virus against which the human immune system would have no defense. FET submitted a request to the Department of Defense for information on whether or not research into such a virus had been initiated. For Segal, MacArthur's statement served as proof of his thesis. In 1989, Segal undertook a lecture tour through the Federal Republic of Germany to announce precisely that. The HV A/X forwarded a German translation of the FET's request to the U.S. Department of Defense to its Bulgarian "sister organization" for use in future active measures, along with the latest edition of Segal's thesis in the form of an article in "Combative Materialism." In 1990, the Segals published a translation of MacArthur's statement and the FET's petition in their book "AIDS—The Trail Leads to the Pentagon."

The final and perhaps most ambitious active measure taken by HV A/X as part of the "Denver" operation was the co-financing of the film "AIDS – The African Legend" by Claßen, who was registered in the IMA operation "Joachim" of HV A/X/1, and the West German filmmaker Malte Rauch, who was registered in the "Denver" operation. With the help of its "sister agencies," HV A/X intended to distribute the film in India and other developing countries. The film, co-financed by WDR, was shown at least three times on West German television in 1989, and the English version, "Monkey Business: AIDS, the Africa Story," was broadcast on Britain's Channel 4. At the center of the film were Segal's thesis alongside the new "Evidence" from Rifkin's FET and the statements by Richard and Rosalind Chirimuuta regarding the allegedly racist motivations behind the "Africa theory" of the origins of AIDS. As part of "Den-ver," HV A/X sought to contribute to the dissemination of the Chirimuutas' work \*AIDS, Africa, and Racism\*.

Since the inception of the KGB's disinformation campaign on AIDS, there has been a cycle of disinformation and misinformation regarding AIDS, particularly between the KGB and its multipliers as well as conspiracy theorists in the U.S. This cycle did not cease with the end of the Cold War. Many of the multipliers of the Fort Detrick thesis remained active even after 1989—e.g., the Segals, Claßen, and Rauch—while others now began in earnest to disseminate the Fort Detrick thesis or its Segal variant. The Segal thesis became a topic in literature and film in Germany and Sweden in the 1990s. To defend

and to further disseminate their theory, the Segals presented themselves as “AIDS dissidents” in the former GDR, despite their privileged position compared to other East German scientists regarding publications in the West, despite the behind-the-scenes assistance of the Stasi (of which they were not supposed to know), and despite their appointment to a research position at the MfG in 1988.

The “AIDS dissidents” myth benefited not only the Segals, but also their new co-author Christoph Klug and the MLPD, of which he was a member. To this day, Klug, the MLPD, and the informally affiliated support group “New Approaches in HIV Therapy” have continued to promote this narrative

e. V. promotes Segal’s thesis and Jakob Segal’s proposal for early therapy with aspirin, even though its effectiveness is unproven and dangerous side effects are known. Not only the use of ineffective alternative therapies, but even the belief in the thesis that HIV is a biological weapon can hinder the protection and healing of those affected. Studies show that this group of people—characterized by “unprotected sex, non-adherence to antiretroviral treatment, and failure to get tested for HIV”—often exhibits pronounced risk-taking behavior.<sup>624</sup> Each of these behavioral patterns can have fatal consequences. As the controversy surrounding the 2012 AIDS song by the duo “Die Bandbreite”—a rap version of Segal’s theory—shows, conspiracy theories circulate among right- and left-wing extremists and can serve the interests of both political camps. In this context, it has been demonstrated that Segal’s thesis and its dissemination endanger not only physical health but also political health.

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<sup>624</sup> Natrass: AIDS Conspiracy (note 12), p. 1.

## 8 List of Abbreviations

AARC	Assassination Archives and Research Center (US)
ABS	Archive of the State Security Services (Czech)
AdW	Academy of Sciences
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (English – acquired immune deficiency syndrome)
AM	Active measure
AN	Work alias
AP	Associated Press
APN	Foreign Press Agency Novosti
(Russian) ARV	Antiretroviral drug
AZT	Azidothymidine (an ARV)
BV	District Administration (of the Stasi)
CAIB	Covert Action Information Bulletin (Washington, D.C., quarterly)
CBW	Chemical and biological weapons (English) CDC Centers for Disease Control (US)
COMDOS	Commission/Authority for the Investigation of the State Security (Bulgarian)
CREST	CIA Records Search Tool
(DE)	Service Unit
DS	State Security (Bulgarian)
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
EIR	Executive Intelligence Review
EMBO	European Molecular Biology Organization
FMdI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
GI	Secret Informant
HAART	Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy
(English) HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
HOT	Hematogenous Oxidation Therapy
HV	Headquarters
JAIDS	Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes
JRSM	Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine
People's Police Hospital	People's Police
Hospital KP	Contact person
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
KGB	Committee for State Security
(Russian) MfG	Ministry of Health

NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (US)
n.p.	unpaginated
NSC	National Security Council (US)
OibE	Officer on Special Assignment
OV	Operational Procedure
OVO	Object operation
RF	Red Flag
RoHo	Rosewood
SPID	AIDS (Russian)
SVG	Backup process
USAMRIID	U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
USIA	US Information Agency
UVB	ultraviolet radiation